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Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete
Less?
Merritt B. Fox † & Menesh S. Patel ††
0F

1F

This Article addresses an important question in modern antitrust: when
large investment funds have holdings across an industry, is competition
depressed?
The question of the impact of common ownership on competition has gained
much attention as the role of institutional shareholding has grown, with the funds
of the three largest management companies holding in aggregate approximately
21% of the shares of a typical S&P 500 firm. It is a source of acute disagreement
among scholars and policymakers, with some who believe common ownership
does depress competition seeking antitrust law reforms that would significantly
constrain how investment funds operate. Neglected in this vigorous debate,
however, is a careful analysis of how the persons who in the first instance
actually make the decisions that determine an industry’s competitiveness—firm
managers—would act differently in the presence of common ownership. In
essence, even if the common owners were to pressure firms to compete less, how,
if at all, would that change the structure of incentives within which these
managers work?
The forces that shape managerial decision-making at publicly traded firms
have been the object of intense study by scholars of corporate governance for
decades, primarily through use of managerial agency cost analysis. The question
of how the dynamics among firms in a concentrated industry affect its level of
competition has been subject to similarly intense scrutiny by industrial
organization economists. We use learning from both of these fields to conclude
that, at current levels, common ownership is unlikely to have a meaningful effect
on the managerial structure of incentives in ways that the industrial organization
theories suggest would affect competition. This conclusion thus cautions against
the proposed antitrust reforms, which would solve a non-problem while adding
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Introduction
Institutional holdings of the country’s publicly traded companies have
increased substantially over the last few decades. Today, some investment funds
have significant shareholdings in every public firm in each of the nation’s major
industries. This growth in common ownership has led to concerns that the funds
will pressure firms to compete less aggressively and to calls to extend the
antitrust laws so as to constrain the operations of these funds. Less attention,
however, has been given to whether the managers of these commonly owned
firms—the persons who in the first instance are making the decisions that
determine an industry’s competitiveness—would be likely to respond to any such
pressure. We conclude that they would not, which suggests the undesirability of
the proposed extensions of the antitrust laws with the costs they would impose
on the investment vehicles of choice for tens of millions of ordinary Americans.
The particularly striking feature of the institutionalization of share
ownership is the growth in the holdings of mutual funds and exchange-traded
funds (ETFs), a growth driven primarily by the increasing popularity of funds
that track broad-based indexes such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000. A
mutual fund and an ETF are each an investment vehicle open to the public that
is run by a management company, which typically runs a number of such funds.
Three management companies alone—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street
(the “Big Three”)—manage funds holding in aggregate approximately 21% of
the shares of a typical S&P 500 firm. 1 By dollar volume, the bulk of the funds
managed by the Big Three are broad-based index funds and, in turn, the Big
Three’s broad-based index funds dominate this market. Because each of the Big
Three has some actively managed funds and specialty index funds as well, the
proportion of shares held in aggregate by the funds it manages varies somewhat
from one corporation to the next. But, in a typical industry, each of the Big Three
holds approximately 4-9% of the shares of every one of the industry’s constituent
publicly traded firms. 2 In other words, for each firm in an industry, a meaningful
portion of the firm’s shares is controlled by entities that concurrently hold shares
in all the firm’s relevant competitors, a pattern ordinarily referred to as “common
ownership.” 3
An important literature has developed on this subject, noting the many
industries in the United States with oligopolistic market structures 4 and arguing
2F

3F

4F

5F

1.
Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership in America:
1980-2017, 13 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 273, 285 (2021).
2.
See id. at 285 fig.5 (showing that each of the Big Three held approximately 4%-9% of a typical
S&P 500 firm in 2017).
3.
Some scholars have referred to the common ownership issue as “horizontal shareholding.”
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016); Fiona Scott Morton
& Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026 (2018).
4.
An oligopoly is a market structure comprised of a few firms such that each firm possesses
some degree of market power. Across the spectrum of possible market structures, an oligopoly occupies
an intermediate position, situated between the economic ideal of a perfectly competitive market and a
monopoly.
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that the increase in common ownership in these industries substantially lessens
competition and consequently raises prices for consumers of their products. 5
Moreover, it is argued that the enhanced profits arising from this restricted
competition increase capital’s share of national income vis-à-vis that of labor,
worsening economic inequality. 6 All this happens, the literature suggests, even
in the absence of any communication or engagement by the common owners with
respect to the companies in which they are invested. 7 Concern about this claimed
decline in competition, and about the inadequacy of traditional antitrust law in
combatting this decline, has sparked regulatory proposals by leading scholars.
These proposals aim to ameliorate the perceived problem through laws or
enforcement actions by the federal antitrust agencies that would result in major
changes in the operations of mutual-fund and ETF management companies. 8
The literature arguing that increasing common ownership has lessened
competition—what we will label the “common ownership literature”—is not free
from controversy. Some scholars have questioned the persuasiveness of the
empirical studies offered in support of this proposition. 9 Others have questioned
whether the business model of the typical fund-management company would
lead it to take an action designed to lessen competition in an industry, whether it
be the choice of how to vote the shares of the competing firms held by its funds,
the sale of some such shares, or jawboning the managers of these firms while
6F

7F

8F

9F

10F

5.
See, e.g., José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common
Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) [hereinafter Airline Paper] (empirically evaluating the effects of
common ownership in the airline industry); José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate
Ownership and Bank Competition, 2021 FIN. MGMT. 1 [hereinafter Banking Paper] (empirically
evaluating the effects of common ownership in the banking industry). José Azar laid the groundwork for
the modern studies of common ownership in his 2012 dissertation. See José Azar, A New Look at
Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification (Sept. 2012) (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Princeton
University),
https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01w9505050d/1/Azar_
princeton_0181D_10324.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ9Y-F5S8].
6.
See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1291-1301.
7.
See, e.g., id. at 1270 (“[A]ctive communication is unnecessary for horizontal shareholdings
to have anticompetitive effects . . . . The anticompetitive incentive created by . . . horizontal shareholding
is purely structural, changing the price-setting incentive of each firm acting separately.”); Eric A. Posner,
Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional
Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 686 (2017) (“[T]hese effects [of common ownership] do not require
any communication among rivals in the product market, nor do they require any communication among
different investors; they simply involve the direct effects of the common ownership . . . .”); José Azar,
Martin Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Why Common Ownership Creates Antitrust Risks, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON. 6 (June 2017) (“[I]t is an absence of incentives to compete (rather than an increased incentive to
collude) that leads to reduced competition under common ownership.” (emphasis removed)). To be clear,
this Article does not contend that the Big Three do not actively communicate with or otherwise engage
with their portfolio companies. The Big Three themselves acknowledge such engagement on corporate
governance and other issues, though they do not suggest they communicate concerning an issuer’s level
of production, pricing, or other competitive issues. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, OUR 2021 STEWARDSHIP
EXPECTATIONS
(2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/our-2021stewardship-expectations.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCS5-PZRJ]. Instead, the Article’s objective is to
interrogate the claim in the literature that common ownership can generate competitive harm apart from
any such communication or engagement related to competitive issues.
8.
See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1302-04; Posner et al., supra note 7, at 708-10.
9.
See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 240-46 (2018); Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of
Common Ownership: We Know Less Than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 748-58 (2017).
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wielding the implicit or explicit threat of a negative vote or share sale. 10 A final
question is whether, even in the face of such actions by common owners, the
managers of firms in an oligopolistic industry would in fact make competitionaffecting decisions that are different from what they would have made in the
absence of common ownership. Although some attention has been paid to this
last question, 11 it still awaits the kind of rigorous analysis that it deserves. This
Article seeks to fill this void.
The question addressed here is important. Though unresolved as an
empirical matter, 12 the proposition that increased common ownership reduces
competition, and hence leads to higher consumer prices and exacerbates
economic inequality, has considerable power as an idea. As a result, the idea has
given rise to proposed significant policy changes that would come at a heavy cost
in terms of economic benefits that these types of investment vehicles can confer
on society, such as providing ordinary investors with an inexpensive means of
diversifying their investments and broadly participating in our thriving capital
markets. Given their costs, the proposed reforms should not be undertaken if a
deeper examination suggests that there is no problem to fix in the first place. We
conclude that this is exactly the case: common ownership, at least to the extent
found in most industries today, is very unlikely to significantly affect firm
managers’ competition-related decisions.
Our approach is as follows. The forces that shape managerial decisionmaking have been the object of intense study by scholars of corporate
governance for decades. For publicly traded corporations without a controlling
shareholder, this has meant that primary attention has been paid to the agency
costs of management: a cost-benefit analysis of the forces that limit the extent to
which corporate managers, to satisfy their personal desires, make decisions that
deviate from the ones that would maximize the value of the firm’s shares.
Similarly, the question of how the dynamics among firms in a concentrated
1F

12F

13F

10.
See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common
Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392, 1440-46 (2020); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the
Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2131-33
(2019). In a similar vein, others have questioned whether each common owner has sufficiently similar
interests that common owners can be treated as one, with each taking actions to encourage the same
competition-lessening decisions. See, e.g., Menesh S. Patel, Common Ownership, Institutional Investors,
and Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 311-14 (2018).
11.
See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 10; Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 236-37; Noah J.
Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks, FTC Hearing #8: Corporate Governance,
Institutional Investors, and Common Ownership 9-10 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1454690/phillips_-_ftc_hearing_8_opening_remarks_12-618.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVZ7-M7VU].
12.
For example, the Airline Paper, supra note 5, found competitive harm from common
ownership in the airline industry in the form of higher prices. However, subsequent studies found no
empirical relationship between the extent of common ownership and airline ticket prices. See, e.g., Pauline
Kennedy, Daniel P. O’Brien, Minjae Song & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence (Soc. Sci. Rsch. Network, Working Paper,
July 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008331 [https://perma.cc/R2XU3E42]; Patrick J. Dennis, Kristopher Geraldi & Carola Schenone, Common Ownership Does Not Have
Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry, J. FIN. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063465 [https://perma.cc/2DXZ-FEA7].
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industry affect its level of competition has been subject to intense scrutiny by
industrial organization economists. We seek to use learning from both these
fields to undertake a rigorous analysis of how, if at all, the existence of
shareholders in common would affect the decisions of the firm managers in an
oligopolistic industry.
Our decision to focus on managerial decision-making arises from the fact
that it is decisions by firm managers—not shareholders—that in the first instance
determine the firm behavior whose interaction results in an industry’s level of
competition. A fundamental feature of corporate law is that the corporation is
managed under the direction and authority of its board of directors, who in turn
choose the officials making day-to-day decisions (we will refer to the
combination of the board and these managers as “management” or
“managers”). 13 The common ownership literature relates to companies that have
shareholders in common. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the role
of shareholders is legally circumscribed and limited to certain discrete matters
such as electing directors (typically by majority vote), approving certain
extraordinary transactions, and voting on nonbinding proposals for management
consideration. An inquiry into how, if at all, common ownership can affect
competition in an industry thus requires subtler investigation. Given
shareholders’ limited powers, it is imperative to know how an increase in the
overlap of the shareholders of firms in an industry affects incentives facing these
firms’ managers when they make decisions affecting the industry’s level of
competition. Our conclusion is, very little, at least at the levels of common
ownership we have seen so far.
Our Article makes four key points, none of which has been given in-depth
attention in the debate so far concerning common ownership’s effect on
competition:
1. The common ownership literature’s critical assumption: firm managers
have a concern with boosting other firms’ net revenues. The theoretical and
empirical work suggesting that common ownership reduces competition rests on
the assumption that with common ownership, a firm’s management will seek to
maximize not its own firm’s net revenues alone, but the sum of its firm’s net
revenues and, to one extent or another, the net revenues of the other firms in the
industry in which its shareholders also have shares. In other words, the managers
act as if to serve the interests of a hypothetical “blended shareholder” that
represents some kind of averaging of the interests of the firm’s common and noncommon shareholders. This assumption is necessary for the conclusion that the
managers of each firm will set its output level lower, resulting in higher prices,
than they would in the absence of common ownership.
2. The basic conflict: a firm’s non-common shareholders will want a higher
level of output than would its common owners. Say that the big fund managers
manage funds that in aggregate hold about 21% of the shares of each firm in an
14F

13.
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oligopolistic industry. Suppose that the other 79% of each firm is held by noncommon owners, that is, shareholders who have no meaningful interest in any
other firm. 14 The 21% common shareholders would want each firm’s managers
to make output decisions that would maximize the firm’s own net revenues but
also some portion of rivals’ net revenues, that is, decisions that would result in
the industry’s aggregate output being closer to or at the level a firm monopolizing
the industry would choose. The 79% non-common shareholders of each firm
would want its managers to make decisions that would maximize the net
revenues of just that firm, the same goal that all shareholders would have if there
were no common shareholders.
The standard workhorse model of oligopolistic competition—the Cournot
model—assumes that each firm maximizes solely its own net revenues and
shows that if they do so, the industry’s level of production, though lower than
with perfect competition, will be higher than if the industry were a monopoly.
Thus, if the management of each firm adheres to the preferences of its 79% noncommon shareholders, each firm will produce at this same level of output as if it
had no common shareholders. In other words, prices would be the same as if
there were no common ownership, and the presence of common owners would
not reduce competition at all.
It is true that each firm’s non-common owners would be made better off if
all firms’ managers were to adhere to the preferences of the common owners and
suppress competition, because that would increase each firm’s net revenue.
However, this does not mean that the non-common owners at any given firm
prefer that their own managers restrict competition. Instead, if all firms are
suppressing competition in response to common ownership, the non-common
owners at any given firm would be made even better off if their firm managers
exploited the suppression in competition by the other firms and competed
aggressively. So, the relevant question is: given the conflicting interests of
common and non-common shareholders over firm output levels, what will
management do?
3. An oligopolistic firm’s managers’ own preferences are the higher output
level preferred by the non-common shareholders. In terms of their own
preferences, the managers of an oligopolistic firm would likely want to choose
the same higher level of output that the firm’s non-common shareholders would
want them to choose, not the level that the hypothetical blended shareholder
would wish them to choose. The managers’ positions in the firm are likely to
give them, to one extent or another, a variety of benefits that most people desire:
15F

14.
To focus the analysis, we start with a circumstance in which a firm’s shareholders are either
common owners, in the sense that they maintain meaningful interests in each of the firm’s relevant
competitors, or non-common owners, in the sense that they maintain no meaningful interest in any rival
firm. In actual markets, a firm’s shareholders may also include other shareholder types, such as
shareholders who maintain meaningful interests in some or all relevant competitors in the industry and at
levels that are proportionally different from those of the common owners. We discuss these shareholder
types at later stages of the Article. As we discuss there, the presence of those shareholders does not alter
the Article’s conclusions. See infra Sections II.D, III.D.
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compensation, perquisites, power, prestige, the pleasure of benefiting their
associates in the firm, a sense of doing social good, and so on. The extent to
which the firm can provide the managers with these desired benefits depends on
its residuals: the difference between what it can sell its output for and the cost of
producing that output, the maximization of which calls for the same higher level
of output preferred by the non-common shareholders. The net revenues of a
firm’s competitors in the industry provide its managers with none of these
benefits.
4. Management’s structure of incentives will determine the output level it
chooses, and the current level of common ownership will not alter these
incentives relative to a baseline of no common ownership. The incentives faced
by management have been, as noted above, the central focus of the study of
corporate governance over the last few decades, a study usually characterized as
concerning the agency costs of management. If common ownership were to alter
managerial decision-making, it would be through changing this already familiar
incentive structure, one that consists of a number of sticks and carrots. The sticks
involve a variety of threats: (i) a proxy fight (the threat of management being
voted out of office by its existing shareholders) and related mechanisms, such as
using proxy access to nominate competing directors and voting against
unopposed directors; (ii) a hostile tender (the threat that some person will
purchase enough shares to be able itself to vote management out of office); (iii)
an activist campaign (the threat that some person purchases a foothold stake in
the firm and then persuades a sufficient number of existing shareholders to vote
to replace management); (iv) sale of a share position (the threat of a shareholder
with a significant block of shares selling and thereby depressing the share price
to the disadvantage of the managers); and (v) fiduciary duties (the threat of a
derivative suit against the firm’s directors and officers claiming that they are not
acting in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders). The carrots
are the design of the managers’ compensation packages and the managers’ own
shareholdings in the firm. A careful examination of these sticks and carrots
suggests that none of them is changed meaningfully by the current level of
common ownership relative to there being no common ownership at all.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explore the standard Cournot
model, the economist’s workhorse model for studying oligopoly. We explain the
way the common ownership literature builds on this conceptual framework
through the use of particular assumptions about managerial behavior to construct
a modified Cournot model. The modified model, in turn, leads to the conclusion,
embraced by a number of antitrust law scholars, that common ownership lessens
competition.
In Part II, again using the Cournot model as a foundation, we show how,
for a firm with both common and non-common shareholders, there is basic
conflict between the output level that is in the best interests of the common
shareholders and the one in the best interests of the non-common shareholders, a
conflict that is glossed over in the common ownership literature.
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In Part III, we proceed to question the assumptions about managerial
decision-making employed in the common ownership literature’s modified
Cournot model. We consider the case of an oligopolistic industry where firms
have some common and some non-common owners and management faces
corporate governance constraints designed to limit managerial agency costs. We
examine how, in that scenario, each firm would make its output-level decision.
We conclude that common ownership, at least at current levels, will not result in
each firm in the industry choosing a different output level than if there were no
common ownership. Therefore, we argue, common ownership at current levels
will not generate appreciable competitive harm.
Part IV takes the lessons learned from the preceding analysis to comment
on previous contributions to both sides of the common ownership debate. Part V
concludes with an analysis of the policy proposals to extend the antitrust laws to
address the common ownership issue and our own view of the best way forward.
I. Conceptual Foundations: The Standard Cournot Model and the Common
Ownership Literature’s Modifications
In our exploration of conceptual foundations, we start by going back to first
principles and considering how firm managers in an oligopolistic industry would
make their output-level decisions if there were no common ownership and no
agency costs of management, with managers of each firm seeking to choose the
output level that maximizes their own firm’s net revenues. This involves an
explication of the standard Cournot model, the workhorse model used by
economists to study oligopoly. Under the standard model, each firm chooses
output levels such that prices are higher than with perfect competition, but lower
than if the industry consisted of a single monopoly firm.
We then repeat the analysis but with a new condition: a portion of each
firm’s shareholders are common shareholders, and the rest are not. Exactly
mimicking the common ownership literature, we momentarily assume that the
managers of each firm seek to maximize the interests of some hypothetical
blended shareholder. This involves an explication of a modified version of the
Cournot model that is the theoretical basis for the common ownership literature.
The outcome of this modified model is that, with each firm seeking to maximize
the sum of its own net revenues and some portion of the net revenues of all other
firms in the market, the industry’s firms will choose output levels such that prices
are higher than in a similarly concentrated oligopoly without common
ownership. This outcome demonstrates the central and provocative tenant of the
common ownership literature: even with no communication or coordination
among the common owners, common ownership reduces competition.
This exploration of conceptual foundations sets the stage for Parts II and
III. In Part II, again using the Cournot model as the foundation, we show how,
for a firm with common and non-common shareholders, there is a basic conflict
between the output level that is in the best interests of the common shareholders
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and the one in the best interests of the non-common shareholders. In Part III, we
consider what this conflict means in the real world, where there are agency costs
of management and a variety of corporate governance devices to minimize those
costs. We conclude that, at least at the current levels of common ownership,
managers’ resolution of the conflict will not result in firms choosing a different
output level than if there were no common ownership. As a result, we argue,
current levels of common ownership will not increase prices.
A. Oligopolistic Firm Behavior in the Absence of Both Common Ownership and
Agency Costs
As a foundational step in analyzing common ownership’s influence on
managerial incentives and objectives, consider first the baseline case in which
there is neither common ownership nor agency costs of management. Agencycost theory, which contemplates a situation where a principal seeks to have an
agent perform a task, is concerned with how the principal can get the agent to
perform this task in a way as close to the principal’s preferences as possible,
taking account of the costs of incentives, monitoring, and enforcement. 15 Applied
to corporate governance, the shareholders are the principal, and management is
the agent. 16 In this application, therefore, the starting point is that a firm’s
shareholders have, as a body, specified preferences. To assume no agency costs
means to assume that management can be costlessly incentivized to act perfectly
in accordance with these preferences.
In this Section, we will seek to establish two main points. First, in a world
with no common ownership, the idea that a firm’s shareholders prefer that
management maximize the firm’s own net revenues is a good working
assumption for a study of competition in an oligopolistic industry. Second, in
such an industry, if each firm’s management acts to maximize solely its firm’s
net revenues, there is an equilibrium level of output in the industry that is less
than if the industry were fully competitive and more than if it were a single-firm
monopoly.
1. Viability of the assumption that shareholders in a non-common
ownership world prefer their firm to maximize net revenues. Owning a share of
stock in a corporation confers one basic financial right: to receive dividends and
other distributions. The capacity of the firm to make dividend payments and
distributions over time is directly related to the size of its net revenues. Thus,
when it comes to a firm’s output-level decision, every shareholder of a
corporation, all else equal, should prefer that the corporation’s output level in
each period be the one that, given its then-existing productive capacity,
16F

17F

15.
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent
Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the
Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983).
16.
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976).
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maximizes its net revenues. Doing so is an essential part of maximizing the value
of the corporation’s shares. 17
In reality, even under the assumption of no common ownership that we
make in this baseline analysis, all things are not equal. Shareholders may have
idiosyncratic interests leading them to prefer that the firm produce above or
below the net revenue maximizing level. For example, a firm’s shareholder may
be an actual or prospective employee of that firm, a shareholder in another
corporation that supplies the firm or that consumes its product, or a consumer of
the firm’s product. 18 The shareholder also may have views on the social
consequences of the corporation’s output decision that are not captured at the
margin by the prices the corporation pays for its inputs or receives for its output.
This reality, however, does not mean that net revenue maximization is not
the operative preference of shareholders as principals in the principal-agent
relationship. For shareholders to have any role in the firm’s decision as to output
level (or as to any other matter), they need to coalesce on some preference. In
theory, this could be some weighted average of the preferences of each
shareholder, 19 but ascertaining this weighted average would be an impracticably
complex task. Coalescing instead on net revenue maximization is the sensible
solution since it is simple and, at least for firms with no common shareholders,
is unlikely to be far off from the level that would have been called for by the
weighted average approach. For one thing, the preferences of the different
shareholders are likely to cancel each other out to a considerable extent, with
some preferring an output level that is higher, and others preferring one that is
lower, than the net revenue maximizing level. Also, for most shareholders, the
interests that give rise to any differences in the preferred level of output are likely
to be distinctly second order, 20 in particular relative to the one interest—common
ownership—that we have ruled out in our current baseline analysis.
One additional factor strongly suggests that net revenue maximization is a
good working assumption when trying to model our hypothetical no common
ownership, no agency-cost firm’s output decision. Consider the situation back
18F

19F

20F

21F

17.
A share’s value is the discounted present value of all of the firm’s expected future dividends
and distributions. See RICHARD BREALEY, STEWART MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 83 (2020).
18.
For example, a shareholder who was a consumer of the firm’s output would want output
higher than the profit maximizing level because a higher output means a lower price. A shareholder who
was a potential supplier to the firm (such as a prospective employee, who supplies labor) would prefer, all
else equal, output to be above the net revenue maximizing level because that would amplify demand for
what the shareholder seeks to supply to the firm.
19.
Indeed, some prominent economic theorists argue that this is what managers should do as a
normative matter and that firm managers should maximize shareholder utility rather than shareholder
profit. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market
Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017). The issue before us, though, is the positive question of what
message shareholders as a body, at least in the absence of common ownership, are likely to send as their
preferences. We believe, as argued here and as is standard in the economics and common ownership
literature, that the message is to maximize the firm’s net revenues.
20.
These interests are further reduced in importance by the fact that many portfolio investors in
publicly traded stocks are not locked into their holdings long term. If an investor can instead sell, the share
price will be highest if the firm is maximizing its net revenues.
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when the firm becomes a public company through a public offering of equity.
The firm’s promoters can raise the most cash for the least dilution of their own
stakes in the company if the market expects that the firm will pursue net revenue
maximization. 21 That requires as credible a promise as possible that the firm will
in fact pursue this policy. So, through the choice of the firm’s corporate law
regime and the language of the articles of incorporation, it is likely that the
promoters will at least implicitly make such a promise because doing so is in
their interests. And, in the absence of agency costs, this promise will be fulfilled.
In essence, at the time of the offering, the promoters and the initial public
shareholders tie the firm to this arrangement long term because doing so allows
the most mutually advantageous transaction.
Given all this, it should come as no surprise that the assumptions that
shareholders prefer that their firm maximize share value and that, in the absence
of agency costs, managers seek to do so, are standard in the economics, 22
corporate finance, 23 and corporate governance 24 literatures. It is also considered
by many commentators on corporate law as an obligation of management, at least
where, as is usually the case, the corporate charter does not indicate to the
contrary. 25
We recognize, of course, that as our country’s deep social and
environmental problems have become more widely appreciated and our
government’s difficulties in meeting them more apparent, there has been a
reinvigorated interest in the “stakeholder model” of the corporation, which holds
that the purposes of the corporation should be broader than just to serve its
shareholders’ financial interests. 26 But even if many corporations shift their
behavior to be of service to this broader sense of social responsibility, it is
unlikely to affect the analysis of common ownership’s impact on competition
2F

23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

21.
In the simplest model, at the time of a firm’s initial public offering, all of its shares are owned
by its entrepreneurial founders and initial private investors (the “pre-offering holders”). The firm engages
in the public offering in order to fund new real investments costing some set dollar amount. The shares
that are sold in the offering will give their holders a pro rata claim on the future cash flows generated by
the firm, thereby diluting the claims of the pre-offering holders. The greater the expected future cash flows
of the firm with its new investment, the smaller is the number of shares, relative to those owned by the
pre-offering holders, that will need to be sold in order to raise the set dollar amount. This is because each
such share can sell for more. The expectation that the firm will be run in a share value maximizing way
translates into greater expected future cash flows than an expectation that it will not be run in this way.
For a discussion of the role that mandatory periodic disclosure can play in this process, see Merritt B. Fox,
Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles, 66 DUKE L.J. 673, 697-99 (2016).
22.
Profit maximization is the standard economic assumption of firm behavior across all market
structures. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 317 (perfectly competitive firms maximize profits), 384 (monopolists maximize profits), 387400 (oligopolists maximize profits) (1995).
23.
See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 17, at 8-9.
24.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). Corporate law scholarship is evolving on this issue. See infra note 26 and
accompanying text.
25.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (AM. L. INST. 2005) (“[A] corporation should have as its objective the
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).
26.
See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From
Shareholder Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419, 2427-42 (2020).
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that follows here. To start, most such changes in corporate behavior would be
unrelated to a corporation’s output decision. In fact, producing at the net revenue
maximizing output level would generate the most resources for pursuing these
broader social objectives. Moreover, even where the output level is implicated,
different social concerns might call for producing either above or below the net
revenue maximizing level. 27 Finally, and even more relevant to this Article’s
inquiry, the issue being addressed here is the effect, if any, of the increase in
common ownership on an industry’s output level. Consider a corporation seeking
to serve broader social concerns and compare its output decisions with and
without common owners. There is no obvious reason why the effect of common
ownership on that firm’s output decision (if any) would be any different than the
effect of common ownership on the output decision of a firm that instead is
concerned solely with choosing an output level that maximizes its own net
revenue. In this regard, it is important to note that net revenue maximization is
assumed to be the preference of shareholders in the common ownership
literature’s own baseline treatment of the situation where there is no common
ownership. 28
2. Where the managers of each firm in an oligopolistic industry act to
maximize solely the firm’s own net revenues, there will be less than full
competition. We have established that in the absence of both common ownership
and agency costs of management, a good working assumption is that the
management of each firm in an oligopolistic industry will choose the output level
that maximizes its own firm’s net revenues. And, indeed, this is exactly what
each of the seminal economic models of oligopolistic competition assumes. 29
An oligopolistic industry is one that has few enough firms that each firm’s
choice of its own level of output will meaningfully affect the industry’s aggregate
production and price levels. A model of economic competition predicts how, in
the absence of collusion, firms in such an industry will behave and what, as a
result, the industry’s aggregate level of output and price will be. We analyze
these questions using the Cournot model. We choose this model from among the
available possibilities for two reasons. First, the Cournot model is a standard
model used in industrial organization economics. 30 Second, as discussed in the
next Section, the Cournot model, in modified form, provides the theoretical base
for the common ownership literature’s analysis of what an oligopolistic
industry’s production and price levels will be when there are common owners. 31
28F

29F

30F

31F

32F

27.
See supra note 20.
28.
See infra Section I.B.
29.
As discussed in infra Section I.A.2.a, this is true of the classic Cournot model, in which firms
choose their respective output levels without colluding. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly
Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 329, 333-39 (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds.,
1989). It is also true of the other major models of oligopoly, such as the Bertrand model (in which firms
choose prices). See, e.g., id. at 343-48.
30.
See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability
Rules for Product Markets, 30 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 371, 377 (2012) (“The modeling of oligopoly is not a
settled topic in economics, but the workhorse of industrial organization is the Cournot model . . . .”).
31.
See infra Section I.B.
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Some common ownership scholarship uses other industrial organization models
of firm behavior, 32 but the Article’s analysis carries over to those other market
structures. 33
a. The Cournot model. The Cournot model seeks to ascertain the
equilibrium level of output for each firm in an oligopoly. In the original, noncommon ownership version, the Cournot model assumes that management
chooses its level of output in order to maximize solely its own firm’s net
revenues. In determining what output level does this, the managers of each firm
face a tradeoff. On the positive side, each extra unit of output is another unit to
sell, adding to the firm’s total revenue. On the negative side, each extra unit adds
to the industry’s total level of output. In doing so, it depresses the price at which
all of the industry’s output will be sold, whether produced by this firm or some
other firm in the industry. 34 By putting the positive and negative together, it is
typically the case that each additional unit of output increases total revenue by
less than the unit before, that is, the firm faces a declining marginal revenue
curve. Economic theory postulates that the managers of a net revenue
maximizing firm will set their level of output at the level such that the marginal
revenue (𝑀𝑅) gain in producing an additional unit corresponds to the marginal
cost (𝑀𝐶), that is, where 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶.
In making this calculation, however, the managers will need to recognize
that what its firm’s marginal revenue will be for any given level of its own output
depends on the aggregate output level of all the other firms in the industry. The
greater the aggregate output from the industry’s other firms, the less the firm in
question can add to its revenues by selling another unit. In other words, the firms’
respective output levels are interdependent: each firm’s marginal revenue curve
determines its level of output (given its marginal costs), but the level of its
marginal revenue curve will depend on the output decisions of all the other firms
in the industry.
The Cournot model seeks to find an equilibrium set of outputs for the firms
in the industry given this interdependence. Conceptually, the Cournot model
starts by asking, for each firm in the industry, what level of output it would
choose, given different possible aggregate levels of output of all the other firms
in the industry. The equilibrium arises from the fact that each firm, in choosing
its level of output, is subject to two opposing considerations. On the one hand,
given any particular aggregate level of output by all the other firms, the more the
firm in question constrains its own output, the higher the price at which it can
sell each unit of that output. On the other hand, the more the firm constrains its
3F

34F

35F

32.
See, e.g., Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership
and Competition in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 28350, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28350 [https://perma.cc/NM4Z-GR6S] (using the
differentiated-goods Bertrand model).
33.
See infra note 135.
34.
The conclusion that a higher level of industry output leads to a lower price is the result of
the standard economic assumption that the demand for the typical good is depicted by a downward-sloping
demand curve.
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output, the higher will be the marginal revenue curves of the industry’s other
firms and so the higher will be their respective levels of output. And the higher
their levels of output, the lower will be the price at which the firm in question
will be able to sell each unit of its output.
The result of this interaction is an aggregate industry level of production
that is lower than it would be if the industry were perfectly competitive: each
firm will constrain output somewhat so that, unlike with perfect competition, the
industry price will be higher than each firm’s marginal cost. But the aggregate
production level will be higher than if the industry consisted of a single
monopoly firm. Unlike in the monopoly situation, where the single firm fully
feels each additional unit’s price depressing effect on the revenues of the industry
as a whole, in an oligopoly, each individual firm feels the price depressing effect
of an additional unit of output only on its own revenues, not the additional unit’s
price-depressing effect on the revenues of the other firms.
b. An example of a Cournot equilibrium for an oligopolistic industry. To
see the workings of the model numerically, consider an example of an industry,
widgets, that consists of two firms, Firm A and Firm B. Suppose the demand
curve for widgets is depicted by the equation 𝑃 = $10 − 𝑄/10,000, where 𝑄 is
the aggregate widget production of the two firms and 𝑃 is the resulting price for
any given 𝑄. Also suppose, for ease of exposition, that the firms have identical
costs, with 𝑀𝐶 equal to $2 per additional unit, whatever its level of production.
Let 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵 represent production amounts for Firms and A and B, respectively.
In this market environment, for a given level of Firm B’s output, 𝑞𝐵 , Firm
A will choose its quantity, 𝑞𝐴 , such that its quantity decision maximizes its net
revenues. And, for a given level of Firm A’s output, 𝑞𝐴 , Firm B will choose its
quantity, 𝑞𝐵 , such that its quantity decision maximizes its net revenues. Denote
the expected equilibrium output quantities of 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵 to be 𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 ,
respectively. 35 Calculations in the Appendix show that 𝑄𝐴 = 𝑄𝐵 = 26,667. At
that quantity combination, each firm is maximizing its net revenues, given the
quantity choice of the other firm. It follows that the system is in equilibrium: at
these respective output levels, neither firm can increase net revenues by
producing either more or less than its current output, holding fixed the other
firm’s quantity decision. In the Cournot oligopoly, therefore, market output is
53,333 widgets and so the market price is 𝑃 = $10 − 53,333/10,000 = $4.67.
Because each widget costs $2 to produce, each firm makes net revenues of
26,667 ∗ ($4.67 − $2.00) = $71,201, with industry net revenue being 2 ∗
$71,201 = $142,402.
c. Output and profits if the industry were purely competitive. Suppose that
instead of an Cournot oligopoly, the market structure instead is perfectly
competitive. Rather than just two firms, there are many firms, each with the same
cost structure as Firms A and B such that no firm exercises any market power.
In this case, the market price will equal the marginal cost of $2, instead of the
36F

35.

More precisely, 𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 denote the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game.
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Cournot price of $4.67, and industry output will be 80,000, instead of the Cournot
level of 53,333. 36 In other words, even without collusion, the Cournot model
suggests that prices will be higher, and industry output lower, in an oligopoly
than if the industry were perfectly competitive. And because, in the example,
each unit sells for its marginal cost of $2, each firm earns zero economic profit
with perfect competition.
d. Output and profits if the industry were a monopoly. Finally, take another
extreme and suppose that instead of a perfectly competitive market, the market
is monopolized. There is just a single producer with the same cost structure as
Firm A and Firm B. The monopolist makes its output decision in order to
maximize its net revenue but faces no competitive constraints from rival firms.
In this case, industry output is 40,000, which is lower than the Cournot oligopoly
industry output of 53,333, and the market price is 𝑃 = $6, which is higher than
the Cournot market price of $4.67. 37 Because each widget costs $2 to produce,
the monopolist’s net revenue, which is the total industry net revenue, is 40,000 ∗
($6.00 − $2.00) = $160,000, instead of the Cournot total industry net revenue
of $142,402.
e. Forces working to keep the oligopoly output level above, and price
below, the monopoly levels. Because the market price in a Cournot oligopoly is
lower than the price if the industry were a monopoly, the shareholders of each
firm, even without common ownership, would be better off if the managers of
all the industry’s firms further constrained their respective individual-firm output
decisions such that they equaled, in the aggregate, the monopoly output level.
But this will not happen, given the managerial incentives that we elaborate in
Part III. Instead, the Cournot level of output is what will result in a no agencycost world in which the shareholders of each firm seek to have their managers
maximize their own firm’s net revenues. 38
To see why in terms of our example, remember that we concluded that Firm
A and Firm B’s combined net revenue of $142,402 is less than the $160,000 of
industry net revenue if the industry was monopolized. Thus, the shareholders of
each firm would be better off if both firms restricted their respective outputs so
37F

38F

39F

36.
In a perfectly competitive market comprised of firms each with the same constant marginal
cost, the market price equals firms’ $2 common (and constant) marginal cost. Rearranging the industry
demand curve of 𝑃 = 10 − 𝑄/10,000, 𝑄 = 100,000 − 10,000𝑃. With 𝑃 = $2, total industry output is
𝑄 = 100,000 − (10,000 ∗ 2) = 80,000.
37.
The net revenue maximizing monopolist choses the level of output whereby 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 = $2.
Given the industry’s demand curve, whereby 𝑃 = 10 − 𝑄/10,000, the monopolist’s total revenue, 𝑃 ∗ 𝑄,
equals (10 − 𝑄/10,000) ∗ 𝑄 = 10𝑄 − 𝑄 2 /10,000. So, its 𝑀𝑅 curve (the first derivative of the total
revenue curve) is 10 − 2𝑄/10,000. Equating 𝑀𝑅 and 𝑀𝐶 means choosing a level of output such that
10 − 𝑄/5000 = 2, which means that 𝑄 = 40,000. Given the demand curve 𝑃 = 10 − 𝑄/10,000, 𝑃 =
10 − 40,000/10,000 = $6.
38.
Our analysis focuses on single period interactions between rival firms, rather than repeated
interactions over time. Economic theory predicts that if firms engage in repeated interactions over time,
they may be able to sustain the monopoly level of production. See, e.g., James W. Friedman, A NonCooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 11-12 (1971). We focus on single
period interactions because that framing allows us to highlight the key properties of the model used in the
common ownership literature, which similarly focuses on single period firm interactions. See infra Section
I.B.
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that, in the aggregate, output was reduced to the 40,000 level a monopolist would
produce. The firms could accomplish this, for instance, by evenly splitting the
monopoly output level of 40,000 widgets, with each producing just 20,000
instead of 26,667. Then, with the price of widgets at $6, each firm’s net revenue
would be $80,000 instead of $71,201, and the shareholders of the two firms
would be better off than under the Cournot level of production.
But this is all merely hypothetical. The firms will not be able to sustain an
output decision where they restrict output and each produce just 20,000 widgets.
The reason is that, at that output combination, each firm has an incentive to
exploit the other firm’s decision to produce at low levels by itself producing more
than the specified production of 20,000 units.
To see this, start the story with each firm producing 20,000 widgets and ask
whether this is an equilibrium situation. That is, would each firm be content with
its specified output decision, given the output decision of the other firm? The
answer is no: there would be incentives for each firm, in seeking to maximize its
net revenues, to increase its output level from 20,000. Consider this first from
the point of view of Firm A. As the calculations in the Appendix show, if Firm
B produces 20,000 widgets, then the output decision that maximizes Firm A’s
net revenues is 30,000 widgets, not 20,000 widgets, and Firm A’s profits will be
$90,000, more than the $80,000 if it had constrained itself to 20,000 units.
This opportunistic incentive is not limited to just Firm A; it is available to
Firm B by parallel reasoning. As a consequence, any output combination in
which the firms together produce less than the expected Cournot output level of
production cannot be a sustained outcome. Each firm would have an incentive to
produce more than the specified Cournot amount.
f. Conclusion. In sum, the Cournot model predicts that oligopoly leads to
competitive harm in that, even without any collusion among firms in an industry,
firm managers’ aggregate output decisions (and therefore market price) are
worse for consumers than if the market had been perfectly competitive. Because
firm net revenues are higher than if the industry were perfectly competitive, the
firms’ shareholders are each made better off by the associated competitive harm
to consumers. At the same time, the Cournot model predicts that the resulting
market price is lower, and total industry output higher, than if the industry
consisted of a single monopolist. Each oligopolistic firm’s drive to maximize its
own net revenues will prevent the firms in the industry from constraining their
respective output levels to make aggregate industry output equal to the monopoly
level or any amount less than the expected Cournot level of production. The
question we turn to next is, does common ownership change any of this?
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B. Oligopolistic Firm Behavior in the Absence of Agency Costs Where
Managers Are Directed to Maximize the Interests of Each Firm’s Blended
Shareholder
The common ownership literature has a single key conclusion: common
ownership in an oligopolistic industry diminishes managerial incentives to
compete, even in the absence of collusion or communication. 39 Managers, it is
claimed, constrain each commonly owned firm’s level of output below that
predicted by the standard Cournot model discussed in Section I.A above. That in
turn increases aggregate industry profits and impairs consumer welfare by
lowering output and increasing prices so that they are closer to monopoly levels.
The common ownership literature’s key conclusion, though, rests on a critical
assumption: when the managers of a firm with common owners set their output
level, they take account of the effect of that decision on the net revenues of their
rival firms. This substitutes for the standard model’s assumption that each firm’s
managers seek to maximize only its own firm’s net revenues.
We describe here this modified Cournot model on which the common
ownership literature relies. As in Section I.A, and as in the common ownership
literature itself, we assume for now a no agency-cost world. The management of
each firm with common owners is still the agent. In contrast to the standard
Cournot model, however, the assumed objective of the principal–the firm’s
shareholders–is to maximize the sum of the firm’s own net revenues and some
portion of the net revenues of its rivals, not just its own net revenues alone. In
setting up the modified model in this way, our analysis mirrors the common
ownership literature in all relevant respects.
Developing the modified Cournot model described in this Section
illuminates key aspects of the common ownership literature that have largely
gone unnoticed. As Part II explains, there are significant differences between the
interests of a firm’s non-common shareholders and its common shareholders.
The common ownership literature’s use of the modified Cournot model glosses
over this conflict by assuming, without serious exploration, that managers will
make output decisions based on some kind of averaging of these differing
interests. In Part III, we show that this assumption is implausible. There, we
introduce the reality of the agency costs of management and consider the
mechanisms in our corporate governance system to deal with these costs. At least
at current levels of common ownership, these very same mechanisms most
probably also resolve the conflicts of interest between common and non-common
shareholders entirely in favor of the non-common shareholders, resulting in
output decisions no different than if there were no common ownership. Thus, the
exposition in this Section of the modified Cournot model lays a necessary
foundation for Part IV, where we engage the common ownership literature
directly and critique the empirical and other findings that purportedly verify its
40F
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conclusions. From this discussion, it will become clear that the case has not been
made that common ownership is actually generating competitive harm sufficient
to justify the significant policy changes advanced in this literature, a topic we
turn to in Part V.
1. The concept of the “blended shareholder.” In the modified Cournot
model, as in the standard one, each firm’s managers must decide their level of
production in order to maximize shareholder welfare, taking as given the output
decisions of rival firms. The primary difference between an environment with
common ownership and one without is that the shareholders, as already noted,
have divergent preferences as to how vigorously their managers should compete.
In the absence of common ownership, all firm shareholders prefer that their
managers maximize own-firm net revenues. However, with common ownership,
shareholders who hold significant interests across the industry’s firms, that is,
the common owners, 40 prefer that their managers compete less than the noncommon owners prefer, all else equal, because the reduction in competition
inures to the benefit of rival firms in which the common owners also have
ownership interests.
The common ownership literature assumes that this conflict is resolved in
a particular way. The literature modifies the Cournot model so that firm
managers, instead of maximizing own-firm revenues, seek to maximize the
financial interest of a hypothetical shareholder who represents the average
shareholder in a particular sense. 41 We will refer to this hypothetical shareholder
41F

42F

40.
Thus, our definition of common ownership corresponds to the ownership patterns of the Big
Three. We focus on the Big Three because they have been the primary subject of academic and other
discussions of the common ownership issue. See, e.g., Martin C. Schmalz, How Passive Funds Prevent
Competition, ERIC POSNER (May 18, 2015), http://ericposner.com/martin-schmalz-how-passive-fundsprevent-competition [https://perma.cc/VQ3X-82CY]; Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier GarciaBernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate
Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 299-300 (2017); Matt Levine, They’re All
Friends in the Index, BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2020, 11:59 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2020-07-20/they-re-all-friends-in-the-index [https://perma.cc/FM3U-TCG4]; David
McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund Takeover, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
9, 2020, 1:40 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/the-hidden-dangers-ofthe-great-index-fund-takeover [https://perma.cc/MS2N-LYRD]. We discuss other investor types in
Section II.D infra.
41.
The modified Cournot model used in the common ownership literature is based on an
economic model of managerial decision-making developed by Daniel O’Brien and Steven Salop, known
as the O’Brien-Salop model. See Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial
Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000); see also Julio J.
Rotemberg, Financial Transaction Costs and Industrial Performance (Apr. 1984) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/47993/financialtransac00rote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HEK3-U66J] (developing a similar model). At the most general level, O’Brien and Salop
seek to describe the objective of firm managers when there is overlap in ownership interests across rival
firms. O’Brien and Salop acknowledge that managerial objectives in a common ownership environment
will be determined by the particular corporate governance structure of the firm. However, to illustrate
their approach, O’Brien and Salop assume that firm managers in common ownership environments act to
maximize the weighted average of shareholders’ portfolios across all firms in the relevant market. See
O’Brien & Salop, supra, at 609-10. O’Brien and Salop do not specify how managers actually weigh
shareholders’ portfolios, recognizing that their general formulation “includes a wide variety of plausible
assumptions about the amount of influence each owner has over the manager of the firm.” Id. The common
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as the “blended shareholder” and refer to the assumption that firm managers seek
to maximize the wealth of this hypothetical shareholder as the “blendedshareholder assumption.” More specifically, in our discussion of how this idea
underlies the common ownership literature, we will assume that the blended
shareholder of a given firm derives her wealth from a particular portfolio. That
portfolio is comprised of shares of the given firm and its competitors in
proportions reflecting the given firm’s shareholders’ average holdings in the
given firm and in each of its competitors. 42 In other words, a firm’s managers
will, in the absence of agency costs, make their output decision with the goal of
maximizing the combined value of all the firm’s shares plus all the shares of the
firm’s rivals held by its own shareholders. 43
2. The modified Cournot model where each oligopolistic firm’s managers
act to maximize the wealth of the blended shareholder. The common ownership
literature, as discussed, analyzes managerial output decisions in common
ownership, no agency-cost environments using a Cournot model that is modified
to assume that managers maximize the welfare of the blended shareholder, rather
than, as is assumed in the standard model, own-firm net revenues. We will lay
out the concept of this modified model followed by an example that shows how
the aggregate industry level of production will be below what the standard
43F

4F

ownership literature, however, takes the O’Brien-Salop model one step further and assumes that managers
weigh shareholders’ portfolios in the particular manner discussed below. See infra note 43. In both the
O’Brien-Salop model and the particular version of it used in the common ownership literature, see infra
note 43, shareholders’ returns are taken as payouts of firms’ net revenues in proportion to the shareholders’
ownership interests. See O’Brien & Salop, supra, at 609. See also Patel, supra note 10, at 289-92
(describing the O’Brien-Salop model and working through a numerical example).
42.
For instance, suppose that there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B, each with 100 shares
outstanding. Firm A’s shareholder 1 is a common owner who owns 20 shares of A and 20 shares of B,
while Firm A’s shareholder 2 is a non-common owner who owns the remaining 80 shares of A but no
shares of B. The blended shareholder associated with Firm A, then, is a hypothetical shareholder who
owns 50 shares of A and 10 shares of B.
43.
The common ownership literature assumes that the firm’s corporate governance structure
causes managers to make output decisions that take some account of their effects on the value of the
common shareholders’ holdings in rival firms, but only fractionally in proportion to the common
shareholders’ portion of the total shareholder franchise. That is, the common-ownership literature
parameterizes the O’Brien-Salop model, see supra note 41, so that firm managers are assumed to
maximize the weighted average of shareholders’ portfolio value, where the weights are proportional to
shareholders’ interests in the firm. See, e.g., Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1525 (“[W]e calculate the
control share of shareholder i in firm j . . . as the percentage of the sole and shared voting shares of firm j
held by shareholder i.”); Posner et al., supra note 7, at 683 (setting control shares equal to shareholders’
fractional ownership interests). Our formulation instead assumes that firm managers fully take these
effects into account and thus suggests that common ownership leads to greater reductions in competition
than is suggested by the particular specification used in the common ownership literature. We choose our
formulation because it more simply lays out how the common ownership model predicts that common
ownership impairs competition. This is a better starting point than making an unexplored guess as to how
a firm’s corporate governance structure would resolve differences between common and non-common
shareholders. We then undertake the needed exploration in Part III of how the corporate governance
structures of publicly traded U.S. firms, at least at the current levels of common ownership, would in fact
resolve these differences. We conclude there that such firms’ managers, rather than taking full account of
effect of an output decision’s impact on the value of the shares of rivals held by the firm’s shareholders,
as in our formulation here, or some fractional account, as specified in the common ownership literature,
in fact take no account of these effects.
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Cournot model suggests, which is the key conclusion of the common ownership
literature.
Recall our description in Section I.A of the standard Cournot model, where
each firm’s managers focus solely on their own firm’s net revenues. There, the
managers face a tradeoff in their determination of the firm’s level of output. On
the positive side, each extra unit of output is another unit to sell, adding to the
firm’s total revenue. On the negative side, each extra unit adds to the industry’s
total level of output and, as a consequence, depresses the price at which all of the
industry’s output will be sold. Now, suppose instead that a firm has shareholders
in common with the other firms in the industry and, following the dictates of the
common ownership literature, the managers of the firm seek to maximize the
wealth of the firm’s hypothetical blended shareholder. In that case, the managers
view as amplified the negative side of the tradeoff, that is, the decline in the price
of the industry’s product due to their firm’s additional unit of production. This is
because the hypothetical blended shareholder is itself a common owner. 44 Thus,
when the firm’s managers maximize the blended shareholder’s wealth, they care
not only about the effect of the decline in price on their own firm’s net revenues,
but also, given the common shareholder’s interest in the firm’s rivals, on the
effect, to some extent, of its extra unit of production on the net revenues of the
other firms as well.
This analysis reveals a key implication of the modified Cournot model
deployed in the common ownership literature. Because a firm’s managers are
assumed to maximize the welfare of a hypothetical blended shareholder who
itself will be a common owner, in no agency-cost environments they make output
decisions that maximize the sum of the net revenues of their own firm plus some
portion of the net revenue of the other firms in the industry in which the firm’s
shareholders also maintain an ownership interest.
Label as 𝑂𝐹𝑁 (other firm negative effect) the negative effect on the value
of the blended shareholder’s portfolio arising from the extra unit of output’s
impact on the net revenues of the other firms in the industry whose shares the
blended shareholder holds. The managers of the firm in question will then set its
level of output such that the gain in its own revenues from producing an extra
unit, that is, its 𝑀𝑅, equals the marginal cost of producing this extra unit, that is,
𝑀𝐶, plus this other negative effect, 𝑂𝐹𝑁. In other words, it will choose the level
of output where 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 rather than where 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. This amplified
downside will lead the firm to choose a different point in the tradeoff between
having an extra unit to sell and that extra unit’s depressing effect on price. Since
45F

44.
This follows from the definition of the blended shareholder. The blended shareholder is
assumed to derive wealth from a portfolio that equals the average portfolio of the firm’s shareholders after
weighting those portfolios in proportion to the shareholders’ interests in the firm. Therefore, if any of the
firm’s shareholders is a common owner, then the blended shareholder also has ownership interests in rival
firms.

157

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 39:101 2022

𝑀𝑅 decreases with each additional unit of output, the output level at which
𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 will be below the output level at which 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. 45
In making this calculation, the managers of the firm in question will need
to recognize that the level of the firm’s own marginal revenue curve will depend
on the aggregate output level of all the other firms in the industry. The modified
Cournot model, like the standard model explored in Section A, again seeks to
find the equilibrium set of outputs for the firms in the industry given this
interdependence. The modified model, though, reflects the fact that firms with
common ownership will be concerned to some extent with the net revenues of
the other firms in the industry. In deciding the optimal level of production, the
firm’s managers still face the same trade-off as in the standard Cournot model:
an output restriction raises the price at which that firm can sell each unit of its
production, but the higher price also encourages an output expansion by the
firm’s rivals. At the Cournot equilibrium level of output, whether in the standard
model or the modified one, these competing considerations net out so that the
firm’s managers have no incentive to decrease (or increase) production in order
to maximize their own firm’s net revenue, taking as given the output decisions
of rival firms.
Common ownership, however, introduces another consideration in the
firm’s decision-making calculus: because a production curtailment generates an
immediate price increase, rival firms, who are now able to sell their own output
for more, are made better off by the output restriction. Thus, because the firm in
question places a positive value to some extent on the net revenues of those rival
firms, the output curtailment is associated with an additional benefit to the firm
that is absent if its managers focused solely on their own net revenues, as is the
case in the standard Cournot model. The implication of this additional benefit
from output curtailment is an aggregate industry level of production that is lower,
and a product price that is higher, than they would be if each firm instead sought
to maximize solely its own net revenues. In other words, aggregate output would
be constrained to a level closer to what it would be if the industry consisted of a
single monopoly firm.
In sum, the common ownership literature assumes that firms in common
ownership environments maximize the portfolio of a hypothetical shareholder
who also has an ownership interest in one or more other firms in the industry.
Because of this, each firm values not only its own net revenues but to some extent
the net revenues of those rival firms. 46 To this extent, the firm directly feels each
additional unit of production’s price-depressing effect on the net revenues of
other firms, not just on its own, when it makes its output level decision. Thus,
although the aggregate industry level of production is not as low as it would be
with a monopolist, where this price depressing effect would be fully felt, it is
46F

47F

45.
A curve representing 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 for each possible level of output will be higher at all output
levels than a curve representing just 𝑀𝐶. Thus, the 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 curve will intersect the firm’s downwardsloping 𝑀𝑅 curve at a lower level of output than does the 𝑀𝐶 curve.
46.
The extent to which the firm values the net revenues of its rivals under the modified Cournot
model is embodied in a term ordinarily referred to as kappa, which is discussed in infra Section IV.C.
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lower than where each firm seeks to maximize solely its own revenues, where
the price depressing effect is not felt at all beyond its impact on each firm’s own
net revenues. 47 Common ownership, therefore, is expected to generate
competitive harm under the modified Cournot model used in the common
ownership literature. 48
2. An example of a modified Cournot equilibrium for an oligopolistic
industry with common ownership and managers as faithful agents for a firm’s
blended shareholder. To see the workings of the model numerically, consider, as
in Section I.A, an example of an industry, widgets, that consists of two firms,
Firm A and Firm B, with an industry demand curve for widgets again reflected
by 𝑃 = $10 − 𝑄/10,000. Each firm again has identical costs, with 𝑀𝐶 equal to
$2 per additional unit, whatever its level of production.
The difference in the industry from the example in Section I.A is that the
two firms have a certain amount of common ownership. Assume that Firms A
and B each has 1,000,000 shares outstanding and three investors each holds
70,000 shares of A and 70,000 shares of B. Assume that for each firm the
remaining shares are held by non-common owners. At this distribution of
ownership, the hypothetical blended shareholder of Firm A owns 0.21 shares of
Firm B for every share of Firm A they own. We will analyze this situation in
accordance with our formulation of the modified Cournot model used in the
common ownership literature. That is, a firm’s managers, in making their output
decision, are assumed to maximize the wealth of this hypothetical blended
shareholder. The managers of Firm B are assumed to do the mirror image of this.
The decision rule of the managers of each firm can be restated in terms of
net revenue maximization, consistent with the discussion above. 49 Let 𝑞𝐴 ′ and
𝑞𝐵 ′ represent production amounts for Firms A and B, respectively. For a given
level of Firm B’s output, 𝑞𝐵 ′, Firm A will choose its output, 𝑞𝐴 ′, such that its
decision maximizes the sum of its net revenue and 21% of the net revenue of
Firm B. Firm B will make an analogous choice in mirror-like fashion.
48F

49F

50F

47.
The exception would be the case of complete common ownership where every shareholder
maintains an equal interest in every other firm in the industry. In this case, because the blended shareholder
would have the same ownership interest in each industry firm, the firms would jointly act like a
monopolist.
48.
More recent common ownership models have more nuanced findings. For instance, in a
recent paper, José Azar and Xavier Vives evaluate the properties of a modified Cournot model in a general
equilibrium setting, rather than a partial equilibrium as in the original O’Brian-Salop model. See José Azar
& Xavier Vives, General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership Structure, 89 ECONOMETRICA 999
(2021). Their theoretical model predicts that an increase in common ownership can have either pro- or
anti-competitive effects depending on whether the rise in common ownership is attributed to increased
intra-industry common ownership or increased inter-industry common ownership. See id. at 1002. For
another recent extension of the common ownership model, see C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan,
Endogenous Choice of Stakes Under Common Ownership (Aug. 30, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3914327 [https://perma.cc/JFQ5-M479] (extending
the O’Brian-Salop model to allow investors to choose their stakes in competing firms).
49.
The only way that A’s output decision for a given period affects A and B, and hence the
value of A shares and B shares, is through its effects on these firms’ respective costs and revenues in that
period. Dollar for dollar, on a per-share basis, the greater the net revenues, the greater the addition to share
value.
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Denote as 𝑄𝐴 ′ and 𝑄𝐵 ′, respectively, the expected equilibrium values for
the two Firms A and B. As the calculations in the Appendix show, 𝑄𝐴 ′ = 𝑄𝐵 ′ =
24,921. At that quantity combination, each firm, given the quantity choice of the
other firm, is maximizing the sum of its own net revenues and 21% of the
revenues of the other firm. It follows that the system is in equilibrium: at these
respective output levels, neither firm can further optimize its specified objective
by producing either more or less than its current output, holding fixed the other
firm’s quantity decision.
C. Comparing No Common Ownership with Common Ownership Under the
Blended-Shareholder Assumption
Compare the equilibrium amounts in the modified Cournot model example
just above with the equilibrium results in Section I.A, which involved the same
market and same two firms but with the managers of each seeking to maximize
solely their own firm’s net revenues. Without any collusion or even
communication between the firms, competition will decrease where the
managers faithfully pursue the interests of the hypothetical blended shareholder
and seek to maximize the sum of their own firm’s net revenues and 21% of the
net revenues of the other firm. Specifically, each firm will produce 24,921
widgets instead of 26,667 widgets, the price will be $5.02 rather than $4.67, and
industry profits will be $150,522 instead of $142,402. 50 At the same time, the
industry is still more competitive than if the industry were monopolized or if the
two firms colluded to each produce half the output level that a monopoly would
choose, that is, 20,000 units each.
This important output-reduction implication of the blended-shareholder
assumption is intuitive. The common ownership literature assumes that common
ownership leads Firm A’s managers to care about the effect of their output
decision not only on Firm A’s net revenues but also, in part, on Firm B’s net
revenues. Each extra unit by Firm A, because it adds a unit to the total industry
output of 𝑄, reduces the price at which Firm B can sell each unit of its output by
$(1/10,000), 51 and thus reduces B’s net revenue by $(1/10,000) ∗ 𝑞𝐵 ′. For a
given level of production by Firm B, Firm A produces less than if its managers
were focused only on their own firm’s net revenues, because lower output by
Firm A serves to benefit Firm B in the form of a higher market price. The
blended-shareholder assumption generates similar incentives on the part of Firm
51F

52F

50.
With each firm producing 24,921 widgets, the total market output is 49,842, and so the
market price is 𝑃 = $10 − 49,842/10,000 = $5.02. Since each widget costs $2 to produce, each firm
earns net revenues of $24,921 ∗ ($5.02 − $2.00) = $75,261, with industry net revenue being 2 ∗
$75,261 = $150,522. For the calculation of the comparable figures in the standard Cournot model
example, see Section A of the Appendix.
51.
This can be seen from the inverse demand curve, 𝑃 = $10 − 𝑄/10,000. Thus, 𝑑𝑃/𝑑𝑄 =
−1/10,000, that is, the price goes down by $1/10,000 for each additional unit supplied to the market by
the industry.
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B’s managers, who, for a given production decision by Firm A, produce less than
if they were focused solely on maximizing own-firm net revenues.
II. The Conflict Between Common and Non-Common Shareholders
In Part I, we explored the implications for competition arising from the
assumption that the managers of a corporation with common ownership care to
some extent about its output decision’s impact on the net revenues of its rivals.
We have no quarrel with the reasoning by which this assumption leads to the
conclusion that common ownership decreases competition. It is important to
realize, however, this assumption is just that, an assumption and not an
established fact. This assumption concerns the firm’s corporate governance
structure and how, in that structure, managers resolve the differing preferences
of the firm’s various shareholders. As O’Brien and Salop, the authors of the
modified Cournot model on which the common ownership literature relies, state:
[W]here the owners have conflicting views on the best strategy to pursue,
the question arises as to how the objective of the manager is determined.
Ultimately, the answer turns on the corporate-control structure of the firm,
which determines each shareholder’s influence over decision-making
within the firm. 52
53F

In this regard, our Article makes two key points. First, as we will
demonstrate in this Part, there are sharp differences between the interests of a
corporation’s common and non-common shareholders with respect to its optimal
level of output. Second, as we will work out in Part III, a study of the corporatecontrol structures of publicly traded corporations strongly suggests that this
conflict is being resolved entirely in favor of the interests of the non-common
shareholders, at least given current levels of common ownership. This means that
the managers of firms with common owners will choose the same, standard
Cournot model output level that they would have chosen in the absence of any
common shareholders. In other words, the assumption that firm managers
account for the net revenues of their rivals in making output decisions is not
plausible. As a consequence, the conclusion that common ownership lessens
competition has not been plausibly established by the common ownership
literature.
A. The Interests of the Common Shareholders
The basic conflict relating to the optimal level of output between common
and non-common shareholders can be illustrated by a return to the example we
used in Part I with Firms A and B. Again, Firms A and B each has 1,000,000
52.

O’Brien & Salop, supra note 41, at 609.
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shares outstanding and there are three investors, the common shareholders, who
each holds 70,000 shares of A and 70,000 shares of B. The remaining shares of
each firm are held by persons, the non-common shareholders, who do not hold
any shares in the other firm. 53
Consider the output level of Firm A that would maximize the wealth
position of the common shareholders for a given production decision by Firm B.
In the numerical example under consideration, because each common owner
owns one share of B for each share it holds of A and thus receives the same
allocation of Firm A’s net revenues as those of Firm B—7% of the net revenues
of each firm—each common owner cares solely about the two firms’ combined
net revenue, rather than how much either firm individually earns. The two firms’
joint revenue is maximized when they jointly emulate a monopolist.
Accordingly, for a given level of production by Firm B, every common owner
prefers that Firm A produce an amount such that the two firms together jointly
produce at the monopoly level. By analogous reasoning, for a given production
decision by Firm A, the common owners prefer that Firm B produce an amount
such that the firms’ aggregate output corresponds to the monopoly output. 54
If the common owners were able to dictate perfectly the objectives of the
two firms’ managers, they therefore would have the firms jointly produce at the
monopoly level, which, as shown in Part I, is 40,000. The market price would be
$6.00 and, given that the marginal cost of every widget is $2.00, each firm would
earn $4 on every unit produced. Total industry profit would therefore be
$160,000 and each common owner would receive a total payoff of $11,200, 55
54F

5F

56F

53.
We consider the circumstance in which some of a firm’s shareholders maintain a meaningful
interest in some but not all of the firm’s rivals below. See infra Section II.D.
54.
Our numerical example assumes, for simplicity, that the common owners’ fractional interests
in Firm A are the same as their fractional interests in Firm B. If that were not the case, then the common
owners would not necessarily prefer that the two firms jointly emulate a monopolist. For instance, if the
common owners had high ownership interests in Firm A and low ownership interests in Firm B, then the
joint-monopolist output would not be the common owners’ preferred output decision. At the jointmonopoly level of production, those common owners would be made better off, for instance, if Firm A
increased production. That would cause Firm A’s net revenue to increase at the expense of Firm B’s, and
the common owners are the beneficiary of a relatively large portion of that gain to Firm A’s net revenue
and incur a relatively small portion of the loss to Firm B’s net revenue. However, a circumstance in which
the common owners had different fractional interests in the two firms would not alter the substantive
analysis in the Article concerning the implausibility of a meaningful linkage between common ownership
and competitive harm. We have also assumed that the common owners are homogeneous, in that they
maintain identical ownership interests across the firms in the industry. This assumption, which is also
made for expositional ease, does not accord with actual common ownership levels. See, e.g., infra note
110 (showing that the Big Three’s ownership interests in the airline industry differ). These differences in
common ownership patterns reinforce the Article’s conclusion that current common ownership levels are
not generating meaningful competitive harm. Heterogeneity in common owners’ holdings would generate
conflicts among the common owners as to their preferred level of competition abatement. These intercommon owner conflicts of interest would further serve to check common ownership’s potential for
competitive harm. See infra Section III.C.1.
55.
Because industry profit is $160,000 and each common owner earns 7% of each firm’s net
revenue, a common owner, between its holdings in the two firms, receives $160,000 ∗ .07 = $11,200.
Although the two firms could evenly split production at 20,000 units each, the common shareholders
would be indifferent as to the actual split so long as the total between the two was 40,000 units.
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which is higher than if managers instead maximized the welfare of the blended
shareholder. 56
57F

B. The Interests of the Non-Common Shareholders
Now consider the output level of the two firms that would arise if firm
managers instead maximized the wealth position of the firms’ non-common
shareholders. Neither firm’s non-common shareholders hold shares in the other
firm, so their wealth position is not affected by the impact of their firm’s output
on the net revenues of the other firm. Thus, the output levels that would emerge
if managers focused on maximizing the wealth of their firm’s non-common
owners (call those amounts 𝑞𝐴𝑁𝐶 and 𝑞𝐵𝑁𝐶 ) would be the same output levels we
calculated in Part I with regard to the standard Cournot model. So, 𝑞𝐴𝑁𝐶 =
𝑞𝐵𝑁𝐶 = 26,667. 57 As a result, the price of widgets would be $4.67 and each
firm’s net revenue would be $71,201. 58
58F

59F

C. Embedding the Differing Interests in the Context of Oligopolistic
Competition
It may occur to the reader that if the common shareholders prevailed in both
firms and managed to incentivize the managers of each firm to fully account for
the impact of the firm’s output decision on the net revenues of the other, they
could make the firm’s non-common shareholders better off than if the managers
of both firms adhered to making output decisions in accordance with the noncommon owners’ preferences. In other words, the non-common shareholders
would gain if the two firms jointly emulated the monopoly level of production.
As we have just seen, in that case, the price would be $6.00 and, supposing that
the two firms split the monopoly level of production, each firm’s net revenue
would be $80,000. That would leave the non-common shareholders of each firm
better off than if the managers of each adhered to their non-common
shareholders’ preferences in making their respective output decisions—in which
case, as we have also just seen, the price would be $4.67 and each firm’s net
revenue would be $71,201. 59 So, one might conclude, the non-common
shareholders of each firm should accede to having their firm’s managers adhere
to the common shareholders’ preferences.
It is important to see the logical flaw in this thinking. It is true that each
firm’s common and non-common shareholders alike would be delighted if the
60F

56.
As shown in supra Section I.B, under the blended-shareholder assumption total industry
profit is $150,522. Each common owner therefore receives $150,522 ∗ .07 = $10,536.54.
57.
See Section A of the Appendix (providing calculations for the standard Cournot model).
58.
See id.
59.
While not the case in our running example, if common ownership were to cause the net
revenues of one or more of the firms in the industry to fall, then those firms’ non-common owners will
have been made worse off by the common ownership levels of production.
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managements of both firms each made decisions with the aim of maximizing the
sum of all the profits of A plus all the profits of B, in which case the firms
collectively would produce 40,000 widgets, and the price would be the same as
if the industry were monopolized. If the management of either firm adheres to
the interests of its 79% non-common shareholders, however, this will not occur
because of the dynamics of oligopolistic competition. The non-common
shareholders of each firm would want the other firm to constrain its output to a
level below what it would be in the total absence of common ownership. But the
non-common shareholders would then be better off if their own firm takes
advantage of this opportunity to increase market share and has a level of output
that actually is in excess of what it would have been in the total absence of
common ownership. 60
To see this point in terms of our example, suppose that the two firms are
adhering to the preferences of the common owners and are each producing
20,000 units. Consider what the non-common shareholders of Firm A would
want the firm to do, given that Firm B is constraining itself to producing 20,000
widgets. From the analysis in Part I, we know that if Firm B is producing 20,000
units, the output that maximizes Firm A’s net revenues is 30,000. The price
associated with this aggregate output of 50,000 would be $5 and Firm A’s net
revenues would be $90,000, 61 which is $10,000 higher than if Firm A produced
20,000 widgets. So, in this situation, the non-common shareholders of Firm A
would not in fact be better off if they acceded to common shareholders and
agreed to the managers of Firm A choosing the output level that the common
shareholders would prefer.
More generally, if Firm B constrains output below the standard Cournot
level, the non-common shareholders of Firm A would want A producing at or
above the 26,667 standard Cournot model output level, not below that level. 62
The mirror image of this story applies if we started with Firm B as the example
instead. So even though the non-common shareholders would be better off if both
firms constrained themselves to producing at the joint monopoly level that would
prevail if the common shareholders of both firms dictated the production level
than if the firms produced at the standard Cournot level of production, the noncommon shareholders of each firm act independently of the non-common
shareholders of the other. For this reason, if the two firms were to accede to the
preferences of the common shareholders and constrain output to the joint
monopoly level, the non-common shareholders of each firm would want their
managers to revert to the maximization of own-firm net revenues. That decision
rule would make the non-common shareholders even better off, given that the
61F

62F

63F

60.
The reasoning here parallels the reasoning in Section I.B as to why firms in non-common
ownership environments will not be able to sustain a collusive outcome in which they emulate a
monopolist.
61.
See id.
62.
See infra Appendix fig.1 (showing that for every 𝑞𝐵 less than 26,667, the output that
maximizes Firm A’s net revenue is greater than 26,667).
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other firm is adhering to the preferences of the common shareholders and
constraining its level of production.
D. Semi-Common Owners
So far, we have envisioned the firm’s shareholders as being one of two
types: the common owners, who maintain a meaningful interest in each of a
firm’s relevant competitors; and non-common owners, who maintain no
meaningful interest in rival firms. In actual markets, there may be shareholders
with different ownership profiles. Scholars have documented an increase in
diversification by institutional investors generally. 63 For this reason, in a given
industry there likely will be at least some shareholders who maintain non-trivial
but relatively small interests in some or all relevant competitors in the industry
and at levels that are proportionally different than those of the common owners. 64
The presence of these shareholders, who we refer to as semi-common owners,
does not disrupt the conclusions from the analysis so far.
Just as with the firm’s common owners and its non-common owners, there
is a conflict of interest between the firm’s common owners and its semi-common
owners. Namely, the semi-common owners will not necessarily want firm
managers to agree to the quantity curtailment preferred by the common owners.
To see this, consider our running numerical example with the given demand and
cost functions, but suppose that there are three firms (A, B, and C) and that, in
addition to common and non-common owners, there are three semi-common
owners, as follows:
64F

65F

Common owners
Firm A’s non-common owners
Firm B’s non-common owners
Firm C’s non-common owners
Semi-common owner 1

Firm A
21%
64%

Firm B
21%

Firm C
21%

64%
71%
8%

8%

Semi-common owner 2

5%

4%

4%

Semi-common owner 3

2%

3%

4%

Now, given this shareholding configuration, suppose that the common
owners somehow prevailed at all three firms and incentivized each firm’s
managers to fully account for the effect of the firm’s output decision on the net
revenues of the other two firms. As discussed above, this would result in the three
firms emulating a monopolist. Suppose that the three firms equally split the
63.
See, e.g., Backus et al., supra note 1.
64.
By two shareholders having proportionally different holdings, we mean that for at least one
pair of firms in the industry, the shareholders’ ratios of holdings of those two firms are unequal.
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monopoly level of production, so they collectively sell 40,000 widgets. In this
case, because the net revenue of each firm will be higher than if the three firm
managers focused on maximizing just their own firm’s net revenues, the semicommon owners are made better off by the curtailment in competition, at least
in the first instance.
Nonetheless, just like the non-common owners, each of the semi-common
owners would reject the common owners’ desired output choice. The reasoning
is similar to the analysis above regarding the divergence in the preferences of the
common owners and the non-common owners. Consider, for instance, semicommon owner 1. Because that shareholder maintains an interest in Firms A and
B but not C, it would prefer that the managers of Firms A and B exploit the
curtailment in competition by Firm C by jointly expanding production. That
expansion in production would collectively benefit Firms A and B at the expense
of Firm C. This, in turn, would benefit semi-common owner 1, because in
contrast to the common owners, semi-common owner 1 does not care about the
effect of Firms A and B’s level of competition on Firm C’s net revenues. Semicommon owners 2 and 3 do maintain interests in all three firms in the industry,
but their interests in the three firms are proportionally different than the common
owners’ interests. For this reason, they too would reject the common owners’
desired output curtailment in favor of some other output configuration. 65 As this
analysis shows, the sharp conflict of interest between the firm’s common owners
and its non-common owners would remain despite the presence of any semicommon owners. Moreover, the presence of semi-common owners adds another
dimension to shareholders’ conflicts of interest. As embodied in the example
above, a semi-common owner, in addition to not agreeing to the output reduction
preferred by the common owners, may not share the output preference of any
other semi-common owner. 66
6F

67F

65.
Consider, for instance, semi-common owner 2. While the common owners have the same
proportional interests in each of the three firms, semi-common owner 2 has a greater proportional interest
in Firm A than in Firm B or Firm C. Therefore, if the common owners were somehow to cause the three
firm managers to split the monopoly output, then semi-common owner 2 would reject that output choice.
For instance, if the three firms are producing at the split-monopoly outcome (i.e., 40,000/3 widgets), then,
holding fixed the production amounts of Firms B and C, semi-common owner 2 would want the manager
of Firm A to produce more than the split-monopoly outcome preferred by the common owners. Similar
analysis shows that semi-common owner 3 likewise would reject the common owners’ preferred output
configuration in which the three firms emulate a monopolist. But here, because semi-common owner 3
has a relatively smaller interest in Firm A than in Firms B and C, if the three firms were to produce at the
split-monopoly outcome (i.e., 40,000/3 widgets), then, holding fixed the production amounts of Firms B
and C, semi-common owner 3 would want the manager of Firm A to produce less than the split-monopoly
outcome.
66.
The three semi-common owners do not share the same desired output levels because their
interests are proportionally different. The reasoning is parallel to why none of the three semi-common
owners shares the same desired output level as the common owners.
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III. Oligopolistic Firm Behavior in the Presence of Both Common Ownership
and Agency Costs
The fundamental conflict between a firm’s common and non-common
owners unearthed in the previous Part can be further leveraged to evaluate this
Article’s central question: in the real world today, is common ownership likely
to affect the level of competition in an oligopolistic industry? We start the answer
to this question with the observation that, in the first instance, the managers of
each firm in an oligopolistic industry, not the shareholders, are the persons who
make their respective firms’ output decisions and in so doing determine the
industry’s level of competition. In turn, it is the preferences of these managers
and the incentive structures within which they operate that determine the output
levels that they set. Thus, the task ahead of us is understanding whether, in the
real world, the rise in common ownership has significantly changed these
incentive structures. If it has not, it has not affected competition.
The preceding two Parts set the stage by exploring the relationships
between firm managerial objectives and competition and between the interests
of non-common versus common shareholders. Part I began by showing that in
an industry with no common ownership, it is reasonable to attribute to each
firm’s principal—its body of shareholders—the objective that the firm’s output
be set at the level that maximizes that firm’s net revenues. In the absence of
agency costs, the firm’s managers—the agent of these shareholders—will seek
to meet that objective. Based on the assumption that this is in fact what managers
do, the standard Cournot model predicts that the total output in an oligopolistic
industry will be lower, and prices and firm profits higher, than if the industry
were perfectly competitive, but not in each case by as much as if the industry
instead consisted of a single monopoly firm.
We then went on to explore the modified Cournot model employed by the
common ownership literature. This modified model assumes that where there is
common ownership, the managers of each of the industry’s firms will be the
agents of some hypothetical blended shareholder and follow an altered objective:
maximizing the sum of the firm’s own net revenues and some portion of the net
revenues of the industry’s other firms. Given this assumption, the modified
model shows that output will be yet lower, and prices and industry profits yet
higher, than what is predicted by the standard Cournot model. This result is the
primary conclusion of the common ownership literature: even without collusion
or communication, common ownership can generate competitive harm.
Part II shows, however, that taking the aggregate output level of all the other
firms in the industry as given, this blended-shareholder assumption papers over
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the sharp difference between the output level that each firm’s non-common
shareholders would want and the one its common shareholders would want. 67
This then leaves the final step in the analysis, which is the subject of this
Part: what is the expected shape of managerial incentives in light of this
divergence in shareholder preferences, where the firm’s non-common owners
prefer that the manager maximize own-firm net revenues, while the common
owners prefer otherwise?
In the real world, of course, firms have agency costs of management.
Because managers have their own objectives, shareholders, whether noncommon or otherwise, cannot simply dictate their managers’ decisions and
expect full compliance. The whole modern law and economics approach to the
corporate governance of dispersed shareholder firms has been to study the legal
institutions and market practices that have arisen to prompt managers to act more
in accord with shareholder desires. This approach recognizes, first, that creating
incentives to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders and
monitoring managerial behavior are costly and, second, that some residual
divergence will persist because, beyond some point, the cost to the shareholders
of further efforts to counter any divergence of interests will exceed their benefits.
This literature has developed without regard to the possible effects of common
ownership and under the assumption that the interest of the shareholders of each
firm is to maximize solely its share value.
The key conclusion of this Article is that introducing common ownership
does not change things, at least at current common ownership levels. Where a
firm has both common and non-common shareholders, these very same
institutions and practices work to assure that managers remain incentivized to
maximize own-firm net revenues, and thus advance the interests of the firm’s
non-common owners, not the interests of some mix of common and non-common
owners, as is assumed in the common ownership literature. As a consequence, at
least with the current extent of common ownership in most industries, the level
of competition should be no different than if there were no common ownership,
that is, the level predicted by the standard Cournot model depicted in Part I.
68F

67.
It is worth reiterating that, while it is the case that non-common owners may be made better
off if all firm managers maximized the wealth of the blended shareholder, and therefore all managers
competed less, that by itself is irrelevant. Instead, if all firm managers were to maximize the wealth of the
blended shareholder, then the non-common owners of every firm could be made even better off if their
firm’s managers exploited rivals’ production curtailment and instead produced at the non-common
owners’ preferred level of output, that is, maximized own-firm net revenues. In other words, taking as
given the decisions of the other firms’ managers, a firm’s non-common owners are always better off if
their managers produce at the higher, non-common owner preferred level of output.
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A. Managers’ Own Preferences: The Higher Output Level Preferred by the
Firm’s Non-Common Shareholders
At least since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ classic 1932 work, 68
corporate law scholars have recognized that managerial objectives and
shareholder objectives may diverge along a variety of dimensions. 69 The
potential divergence relevant to the common ownership debate is the extent of
competition, which is embodied in the Cournot model as the firm’s level of
output. The starting point in trying to determine the effect, if any, of common
ownership on competition is to identify the output levels that the managers would
choose if they set them simply in response to their own interests.
One likely possibility is that managers prefer the same higher level of
output that the firm’s non-common shareholders would want them to choose.
The managers’ positions in their firm are likely to give them, to one extent or
another, a variety of things that most people desire: compensation, perquisites,
power, prestige, the pleasure of benefiting their associates in the firm, a sense of
doing social good, and so on. The extent to which the firm can provide the
managers with these desired things depends on its residuals: the difference
between what it can sell its output for and the cost of producing that output, the
maximization of which calls for the same higher level of output preferred by the
non-common shareholders. 70 The profits of the other firms in the industry
provide them with none of these things, assuming, as would normally be the case,
these managers do not themselves own significant numbers of shares in their
competitors. Of course, even if, as we suggest, the managers and non-common
shareholders share the same interest in the firm’s output decision, there can be
divergences of interest between managers and the non-common shareholders
with regard to other matters such as the level of compensation, perquisites, effort,
risk taking, interested party transactions, and new investments. But with regard
to these other matters, the interests of the common and non-common
shareholders should be aligned since no other firm’s profits are affected and each
kind of shareholder has the same interest in whatever portion of the firm’s
residuals are not consumed by managers.
69F

70F

71F

68.
ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
69.
See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS,
AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144-45 (2000) (summarizing the primary ways in which managerial and
shareholder incentives may diverge).
70.
See, e.g., MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC
ECONOMY 121-23 (1987). The idea that the corporation has two types of claimants on its residuals is
worked out in Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984). Managers will also
have an inherent desire to maximize net revenues because of labor-market considerations. Directors who
want board seats at additional companies and officers who want more lucrative positions at other firms
will shape their current conduct to make those future opportunities more likely. Because the non-common
owners at those other firms will constitute the substantial majority, and because those non-common
owners will want their managers to be net revenue maximizers, a director or officer will be more likely to
obtain those future opportunities if they can demonstrate a track record of delivering high net revenues at
their current company.
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It could be argued that even if the managers have the same interests as the
non-common shareholders with respect to wishing to maximize solely the firm’s
own residuals, managers may prefer to work less rather than more, all else
equal. 71 If so, when the two interests are combined, managers would prefer a
lower level of output than the non-common shareholders. It is far from evident,
however, that a decrease in production would allow leisure-inclined managers to
work less. After all, firm managers generally are not directly involved in the
output-generation process, so their own labor effort would be unaffected by the
firm’s production amount, at least in the first instance. 72 In any event, whether
managerial apathy may cause some managers to prefer an output amount less
than the amount preferred by the firm’s non-common owners is irrelevant to
answering common ownership’s competition question. Instead, an answer to that
question requires a determination of whether common ownership serves to
amplify any already-existing divergence between managerial incentives to
compete and own-firm net revenue maximization. We turn to this question in the
next Section.
72F

73F

B. The Structure of Managerial Incentives
The incentives faced by management have been, as noted above, the central
focus of the study of corporate governance over the last few decades, a study
usually characterized as concerning the agency costs of management. 73 This
extensive body of research has documented and analyzed an intricate incentive
structure consisting of a number of sticks and carrots that shape managerial
incentives, including incentives to compete. 74 If common ownership were to alter
74F

75F

71.
In economic models of managerial decision-making, this possibility is usually modeled with
the manager’s utility being derived from both their compensation and effort, such that greater levels of
effort generate lower levels of utility for a fixed amount of compensation. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note
15, at 57.
72.
Stated in terms of the Cournot model, the managers just set the level of 𝑄, while the
production of that designated amount is left to others in and outside the firm. At the same time, there may
be second-order considerations that generate a negative relationship between the amount the firm produces
and managers’ level of leisure. For instance, if the firm produces less, perhaps leisure-motivated managers
have more free time because they do not have to concern themselves with as many purchase orders or
employees to manage. We do not take a stand on the net effect of these potentially countervailing
influences, as their resolution does not affect the Article’s conclusions. In the next Part of the Article, we
turn to a related argument in the common ownership literature, namely that common ownership creates
competitive harm because managers enjoy living “the quiet life.” See infra Section IV.B.
73.
See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 769 (2017) (“For the last forty years, the problem of
agency costs has dominated the study of corporate law and governance.”).
74.
For a survey of this corporate governance infrastructure, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). Like the common ownership literature,
the corporate governance literature assumes that managers are economically rational agents. Our analysis
assumes the same. However, there is a literature that questions managerial rationality. See, e.g., Douglas
A. Bosse & Robert A. Phillips, Agency Theory and Bounded Self-Interest, 41 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 276
(2016). If managers are instead assumed to be irrational economic actors, then the effects of common
ownership on managerial incentives are indeterminate.
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managerial decision-making with regard to output, it would be through its effects
on this already-familiar incentive structure.
The sticks of this incentive structure involve a variety of threats: (i) a proxy
fight (the threat of management being voted out of office by its existing
shareholders) and related mechanisms, such as using proxy access to nominate
competing directors and voting against unopposed directors; (ii) a hostile tender
(the threat that a person will purchase enough shares from current shareholders
to be able itself to vote management out of office); (iii) an activist campaign (the
threat that a person purchases a foothold stake in the firm and then persuades a
sufficient number of existing shareholders to vote to replace management); (iv)
a sale of a share position (the threat of a shareholder with a significant block of
shares selling and thereby depressing share price to the disadvantage of the
managers); and (v) fiduciary duties (the threat of a derivative suit against the
firm’s directors and officers claiming that they are not acting in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders). Students of the role played by block
shareholders often list “jawboning” as an additional influence on management, 75
but this will only be effective if backed up by one of the foregoing threats. 76
The carrots in the managers’ structure of incentives are the design of the
managers’ compensation packages and the managers’ own shareholdings in the
firm.
76F

7F

C. Today’s Level of Investment Fund Common Ownership Is Unlikely to Alter
Management’s Structure of Incentives and Reduce Output
We conclude that the increases in common ownership that have occurred
over the last few decades as a result of the growth in the holding of mutual funds
and ETFs managed by the nation’s largest investment management companies
are unlikely to alter any of the sticks and carrots incentivizing the managers of
oligopolistic firms in a way that would lead them to constrain output to a level
below what it would have been without common ownership, that is, below the
output level that each firm’s non-common shareholder would want it to choose. 77
78F

75.
See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 461, 472 (1986) (defining the “‘jawboning’ mechanism” as pursuing “informal negotiations with
incumbent management” as a “means of influencing policy”).
76.
See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 23,
27 (2014) (“[A] low stake lowers [a blockholder’s] likelihood of . . . being able to ‘jawbone’ managers into
changing strategy (because managers’ receptivity may depend on the threat of a proxy fight if they are noncompliant).”); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 10, at 2088 (arguing that engagement by the Big Three is not likely
to be effective if not backed up by the threat of the use of the sticks discussed in the text).
77.
There is an active debate in the corporate governance literature about whether passive
institutional investors such as the Big Three are able to affect corporate governance and corporate change
generally. Compare, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 10 (concluding that the Big Three lack sufficient
incentives to effectively engage in stewardship and corporate governance reform), and M. Todd Henderson &
Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Index Funds Are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, WALL ST.
J. (June 22, 2017, 6:30 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-great-for-investors-riskyfor-corporate-governance-1498170623 [https://perma.cc/83NP-GRD9] (similar), with Marcel Kahan &
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Explaining why requires an examination of each of the carrots and sticks referred
to above. In this Section, we consider the baseline case in which a firm’s
shareholders are either common owners or non-common owners. We consider
the relevance of semi-common owners in the next Section.
1. Proxy fights. Where, as today, common ownership arising from the
nation’s mutual funds and ETFs is in the neighborhood of 20% of most
oligopolistic industries, the threat of a proxy fight to remove a firm’s managers
who refuse to constrain production below the level preferred by non-common
shareholders is entirely empty. 78 But even if a proxy fight occurred, the noncommon shareholders, under our baseline analysis of two investor types,
constitute a very substantial majority and are unlikely to vote for a change in
management that would adopt a level of output below what they would prefer. 79
It is irrelevant to the analysis whether or not the managers of other firms are
constraining production at the common-owner preferred level. In either case, as
discussed in Part II, the firm’s non-common owners, taking as given the
decisions of the other firms, prefer that their own managers focus on the
maximization of own-firm net revenues.
An important artery of corporate law scholarship evaluates how differing
investor preferences can affect firm governance and managerial decisionmaking. 80 To the extent relevant to the common ownership issue, heterogeneity
79F

80F

81F

Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L.
REV. 1771 (2020) (concluding that index funds have sufficient incentives to affect corporate change). We
do not seek to wade into this larger debate and instead focus our analysis on the narrow question implicated
by the common ownership literature: is the presence of the Big Three affecting firms’ competition-related
decisions? Our negative answer to this question is not inconsistent with other scholars’ conclusions that
the Big Three are able to affect corporate decision-making in non-competition ways. The shareholder
conflicts of interest discussed below that serve to mute common ownership’s competitive effects are not
necessarily present with respect to these other aspects of firm behavior.
78.
In a proxy fight, an insurgent shareholder tries to secure proxies from the corporation’s other
shareholders for the purpose of voting those shares in favor of one or more competing directors supported
by the insurgent, who seeks to replace the incumbent directors. For discussion of the relevance of proxy
fights in shaping corporate governance and managerial incentives, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel
Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 107782 (1990).
79.
Among the class of non-common owners, retail shareholders are known to be apathetic when
it comes to voting on ordinary matters. See, e.g., Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent”
Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 61-66 (2016) (providing
data). However, retail shareholders are not apathetic in connection with proxy fights. For instance, retail
shareholders were critical to the outcome of the 2015 proxy fight at DuPont on which the common
ownership literature itself relies. See infra note 157. And retail shareholders would be especially active if
the proxy fight involved an insurgent group seeking to oust the incumbent directors because the incumbent
directors were causing the firm to take actions that are preferred by the firm’s retail and other non-common
shareholders.
80.
See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE
L.J. 1554 (2015) (analyzing the divergent preferences of short- and long-term shareholders and their
implications for managerial decision-making); Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity
Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113 (2010) (analyzing inter-investor conflicts and agency issues in a corporation
with diverse investor types); Robert P. Bartlett, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy
of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37 (2006) (analyzing the implications of divergent investor
preferences in venture capital funded start-ups); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Doctrines and
Markets: Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003) (analyzing the means by
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in common owners’ preferences would serve to further mitigate common
ownership’s potential for competitive harm, including by further lessening the
likelihood of a successful proxy contest by the common owners to oust
incumbent managers.
In our analysis so far, we have assumed for expositional simplicity that a
common owner’s percentage interest in each of the industry’s competing firms
is the same as its interest in all the others. This is clearly an oversimplification:
in any given industry, the data show that common owners generally do not have
the same percentage ownership interests across rival firms. 81
To see the implications of these differences in ownership interests, consider
the example of an industry consisting of two firms, A and B, and two common
owners, X and Y. Suppose that common owner X has a disproportionately higher
interest in A than in B, while common owner Y has a disproportionately higher
interest in B than in A. In this case, the two common owners will have dissimilar
preferences on the ideal level of competition and therefore dissimilar preferences
on the managerial slate they would put up for election in a proxy fight. In a proxy
fight at Firm A, while both common owners would prefer that the incumbent
managers of Firm A be replaced with a slate of managers who competed less
with Firm B, common owner X’s preferred slate of managers would curtail
production with B less than common owner Y’s preferred slate would. These and
other divergent preferences among the common owners would impede them
from coalescing on a competing slate of managers to nominate in any proxy
fight. 82
In addition to a proxy fight, shareholders can communicate their
dissatisfaction with directors by using proxy access to nominate competing
directors for election 83 or by voting against directors at the annual meeting. 84 The
82F

83F

84F

85F

which controlling shareholders can extract private-control benefits at the expense of minority shareholders
and discussing associated legal doctrine).
81.
See, e.g., infra note 110.
82.
Other conflicts may also serve to prevent common owner consensus. For instance, as
discussed below, common owners also maintain positions in market segments that may be affected by a
dampening of competition in the relevant market, such as positions in firms that make purchases from
firms in the relevant market. See infra notes 176-177. Differences in their holdings in these out-of-market
but affected market segments would drive a further wedge in common owners’ preferred reduction in
competition. Finally, apart from these issues unique to common ownership, any proxy fight by the
common owners to oust incumbent managers would have to overcome the usual significant impediments
to proxy fights generally, such as the presence of a staggered board. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, John
C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
83.
More than three quarters of S&P 500 companies have adopted proxy access provisions, see
Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire Holland, Proxy Access: A Five-Year Review, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 4, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/04/proxy-access-afive-year-review/ [https://perma.cc/2JYL-JNBN], which enable sufficiently large shareholders to
nominate a certain number of directors for election. See id.
84.
The vast majority of S&P 500 companies, and the majority of all publicly traded U.S.
companies, use majority voting for directors in uncontested elections. See FAQ: Majority Voting for
Directors 1, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (Jan. 2017), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/
board_accountability/majority_voting_directors/CII%20Majority%20Voting%20FAQ%201-4-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P49R-X96N]. Under such a voting scheme, a director in an uncontested election retains
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analysis above forecloses these related mechanisms as pathways for common
ownership to modify managerial incentives to compete. For example, even
assuming the common owners share the same proportional ownership interests
across firms in the relevant market, a firm’s directors would not fear replacement
by the common owners nominating their own candidates who (implausibly)
advocate for curtailed production and competition. The directors would
understand that the non-common owners strictly prefer the current directorial
slate’s competition strategy than that advocated by the competing candidates. 85
2. Hostile tender offers. Corporate law scholarship teaches that managerial
incentives are also shaped by the threat of a hostile tender offer, 86 through which
a hostile bidder seeks to purchase sufficient shares from the target’s shareholders
that it is able to replace the target’s managers through an eventual acquisition. 87
The question is whether there would ever be a credible threat of this sort
incentivizing managers to compete less than would be preferred by the noncommon shareholders. For the reasons set out below, we think there would not
be.
For common ownership to affect firm managers’ incentives to compete
through the tender offer threat channel, it must be that they fear a common owner
will seek their removal through a hostile tender offer because they refused to
constrain production. Mutual funds and ETFs are not organized to pursue such
an activity, and so any potential hostile tender offer acquirer would need to be
some other kind of common owner. 88 To profit from such a tender offer, this
other common owner’s gain from reducing the output level must be greater than
86F

87F

8F

89F

their seat only if they receive more “for” votes than “against” votes. See id. In contrast, under plurality
voting, a director in an uncontested election retains their seat so long as they get a single “for” vote. See
id. In a circumstance involving plurality voting, a shareholder could choose to “withhold” their vote to
signal their dissatisfaction with the director. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy
for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 865 (1993).
85.
The common owners similarly will not be able to affect managerial decision-making through
a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal that seeks to compel management to reduce output. The non-common
owners would not support such an implausible proposal, and it would be excludable under Rule 14a8(i)(7)’s ordinary business exclusion. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act
Release No. 40018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29106, 29108 (1998), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-199805-28/pdf/98-14121.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C97-LACT] (“The policy underlying the ordinary business
exclusion rests on two central considerations. The first relates to the subject matter of the proposal. Certain
tasks are so fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could
not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight. Examples include . . . decisions on
production quality and quantity . . . . The second consideration relates to the degree to which the proposal
seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which
shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”).
86.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1981) (“[S]hareholders benefit even if
their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer. The process of monitoring by outsiders poses a
continuous threat of takeover if performance lags. Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order
to reduce the chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for
shares.”); see also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 74, at 756 (“Takeovers are widely interpreted as the critical
corporate governance mechanism in the United States . . . .”).
87.
Depending on the circumstances, the hostile bidder may also simultaneously wage a proxy
contest that seeks to oust one or more of the target’s directors.
88.
The acquirer would need to be a common owner because otherwise it would not benefit from
any reduction in the target firm’s level of competition.
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the costs of acquiring a portion of an issuer’s cash flow through an ordinary share
purchase. That is, the gain must exceed the tender offer’s considerable
transaction costs plus the share price premium needed to acquire enough of the
target’s shares to squeeze out the remaining minority who fail to tender. 89 For
that to be the case, the potential acquirer’s percentage stake in competing firms
in the industry would likely need to be large enough that the acquisition of the
target’s shares would, as illustrated below, create problems under existing
antitrust law relating to the ownership of major stakes of multiple firms in an
oligopolistic industry. In other words, the share acquisition would cause common
ownership levels to reach such elevated amounts that, in contrast to current
common ownership levels, they would generate sufficient competitive harm to
violate existing antitrust law.
To see this, go back to the example employed in Parts I and II where Firms
A and B are the two firms in the oligopolistic industry of widget production.
Each firm has 1,000,000 shares outstanding and three investors each hold 70,000
shares of A and 70,000 shares of B, with the remaining shares of each company
being held by non-common shareholders. Assume that each of these three
investors is either a mutual fund or an ETF and so not a potential hostile tender
offer acquirer. Initially, in accordance with the preferences of its managers, Firm
A is producing at the level preferred by the firm’s non-common shareholders,
that is, the level that maximizes solely Firm A’s net revenues. Is there somebody
who would be motivated to engage in a hostile tender offer with the goal of taking
over Firm A to cause it to reduce its output below the level preferred by the noncommon shareholders? The way this person (say, Z) could conceivably profit
from such a move would be if Z were a shareholder in Firm B: the lower A’s
production, the more profitable B will be.
The gains that flow to Z from the diminished competition must offset the
costs that Z incurs in conducting the tender offer, or else the tender offer would
not be economically rational. But, as we have noted, the cost to Z in conducting
the tender offer will be significant, owing not just to significant transaction costs
but also to the considerable premium that Z would need to offer firm A’s
shareholders to entice them to tender their shares. 90 For this reason, the
acquisition of A’s shares would be economically rational for Z only if Z were a
large shareholder in Firm B and the acquisition of Firm B by Z resulted in a
significant reduction of competition in the relevant market. That is what would
90F

91F

89.
The typical acquirer in a hostile tender offer seeks full ownership of the target, thereby
avoiding breach of fiduciary duty suits brought by remaining shareholders. Once the acquiror has acquired
sufficient shares of the target, it can squeeze out the remaining target’s shareholders through a statutory
merger, ideally through a short-form merger, which avoids a shareholder vote and allows dissenters only
appraisal rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253. Under Delaware corporate law, for example, the
acquirer must hold at least 90% of the outstanding shares to effect a short-form merger. See id. In a typical
short-form merger, the remaining shareholders get the same consideration, with the same premium, as do
those who tendered.
90.
See, e.g., Sandra Betton & B. Espen Eckbo, Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in
Takeovers, 13 REV. FIN. STUDS. 841, 853 (2000) (for all single-bid takeovers opposed by management
between 1971 to 1990, bidder offered a 40% average initial premium).
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be needed for the associated profitability gains to Firms A and B that flow to Z
to at least offset Z’s significant tender offer costs. However, because of this
resulting substantial competitive harm, the transaction would violate Section 7
of the Clayton Act. 91 Accordingly, prevailing antitrust law would dissuade Z
from commencing its tender offer in the first place. Of course, the mere threat of
a hostile offer, without it actually being undertaken, could prompt managers of
A to change their behavior because they do not want to lose their jobs. But this
behavior change will only happen if the threat is credible, and the analysis here
suggests that it would not be.
Even more to the point, there is little reason to think that the presence or
absence of the three investment funds holding shares in both firms will affect the
critical calculation that Z would need to undertake: comparing the gains to Z
from A’s output reduction with the costs of making a hostile offer. These costs
are predominantly the premium over the pre-offer market price that must be
offered to attract the tender of a sufficient number of shares plus the investment
banking and legal fees involved, matters unrelated to the extent of mutual fund
and ETF common ownership in the two firms.
3. Activist investors. As a general matter, managerial incentives may also
be shaped by threatened or actual interventions by activist investors. 92 But it is
very unlikely that an activist investor or a group of activists will target a firm in
an oligopolistic industry to force it to constrain output below the level preferred
by the non-common shareholders. Going back to our example just above (but
without shareholder Z), assume that initially Firm A’s current output is at the
level preferred by A’s non-common shareholders, that is, the level that
maximizes solely Firm A’s net revenues. The question, then, is whether, given
the standard business model for activist investors, it is likely that such an investor
would intervene to force A to constrain its level of output below that level.
The standard business model for such an intervention involves the activist
undertaking four steps: (i) identify a firm where a change in the way it is run
would increase its share price, (ii) acquire a foothold stake in the target firm of
perhaps 5-7% of its outstanding shares, (iii) persuade enough of the target’s
shareholders of the desirability of the change to amass a majority vote to oust the
incumbent managers if they do not adopt the change, and (iv) sell the shares at a
92F

93F

91.
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) (prohibiting acquisitions that substantially lessen competition);
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1203c (4th & 5th eds., 2021 Cum. Supp.) (“[H]orizontal
shareholding is reachable under § 7 where the threat to competition is present.”). Section 7 does include
an exception for stock acquisitions made “solely for investment.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). However, that
exception applies “only if, and so long as, the stock is not used by voting or otherwise to bring about, or
in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition,” United States v. du Pont & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957), and thus would be inapplicable to the scenario considered in the text.
92.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency
Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863 (2013).
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profit after the change is adopted and the share price increases to reflect the
improvement. 93
The standard financial economics model of an issuer’s share price is that it
reflects the market’s best estimate of the issuer’s expected future dividends and
other distributions to shareholders discounted to present value, 94 which in turn
depend solely on the firm’s expected net cash flow. Accordingly, an activist
pursuing this business model would not push for a change in output level lower
than what would be preferred by a non-common shareholder because to do so
would lower, not increase, the issuer’s share price. After all, the reason that noncommon shareholders prefer this output level is that it is the one that maximizes
their firm’s own net cash flow. 95 And again, the presence or absence of the three
investment funds holding shares in both Firm A and Firm B is not going to
change this reality for the activist fund. 96 Consistent with this reasoning, Rock
and Rubinfeld observe, “[a]lthough there have been dozens of activist hedge fund
engagements, we are not aware of any in which the fight was over whether target
management engaged in excessive competition.” 97
4. Sales of share blocks. Another way that a block shareholder can
sometimes prompt the managers of a firm to change behavior is to threaten to
sell its block of shares. 98 If the managers believe that the sale will depress the
firm’s share price for an appreciable period of time, they may accede to the
blockholder’s request because they want to avoid this price decline. How likely
94F

95F

96F

97F

98F

9F

93.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 92, at 900.
94.
See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 17, at 83.
95.
The specific production amount that maximizes the firm’s net cash flow will depend on the
quantity decision by the other firm. As shown by the best response function in the Appendix’s Figure 1,
if the other firm is producing at a relatively high quantity level, then the non-common owners will prefer
that the firm produce less than if the other firm is producing at a relatively low quantity level. However,
regardless of the other firm’s quantity choice, the non-common shareholders’ preferred level of output is
the one that maximizes the firm’s net revenues, given that other firm’s quantity choice. Additionally, if
both Firm A and Firm B constrained output, Firm A’s net cash flow could very well go up and, with that,
its share price. But, as discussed in Part I, if Firm A constrained output, Firm B would in fact do the
opposite and increase output, unless the sticks and carrots that determine the behavior of Firm B
simultaneously pushed B’s managers to constrain its output. The question of what might lead B’s
managers to constrain output is the same as the question we are investigating here, namely, what might
lead A’s managers to constrain output? In theory, an activist might simultaneously pursue multiple firms
in an industry and solicit the common shareholders of each to join the effort. However, we are not aware
of any example of such a simultaneous campaign happening. Moreover, any activist that tried such a
strategy would be at high risk of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018), on the
theory that the activist was serving as the hub of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v.
Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[C]ourts have long recognized the existence of ‘hub‐and‐
spoke’ conspiracies in which an entity at one level of the market structure, the ‘hub,’ coordinates an
agreement among competitors at a different level, the ‘spokes.’”).
96.
The activist also would have to surmount any of the target’s defensive measures, such as a
poison pill and the firm’s directors having multi-year staggered terms. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, 99 B.U. L. REV 915 (2019) (providing doctrinal and policy analysis of
the use of poison pills against activists). Thus, even if the hypothetical activist were to seek a curtailment
in output despite the economic irrationality of that decision, its likelihood of success would be further
diminished by the need to persuade the directors to eliminate the defenses, something that would not be
supported by the non-common owners.
97.
Rock & Rubinefeld, supra note 9, at 250.
98.
See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism:
Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2647 (2009).
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is it, though, that a threat of a block sale would prompt a firm’s manager to curtail
output below what is preferred by the non-common shareholders?
Consider again the Firm A and Firm B example used just above, and
continue to assume that initially Firm A’s output is at the level preferred by A’s
non-common shareholders, that is, the level that maximizes solely Firm A’s net
revenues. We should start by noting those blockholders who are not possible
candidates for threatening to sell in order to push the managers of A to lower
output below the level that maximizes solely A’s own profits. First, no
blockholder who does not own shares of Firm B as well would wish to do so,
since such a reduction in output would be against its financial interest. Also, to
the extent that the three funds in our example are index funds, they cannot
successfully threaten to sell because they have no choice but to hold their position
in Firm A: they are pledged to hold each stock in the index in proportion to its
role in the index. 99 This observation is important because, as we noted earlier, a
significant portion of the fund-driven increase in common ownership is the result
of increases in the holdings by index funds.
But what about managed mutual funds, that is, investment funds that are
not constrained to hold particular stocks? A threat to sell by one of them, it turns
out, will also not be an effective way of prompting managers to reduce output
below the level preferred by the non-common shareholders. This is because a
blockholder’s sale under these circumstances will at most only depress the firm’s
share price for a short period of time. So, the threat that managers will suffer if
they do not lower output is not credible. Microstructure economics teaches us
that the reason a share sale can depress price is because the market infers from
the seller’s order the possibility that the seller has negative nonpublic information
not reflected in the price prior to the sale. 100 If, however, nothing comes out
subsequently to suggest the existence of any negative news, the price will regain
what it lost. 101 Again, the price reflects the market’s best estimate of the issuer’s
expected future dividends and other distributions to shareholders discounted to
present value. The sale by the common holder does not change what the future
dividends and other distributions will be. So, as soon as the market perceives that
there was no negative nonpublic information driving the sale, the price should be
no different than if the sale had not occurred. Where the price dip is short lived,
management is unlikely to suffer significantly.
10F

10F

102F

99.
Index funds likewise cannot increase their ownership positions to affect corporate change.
For instance, they cannot increase their shareholdings in order to facilitate or support a proxy fight.
100.
See, e.g., Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 72 (1985); LARRY
HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 300 (2002).
101.
If the market is aware that the common shareholder is selling its position to make good on
its threat, the price would not drop even in the first instance, since the market would know that this is not
a sale from which it should infer that it was motivated by someone with negative nonpublic information.
If the market is not aware, the sale may have a negative effect. But there are traders always searching to
see if there is nonpublic information that justifies a price drop accompanying a large sale and then
purchasing shares when they find none. See MERRITT B. FOX, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN & GABRIEL V.
RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK MARKET: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 69-72 (2019).
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5. Fiduciary duties. An officer or director of a corporation has fiduciary
duties to the corporation of care and of loyalty, the breach of either of which can
subject her to suits seeking injunctive relief or monetary damages. The duty of
care requires the director or officer, even where no conflict of interest exists, to
act in a manner that they reasonably believe is in the best interests of the
corporation. 102 The duty of loyalty requires a director or officer who has an
interest in a proposed corporate action to behave fairly toward the corporation.
In essence, her action will not validate any decision of the corporation to take
action unless she can affirmatively show that the action is in the best interests of
the corporation. 103 The discussion below shows that it is extremely unlikely that
the threat of a suit claiming the violation of one of these duties will result in a
firm constraining its level of output below what its non-common shareholders
prefer.
As the above description of these two duties indicates, understanding each
of them depends on the concept of the “best interests of the corporation.” A
corporation is an artificial legal person. Thus, what its best interests are must be
a legal construct as well, created from the interests of the persons who have
stakes in the corporation’s decisions. There is some ambiguity in this legal
construct. Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute’s Corporate
Governance Principles, for example, provides that “a corporation should have as
its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and shareholder gain.” 104 Returning to our illustrative Firms A and B,
consider the position of Firm A. The question here is whether a court would
interpret the concept of best interest in such a way that it would intervene to find
a violation of the duty of either care or loyalty if the management of A chose the
higher level of output that is preferred by the 79% of the shareholders of Firm A
and that maximizes the firm’s net cash flow. The answer seems obvious: the
court would interpret the higher output level preferred by the 79% as more in the
interests of the corporation than the lower output level preferred by the 21%,
because that lower output generates a smaller cash flow and is preferred by only
a minority of the shareholders.
103F

104F

105F

102.
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law, Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations (ALI Corporate Governance Principles) describes the duty of care as follows: “A
director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good
faith, in a manner that [they] reasonably believe[] to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (AM. L. INST. 2005). Rather than a negligence standard, Delaware courts
generally apply a gross-negligence standard in evaluating director duty of care claims. See, e.g., McMullin
v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000).
103.
The ALI Corporate Governance Principles, for example, impose on directors and officers
an “underlying obligation . . . , when interested in a matter affecting the corporation, to act fairly toward
the corporation and its shareholders.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 102, at ch. V, Introductory
Note (referencing § 5.01). Section 5.01 provides, in relevant part, that “[d]irectors [§ 1.13], senior
executives [§ 1.33], and controlling shareholders [§ 1.10], when interested [§ 1.23] in a matter affecting
the corporation, are under a duty of fair dealing . . . .” Id. at § 5.01.
104.
Id. at § 2.01(a).
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To the extent that the concept of the best interests of the corporation relates
to the interests of individual shareholders, rather than what generates the most
net cash flow for the corporation over time discounted to present value, an
argument could be made that the best interests of the corporation is the decision
that maximizes the interests of the “blended shareholder,” that is, the level of
output that maximizes the aggregate wealth of the shareholders as a group.
However, we can find no legal precedent that a corporate action shown to be in
the best interests of a majority and to maximize the corporation’s cash flow is a
violation of either the duty of care or loyalty on the grounds that the best interests
of the corporation are really those of the blended shareholder. Moreover, it seems
unlikely that a court will be persuaded to make such a ruling in the future.
Whatever are the attractions of the argument that the corporation’s interests are
those of the blended shareholder, using such a standard in a duty of care or duty
of loyalty case would create difficult problems of administration. And when
applied to output-level decisions, it would undermine the policy of promoting
competition that is at the heart of our antitrust laws.
A further, monumental roadblock to the success of duty of care cases based
on the failure of management to constrain production below the level preferred
by the non-common shareholders is the business judgment rule. The rule is based
on the idea that judges are not business experts and so, as a general matter, a
judge should not substitute her judgment for that of a firm’s directors or
officers. 105 The only exceptions are in instances where the director or officer is
interested in the transaction, the procedures used are totally flawed, or it is selfevident that the decision lacks any reasonable basis for being in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. 106 Moreover, the party challenging the
director or officer’s conduct bears the burden of establishing the duty of care
breach, 107 which creates a presumption of compliance.
6. Managerial compensation and shareholdings. There is also nothing in
the carrots—managerial compensation packages and shareholdings—that would
incentivize a firm’s managers to constrain its level of output below what its noncommon shareholders prefer. The ways that a manager’s decisions influence the
value of her compensation package relate to her firm’s net cash flow. This is
because her compensation package, to the extent that it deviates from straight
salary, is typically tied in some way to the firm’s net revenues or the value of its
shares. The package will not reward her for any positive effect that her decisions
have on the net revenues of the firm’s competitors. So, her compensation
package will create no incentive to constrain production below what would be
106F

107F

108F

105.
The seminal case describing the logic of the business judgment rule is Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919).
106.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 102, at § 4.01(c) (“A director or officer who
makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty under this Section if the director or officer: (1)
is not interested [§ 1.23] in the subject of the business judgment; (2) is informed with respect to the subject
of the business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under
the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.”)
107.
Id. at § 4.01(d).
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preferred by the non-common shareholders. Her shareholdings in her firm work
the same way since, as noted, she is unlikely to have significant holdings in the
shares of her firm’s competitors.
The remaining issue is whether common ownership can cause firms to alter
their executive compensation schemes such that managers are less incentivized
to compete. For instance, if common ownership were to cause firms to adopt
compensation schemes that were less tethered to the profits or share price of
managers’ own firms, this could incentivize managers to compete less vigorously
than before. However, this is implausible. Common owners have no means of
directly dictating executive compensation, as the board, not shareholders, sets
executive compensation. 108 Nor would common ownership likely affect those
who actually do dictate executive compensation schemes. If the board, for
instance, were to modify the CEO’s compensation in response to common
ownership, such that the CEO was incentivized to compete less, this would
disadvantage the much larger group of non-common owners, who would seek
the board’s removal. A board that modified executive compensation in a manner
that incentivized managers to compete less also would be subject to an activist
campaign seeking to turn around the firm’s drop in profitability.
109F

D. The Common Owners Are Not Aided by the Presence of Semi-Common
Owners
As discussed in Part II, in addition to common owners and non-common
owners, industries likely include at least some semi-common owners, that is,

108.
Shareholders do have an opportunity to vote on executive compensation, but only in certain
circumstances. For example, stock exchange rules require shareholder approval of equity compensation
plans. See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., INC., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.08 (2021);
NASDAQ, INC., THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC RULES, Rule 5635. Also, tax considerations may
prompt the board to put particular compensation plans to shareholder vote. See Charles M. Yablon,
Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1892 n.69
(1992) (“It is true that shareholders now do not have the power to approve or disapprove most forms of
compensation decisions directly, the major exceptions being stock option plans and employee stock
purchase plans, which, to obtain favorable tax treatment, must be submitted to a shareholder vote . . . .”).
Further, shareholders can try to influence executive compensation indirectly, but the available
mechanisms are blunt means for affecting corporate change. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act provided
shareholders with the right to vote on executive compensation through a say-on-pay vote, but that vote is
non-binding on the board and simply affords shareholders an up-or-down vote on the board-determined
executive compensation program for certain top-level executives. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21. Consistent
with the advisory role of the say-on-pay vote, scholars have yet to identify a clear empirical relationship
between the outcome of a say-on-pay vote and the amount of executive compensation. See, e.g., Jill E.
Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm
Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 102 (2018) (“Academic studies have reached inconsistent results
about the effect of low say on pay votes but have generally failed to find conclusive evidence that issuers
reduce executive pay packages in response to lower approval rates.”); see also Fisch et al., supra, at 107109 (discussing empirical findings). For a discussion of other indirect mechanisms available to
shareholders to affect executive compensation, see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1043-55 (1999). In any
event, even if these two ways for shareholders to influence managerial compensation were more effective
than we suggest here, the non-common owners will not be voting in a way that supports constraining
production below the standard Cournot model because that is contrary to their interests.
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shareholders who maintain non-trivial but relatively small interests in some or
all relevant competitors and at levels that are proportionally different from those
of the common owners. The analysis above is not affected by these shareholder
types. Because of significant heterogeneity in semi-common owners’ holdings
of industry firms, the common owners cannot rely on the semi-common owners
to cause firm managers to move away from own-firm net revenue maximization,
as discussed below. Thus, despite the presence of semi-common owners, the
legal institutions and market practices discussed above continue to incentivize
managers to maximize own-firm net revenues.
To see the significant heterogeneity in semi-common owners’ holdings,
consider the airline industry, which is a focal point of the common ownership
literature. Based on Form 13F data, Table 1 below shows the fractional holdings
of United Airlines’ largest shareholders (with Vanguard, BlackRock, and State
Street aggregated as the Big Three) and, for each such top United shareholder,
their fractional holdings in key rival airlines.
Table 1: Fractional holdings of United Airlines’ largest shareholders and those
shareholders’ fractional holdings in key rival airlines as of 12/31/2020 109
10F

The Big Three
(combined)
Primecap
Par Capital
Fidelity
U.S. Global
Geode
Altimeter
Dimensional
Newport Trust
LSV Asset
Mgmt.
Two Sigma
Adv.

United

Delta

AA

SWest

JetBlue

Spirit

Alaska

18.73

19.21

17.72

21.89

19.16

18.27

21.01

9.72
2.41
2.35
2.11
1.70
1.64
1.54
1.49

3.57
0.55
2.00
1.12
1.63

7.80
0.78
0.30
2.79
1.72

11.05
0.42
4.32
1.08
1.73

5.54
0.64
12.06
2.50
1.24

0.38
1.65
4.18
4.71
1.50

4.18
2.27
0.44
1.92
1.73

0.84
1.98

0.19

0.87

3.26

4.38

2.04

1.21

0.61

0.38

0.01

2.38

1.18

0.19

0.27

0.02

0.30
1.51

0.12

As shown in Table 1, the top semi-common owners of United, in addition
to having proportionally different holdings as to the Big Three, have
proportionally different holdings as to each other. Thus, in addition to not sharing
the common owners’ preferred output combination, no semi-common owner in
Table 1 has the same output preference as any other semi-common owner. 110
1F

109.
Based on Form 13F data drawn from WhaleWisdom. Every institutional investment
manager that exercises investment discretion of more than $100 million in securities made available to
the public under Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act must file quarterly a Form 13F, which
identifies the manager’s holdings. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21.
110.
It is important to note that even the common owners’ competition-relevant preferences will
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Because of the divergent preferences of the semi-common owners, the
corporate governance mechanisms discussed in the previous Part will continue
to incentivize firm managers to maximize own-firm net revenues. As a
representative example, consider the proxy fight mechanism. The way that the
presence of semi-common owners could affect managerial decision-making
through that mechanism is if the presence of those shareholders enabled the
common owners to garner sufficient votes for a slate of directors who, if elected,
would cause the firm to choose some diminished level of competition that a
sufficiently large voting block of semi-common owners would prefer to ownfirm net revenue maximization. That strategy seems highly unlikely to succeed
for various reasons.
First, the common owners would need to identify a competitive strategy
that a critical mass of semi-common owners would prefer to own-firm net
revenue maximization, which may not be possible given the significant variation
in semi-common owners’ holdings in industry firms and those shareholders’

not be aligned. Table 1 above groups together the ownership interests of Vanguard, BlackRock, and State
Street, but a disaggregation of those interests reveals that three fund managers have proportionally
different holdings in the airline industry:

Vanguard
BlackRock
State Street

United
10.24
5.31
3.18

Delta
10.22
5.60
3.39

AA
9.53
5.15
3.04

SWest
8.74
5.88
7.27

JetBlue
8.64
8.22
2.29

Spirit
8.56
7.52
2.18

Alaska
10.22
7.48
3.31

These divergent interests are not unique to the airline industry. See, e.g., Posner et al., supra note 7, at
726-28 (presenting tables for a range of industries showing that common owners have proportionally
different holdings in each of those industries). Accordingly, in a given industry, even the Big Three will
not be in consensus as to their preferred output reduction. Moreover, while the Cournot model simplifies
and assumes that a firm competes with all rival firms identically through its output decision, competition
in actual markets is multifaceted, and a firm often will set a separate competitive strategy for each of the
firm’s many rivals. In such an instance, the common owners will be even less likely to coalesce around
an agreed competition strategy since, for every firm in the industry, the common owners likely will have
differing preferences about the manner and extent to which that firm should separately compete with each
of the firm’s rivals. This can be seen in the table above, which shows that, for any two airlines, the ratio
of the three shareholders’ interests in the two airlines are unequal. This property implies that the three
shareholders have different preferences as to how much an airline’s managers should sacrifice their own
firm’s revenue for the benefit of the other airline when in head-to-head competition with that other airline,
all else equal. See also Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 234-35 (making a similar argument). In fact,
in their paper from which the common ownership model springs, O’Brien and Salop expressly note the
possibility of a lack of consensus among common owners. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 41, at 609
(“When multiple owners have partial-ownership interests, however, they may not agree on the best course
of action for the firm.”). Scholars have also sought to evaluate the extent of similarity and divergence in
institutional-investor preferences outside of the common ownership context. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb &
Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper
No.
560/2020,
Dec.
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124039
[https://perma.cc/2Y6E-4WF6] (using mutual funds’ voting patterns to evaluate their corporate
governance preferences and finding that mutual funds are roughly organized into three parties that follow
distinctive patterns of corporate governance philosophies). But there is nothing in this work to suggest
that these patterns would lead to constraining production below the standard Cournot level or the extent
of competition more generally, especially given the paper’s findings of wide dispersion in institutional
investors’ corporate governance preferences and that many institutional investors’ corporate governance
preferences do not align with the Big Three’s preferences. See id. at fig. 2 (graphically depicting a twodimensional measure of institutional investors’ corporate governance preferences).
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interests in cognate markets that may be affected by competition in the relevant
market. 111 Moreover, even if the common owners were able to make that
determination, they would need to identify a director slate that would cause the
firm to implement that strategy if elected. And while the identified slate likely
would not affirmatively campaign on the position of softening competition in the
very specific way that appeals to the sought-after voting bloc, the targeted semicommon owners would somehow need to know that that is the slate’s intended
strategy.
But even if we put these seemingly intractable issues to the side, the fluidity
of semi-common owners’ ownership interests would serve to impede the
common owners’ ability to nominate a director slate that a sufficiently large
voting bloc of semi-common owners prefer to incumbent managers who are
focused on own-firm net revenue maximization. This fluidity arises because,
while they may also passively manage index funds, semi-common owners
manage active funds, continuously moving assets across firms and across sectors
in order to fulfill the funds’ investment objectives. Because of this active
management, the distribution of the semi-common owners’ shareholdings in
industry firms will rapidly change, even over short periods of time.
12F

Table 2: Fidelity’s fractional holdings of the identified airlines for
Q1-Q4, 2020 112
13F

Q1, 2020
Q2, 2020
Q3, 2020
Q4, 2020

United
0.78
0.76
0.79
2.35

Delta
1.38
0.38
0.74
2.00

AA
0.23
0.12
0.12
0.30

SWest
1.24
3.16
2.58
4.32

JetBlue
7.24
6.12
8.12
12.06

Spirit
14.87
6.97
4.88
4.18

Alaska
2.71
2.48
0.85
0.44

The fluidity of semi-common owners’ ownership interests can be clearly
seen in the airline industry. For instance, consider Fidelity, which as of June 2021
had $2.525 trillion in discretionary equity assets under management. 113 Based on
13F data, Table 2 above shows Fidelity’s fractional holdings in the seven
identified airlines for 2020 on a quarterly basis. The table shows that Fidelity’s
investment profile continuously changed over the depicted time period. As just
one example, Fidelity had a greater fractional interest in Delta than in United in
the first quarter (Q1) of 2020, while that relationship was reversed in the
subsequent quarter. Given this, suppose the common owners evaluated
14F

111.
Cf. infra note 176 and accompanying text (explaining that common owners may hold shares
in providers, suppliers, or firms in complementary industries, all of which may benefit from increased
competition in the relevant market).
112.
Based on 13F data drawn from WhaleWisdom.
113.
See Fidelity by the Numbers: Asset Management, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/
about-fidelity/our-company/asset-management [https://perma.cc/SV4R-DEQD].
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shareholding distributions in Q1 2020 and identified a particular level of
curtailment in United’s extent of competition with Delta that would make
Fidelity better off than if United continued under current management and
maximized own-firm net revenue. Suppose that the common owners initiated a
proxy fight at United with a managerial slate that would implement that
diminished level of competition with Delta once elected. The common owners’
level of expected support by Fidelity in that proxy fight would quickly drop, as
in the very next quarter Fidelity had a greater proportional interest in United than
in Delta and thus would weigh United’s profits more than Delta’s profits when
determining its preferred level of competition between those two airlines.
Similarly, because they too actively manage at least some of their funds, other
semi-common owners also have rapidly changing investment profiles, which
likewise would serve to prevent the common owners from honing in on a
managerial slate that is preferred by a significant bloc of the semi-common
owners.
E. Summary
The common ownership literature assumes that the management of a firm
with common shareholders will seek to maximize not its own firm’s profits
alone, but the sum of its firm’s profits and, to one extent or another, the profits
of the other firms in the industry. Reflecting on the fact that the firm also has
non-common shareholders—persons who do not hold shares in any of its
competitors—the common ownership literature posits that common ownership
causes management to choose an output level that maximizes the wealth of some
hypothetical “blended shareholder.” This proposition hides a basic conflict
between the firm’s non-common shareholders and its common shareholders. The
non-common shareholders would want managers to choose the level of output
that would maximize solely the firm’s own net revenues, a level of output higher
than what the hypothetical blended shareholder would prefer. This higher level
of output is the same as would have been preferred by all the firm’s shareholders
if there had been no common shareholders. It is also the output level likely to be
preferred by management because maximizing the firm’s net revenues
maximizes its ability to give managers the things they desire out of their
positions. The firm’s actual output depends on what level managers with these
preferences decide given the incentive structure within which they work. This
incentive structure consists of a set of sticks and carrots. The sticks are threats of
a proxy fight, hostile tender offer, activist shareholder campaign, sale of share
position, and fiduciary duty suits. The carrots are the managers’ compensation
packages and their own share ownership. A review of these sticks and carrots
suggests that, relative to no common ownership, the existence of common
ownership, at least at current levels, is unlikely to change how they work in any
way that would lead to lower output levels and hence diminished competition.

185

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 39:101 2022

IV. The Implications of the Analysis for the Common Ownership Debate
Our conclusion that common ownership is currently having no meaningful
effect on managerial incentives to compete, and therefore on actual levels of
competition, contributes in three significant ways to the larger debate over
whether common ownership reduces competition. First, the analysis provides
theoretical support to the empirical studies that, in contrast to the common
ownership literature, find no evidence of a relationship between current levels of
common ownership and competitive harm. Second, the analysis demonstrates the
absence of any mechanism connecting common ownership to competitive harm
that does not involve coordination of the kinds already prohibited by antitrust
law. Third, the analysis counsels against use of a concentration measure—the
MHHI Delta—that is heavily relied on in the common ownership literature and
in policy proposals based on that literature. We discuss these three points in turn.
A. The Analysis Supports the Empirical Studies Finding No Substantial
Competitive Harm from Current Levels of Common Ownership
The common ownership literature’s central tenet that common ownership
decreases competition is largely built on the empirical results that the authors say
support this conclusion. Contending scholars, however, have conducted studies
that find no statistically significant evidence that common ownership has
meaningfully reduced competition. The analysis in the preceding parts of this
Article helps resolve this empirical debate. This analysis suggests that the
contending scholars found no evidence because there was no evidence to find,
and that the common ownership adherents’ results were due to some other cause.
1. The common ownership literature’s empirical results. Two significant
empirical papers sparked the recent academic and policy interest in common
ownership. In the first paper, which we refer to as the “Airline Paper,” José Azar,
Martin Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu evaluated whether common ownership was
impairing competition in the airline industry. 114 Using fixed-effects panel
regressions, Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu found a statistically significant
relationship between airline prices and a measure of common ownership
discussed below, the MHHI Delta, and concluded that common ownership
resulted in ticket prices being 3 to 7 percent higher on the average U.S. route than
they would be without common ownership. 115 The authors also conducted a
series of econometric tests in order to exclude the possibility that their results
were being driven by other possible factors that might tend to move both airline
prices and their measure of common ownership in the same direction and hence
be an alternative explanation for their results. 116
15F

16F

17F

114.
115.
116.
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See Airline Paper, supra note 5.
See id. at 1517.
See id. at 1517-18.
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In the second, which we refer to as the “Banking Paper,” José Azar, Sahil
Raina, and Martin Schmalz evaluated the effects of common ownership in the
banking sector. 117 In their baseline results, Azar, Raina, and Schmalz find that
their measure of common ownership was positively related to the amount of bank
deposit fees and deposit thresholds. 118 As in the Airline Paper, the authors of the
Banking Paper conducted additional analysis for purposes of establishing a
causal, rather than a mere correlative, connection between common ownership
and competitive harm. 119
The potential positive relationship between common ownership and
competitive harm that the authors of these two papers suggest their results show
has attracted considerable attention from legal scholars and policymakers, some
of whom have called for dramatic changes in antitrust law and enforcement
policy in order to intervene and correct common ownership’s perceived
competitive harm. 120 The two papers have also opened up an entire line of rich
academic research, with scholars from disparate fields seeking to determine
whether common ownership is linked to other macroeconomic or firm-level
phenomenon. 121
2. Critiques of the common ownership literature’s empirical claims, and
studies finding no evidence that common ownership meaningfully reduces
competition. The Airline and Banking Papers have not escaped criticism. One
line of attack has been to critique the papers on their own merits by arguing that
18F

19F

120F

12F

12F

117.
See Banking Paper, supra note 5. Their analysis also incorporates the existence of so-called
partial ownership interests, which occur when one firm maintains an interest in a rival firm. See id. at 3.
For a thorough legal and economic analysis of partial ownership interests, see David Gilo, The
Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
118.
See Banking Paper, supra note 5, at 19-22. For simplicity, when discussing the Banking
Paper, we will use “price” to refer to these two variables.
119.
See id. at 22-33.
120.
See infra Section V.B.
121.
As but one example, researchers also have evaluated the relationship between common
ownership and innovative activity and research and development (“R&D”). See, e.g., Ángel L. López &
Xavier Vives, Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy, 127 J. POL. ECON. 2394
(2019); Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, Innovation: The Bright Side of
Common Ownership?, (May 25, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099578 [https://perma.cc/V6W2-TY7Y]; Jie He & Jiekun Huang, Product
Market Competition in a World of Cross-Ownership: Evidence from Institutional Blockholdings, 30 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2674 (2017); Leonard Kostovetsky & Alberto Manconi, Common Institutional Ownership and
Diffusion of Innovation (Apr. 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2896372 [https://perma.cc/QYB8-D99Z]; Paul Borochin, Jie Yang &
Rongrong Zhang, Common Ownership Types and Their Effects on Innovation and Competition (May 14,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204767
[https://perma.cc/J78Q-NCG9]; Bin Qiu, Institutional Multiple Holdings and Corporate Innovation (Aug.
26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.fmaconferences.org/Boston/Institutional_Investor_
Diversification_and_Corporate_Innovation(FMA_2017).pdf [https://perma.cc/N7PU-W9LE]. Scholars
have also evaluated how common ownership by other investor types affects firm behavior. See, e.g., Ofer
Eldar, Jillian Grennan & Katherine Waldock, Common Ownership and Startup Growth (June 11, 2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3406205
[https://perma.cc/AT3N-3M4A] (evaluating the effects on startup success of common ownership in
startups by venture capital investors).
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a variety of methodological problems cloud their empirical analysis 122 and their
policy implications, 123 some of which we will discuss in more detail below.
At least as important, a number of scholars have conducted their own
empirical studies that have yielded results failing to show evidence of a
relationship between common ownership and any meaningful amount of
competitive harm. In widely reported findings, for instance, Pauline Kennedy,
Daniel O’Brien, Minjae Song, and Keith Waehrer used the same data as in the
Airline Paper but a different empirical methodology, and found that common
ownership had no statistically significant effect on airline prices. 124 Subsequent
empirical research by other scholars likewise found little or no competitive harm
of common ownership in either airlines or banking. 125 Still other studies
123F

124F

125F

126F

122.
For an early and comprehensive critique, see O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9. Matthew
Backus, Christopher Conlon, and Michael Sinkinson recently reviewed the literature and concluded that
“[w]hile the authors of these early papers deserve credit for shining a spotlight on this issue, the methods
used in the early papers—regressions of prices on opaque and theoretically problematic measures of
ownership concentration—are unreliable in many contexts.” Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon &
Michael Sinkinson, The Common Ownership Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence, ECON. STUD. BROOKINGS
2-3 (Jan. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ES_20190205_CommonOwnership.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLC6-9765]. For additional critiques of the Airline and Banking Papers’
empirical methodology, see Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 240-46; Hemphill & Kahan, supra note
10, at 1404-07, 1411-12; and Jeremy McClane & Michael Sinkinson, Uncommon Implications of the
Common Ownership Hypothesis (July 30, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3902736 [https://perma.cc/D94P-ARJA]. See also Daniel P. O’Brien, Price
Concentration Analysis: Ending the Myth and Moving Forward (July 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008326 [https://perma.cc/BS8E-HJCH].
123.
See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 730 (“[O]ur analysis leads us to conclude
that both researchers and policy authorities are getting well ahead of themselves in calling for and
implementing policy changes based on this research. While the correlations identified in the research to
date might seem to suggest that an increase in common ownership has anticompetitive effects, our analysis
shows that this is not a valid inference.”).
124.
Kennedy et al., supra note 12. The authors of the Airline Paper provide a reply to Kennedy
et al. in José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership:
Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence: Reply (Sept. 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044908 [https://perma.cc/WH8E-75DM].
125.
See Dennis, Geraldi & Schenone, supra note 12 (reporting the results of an empirical
analysis indicating that common ownership is not having a causal effect on airline ticket prices); Jacob
Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common Ownership (Fed. Rsrv. Bd.,
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2017-029, Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
econres/feds/files/2017029r1pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RUQ-T3DL] (providing preliminary empirical
results, based on an empirical methodology different than the Banking Paper’s, showing that common
ownership is having at most a small effect on prices and quantities in the banking industry); Eric Lewis &
Randy Chugh, Common Ownership and Airlines: Evaluating an Alternate Ownership Data Source (U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper EAG 19-1, Apr. 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1181681/download [https://perma.cc/GWB4-HPAQ] (finding that
common ownership results are sensitive to data sources and that some data sources yield results showing
no statistically significant relationship between common ownership and airline prices); McClane &
Sinkinson, supra note 122 (replicating the Airline Paper and showing that a relationship between common
ownership and price increases can be obtained using completely random levels of common ownership or
low levels of common ownership); see also Katharina Lewellen & Michelle Lowry, Does Common
Ownership Really Increase Firm Coordination?, 141 J. FIN. ECON. 322 (2021) (concluding that there is
little robust empirical evidence that common ownership affects firm behavior); José Azar & Xavier Vives,
Revisiting the Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (Sept. 27, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3805047 [https://perma.cc/8P4Y-RLCU] (using
data from the airline industry and finding that while increases in intra-industry common ownership are
associated with higher prices, increases in inter-industry common ownership are associated with lower
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generated empirical results indicating no statistically significant positive
relationship between common ownership and competitive harm in other
industries. For instance, in a recent study published in the Journal of Financial
Economics, Andrew Koch, Marios Panayides, and Shawn Thomas conducted an
empirical analysis that indicated that common ownership is not positively related
to prices or industry profitability and is not negatively related to measures of
non-price competition. 126 However, there have also been some studies of
industries other than banking or airlines going the other way. 127
3. Evaluating the empirical literature as a whole. Although, as just
discussed, much of the scholarship since the Airline and Banking papers finds
no evidence that the current level of common ownership is generating
meaningful competitive harm, the totality of the empirical evidence is mixed. 128
This Article’s analysis aids in the resolution of this empirical impasse. All else
equal, where two bodies of empirical work respectively support opposing
hypotheses, but one hypothesis is the more plausible of the two, the work
supporting the more plausible hypothesis is more likely to be the correct one.
Our analysis suggests that the hypothesis that common ownership at current
levels reduces competition is highly implausible. The more implausible a
hypothesis, again all else equal, the more likely that results in a study purporting
to support the hypothesis, though consistent with the hypothesis, are in fact due
to something else. 129 Also, the more implausible the hypothesis, the more likely
127F

128F

129F

130F

prices). But see Alex Haerang Park & Kyoungwon Seo, Common Ownership and Product Market
Competition: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 45 KOREAN J. FIN. STUD. 617 (2019) (conducting
empirical analysis showing that common ownership is generating higher prices in the airline industry).
126.
See Andrew Koch, Marios Panayides & Shawn Thomas, Common Ownership and
Competition in Product Markets, 139 J. FIN. ECON. 109 (2021).
127.
See Mohammad Torshizi & Jennifer Clapp, Price Effects of Common Ownership in the
Seed Sector, 66 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1 (2021) (finding a positive relationship between common
ownership and soy, corn, and cotton prices); see also Lysle Boller & Fiona Scott Morton, Testing the
Theory of Common Stock Ownership, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27515, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27515 [https://perma.cc/3VJ7-KLXJ] (using event study methodology and
finding that increased common ownership is associated with increased firm value); Melissa Newham, Jo
Seldeslachts, & Albert Banal-Estanol, Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from
Pharmaceutical Industry,
(DIW Discussion Paper No. 1738, 2019), https://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/206644/1/dp1738rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN3J-Q7D3] (finding that increased
common ownership between a branded pharmaceutical firm and a potential generic entrant is negatively
related to the likelihood of market entry by the generic firm); cf. Jin Xie & Joseph Gerakos, The
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership: The Case of Paragraph IV Generic Entry, 110 AEA
PAPERS & PROC. 569 (2020) (finding the common ownership between a branded pharmaceutical firm and
a generic entrant is positively related to the likelihood that the two parties will enter into a settlement
agreement in which the generic manufacturer agrees to stay out of the market).
128.
See supra notes 5, 124-126 (citing empirical studies). The empirical findings are similarly
mixed with respect to common ownership’s effects on non-competition outcomes, such as innovation and
R&D. Compare Antón et al., supra note 121 (finding a positive relationship between common ownership
and innovation), He & Huang, supra note 121 (same), and Kostovetsky & Manconi supra note 121 (same),
with Borochin et al., supra note 121 (finding that the relationship between common ownership and
innovation depends on investor type), and Qiu, supra note 121 (finding a negative relationship between
common ownership and innovation).
129.
In essence, the best that an empirical study of the sort such as the Airline and Banking
Papers can do is provide a Bayesian updating of what was known prior to the study with regard to the
likelihood of the hypothesized causal relationship between common ownership and prices being correct.
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it is that the reason a study failing to find statistically significant evidence in
support of the hypothesis fails to do so is that the hypothesized relationship does
not exist (rather than that it does exist but the test just does not have enough
power to find it). All of this helps explain why standard empirical methodology
suggests that one start with a plausible hypothesis before one does a statistical
study to see if one can reject with a high degree of statistical confidence the
theory that the hypothesis is wrong (the null hypothesis), rather than going out
to look for strong statistical relationships and then considering which null
hypothesis the results might reject and which hypothesis the results support.
A final point should be noted in connection with our argument that the
implausibility of the common ownership hypothesis reduces the persuasiveness
of any empirical findings in its support. The hypothesis, as we have seen, rests
on the assumption that common ownership leads firm managers to consider other
firm profits in their output decisions. There is empirical evidence, however, that
in fact firm managers continue to pursue own-firm net revenue maximization
despite the presence of common ownership. 130 In other words, our analysis
showing the implausibility of the common ownership literature’s hypothesis of
common ownership reducing competition itself has affirmative empirical
support.
13F

B. The Analysis Demonstrates the Lack of a Non-Coordinated Mechanism
Connecting Common Ownership to Competitive Harm
In addition to facilitating resolution of the core empirical debate in the
common ownership literature, this Article’s analysis also helps answer the
literature’s core theoretical question. That question, sometimes referred to as the
“mechanism question,” asks whether there is any plausible mechanism
Imagine a test, free from econometric problems, that has results with regard to the relationship between
common ownership and higher prices that are sufficiently strong to be considered to be statistically
significant at 95% level in a two-tailed test. This tells us only that if in fact common ownership did not
lead to higher prices, and if we ran this test 100 times in 100 parallel universes (each with all the same
factors at work affecting price that are not otherwise fully and accurately controlled for in the study), then
we would get results this strong no more than five times out of the 100. This is not the same as saying that
if, in a single test in a single universe, we observe results this strong, there is less than a 5% chance that
common ownership does not lead to increases in price. To see what statistically significant results tell us
about the likelihood that greater common ownership leads to higher prices, we have to start with what,
prior to considering the results of the test and based on the previously available evidence, we believed to
be the likelihood that greater common ownership leads to higher prices. In other words, the fact that the
results are this strong adds to the odds that common ownership leads to price increases, but to determine
what these new odds are, we would need to know our view of the odds before taking account of the test
and its results. If the hypothesis is implausible, as we find it is, the upshot is that other things we know
about the world—the things that indicate the implausibility of the hypothesis—suggest that the odds being
updated by the study started at a very low level. Put another way, this other information suggests that there
is a good chance that the strong results we observed were one of those five times in 100 that a test could
get such results despite common ownership in fact not having any effect on prices.
130.
In a recent paper, Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon, and Michael Sinkinson used
detailed consumer and scanner data from the ready-to-eat cereal market to empirically evaluate the
plausibility of the common ownership hypothesis. See Backus, Conlon & Sinkinson, supra note 31. As
the authors explain, their empirical findings consistently reject the common ownership hypothesis in favor
of own-firm profit maximization. Id. at 38.

190

Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?
connecting common ownership to competitive harm. 131 Numerous scholars and
policymakers have considered the mechanism question. 132
1. Common ownership will not lead to reductions in competition absent
coordination. This Article provides an answer to the mechanism question that
goes straight to the behavior of the persons whose decisions in the first instance
determine the level of competition: firm managers. As shown in Parts I-III, it is
highly unlikely that common ownership at current levels is causing any
additional distortion in managerial incentives to maximize own-firm net
revenues. As such, there is no plausible non-coordinated mechanism connecting
current levels common ownership to competitive harm. 133 The modifier “noncoordinated” is important. The Article’s analysis purposely carved out, and did
not address, the prospect of common ownership generating competitive harm
through an increased likelihood of collusion or coordinated conduct, such as
common owners serving as ringleaders among their portfolio firms. 134 As
discussed earlier, the provocative and novel claim of the common ownership
literature is that, even in the absence of communication or coordinated conduct,
common ownership can generate competitive harm by altering managerial
132F

13F

134F

135F

131.
See David I. Walker, Common Ownership and Executive Incentives: The Implausibility of
Compensation as an Anticompetitive Mechanism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2373, 2375 (2019) (“A key question in
[the common ownership] debate is: What mechanism would translate the anticompetitive preferences of
common owners into competition-reducing actions by the managers of the commonly held companies?
To a significant degree, the persuasiveness of the anticompetitive narrative depends on the identification
of a plausible mechanism.”).
132.
See, e.g., id.; Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 2031 (“The theoretical literature
to date does not identify what mechanism funds may use to soften competition.”); Hemphill & Kahan,
supra note 10, at 1398 (“Missing from the [common ownership] debate thus far has been a systematic
explication and assessment of the causal mechanisms that might link common ownership to higher
prices.”); Einer Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2021)
(evaluating various mechanisms of potential competitive harm); Phillips, supra note 11, at 5
(“Understanding [common ownership’s] mechanism is . . . critical to developing a coherent legal theory
of antitrust harm, and ultimately to crafting an appropriate remedy.”); Eric A. Posner, Policy Implications
of the Common Ownership Debate, 66 ANTITRUST BULL. 140, 143-44 (2021) (discussing mechanisms
that have been advanced in the literature); Anna Tzanaki, Varieties and Mechanisms of Common
Ownership: A Calibration Exercise for Competition Policy (Aug. 25, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3779856 [https://perma.cc/S5QJ-MA2C] (same).
133.
For another corporate governance-focused analysis of common ownership and competitive
harm, see Noah J. Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Taking Stock: Assessing Common Ownership,
Prepared Remarks for The Global Antitrust Economics Conference 7-9 (June 1, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1382461/phillips_-_taking_stock_6-118_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N64V-ULMK] (expressing skepticism that managers will favor common
owners over non-common owners).
134.
For a comprehensive analysis of common ownership and coordinated conduct, see Edward
B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Common Ownership and Coordinated Effects, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 201
(2020) [hereinafter Rock & Rubinfeld, Coordinated Effects]. In earlier work, Rock and Rubinfeld,
commenting on the Airline Paper, stated they were “unaware of any substantial evidence that institutional
investors have, in fact, organized an airline cartel.” Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 240. For additional
analysis of common ownership and coordinated conduct, see Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1273-74; Patel,
supra note 10, at 318-23; and D. Daniel Sokol, Debt, Control, and Collusion, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3802548
[https://perma.cc/4WWR-HES8].
Furthermore, it is important to note that the focus of the analysis was solely on common ownership’s
effect on competition, not its effect on any other aspect of firm behavior. The Article therefore takes no
position on whether, and the extent to which, common ownership affects any non-competition aspects of
firm behavior, such as those non-competition aspects evaluated in the literature. See, e.g., supra note 121
(collecting studies evaluating the relationship between common ownership and R&D).
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incentives to compete. The analysis above shows there is no such change to
managerial incentives, at least at current levels of common ownership. 135
Thus, to the extent common ownership currently is generating any
appreciable competitive harm, the causal mechanism cannot be a pure distortion
of incentives to compete and instead must be the product of additional collusion
or coordinated conduct among an industry’s firms that is enhanced by the
presence of common ownership. Using the nomenclature of antitrust, our
analysis shows that any potential harm from common ownership must be through
coordinated effects, rather than unilateral effects. 136 This is a critical conclusion
because it suggests that there is no need for new antitrust regulation aimed at the
underlying functioning of the investment fund industry.
2. Executive compensation. The Article also complements specific strands
of the scholarship directed at the mechanism question. One important question
in the literature is whether executive compensation can serve as a potential
mechanism linking common ownership to competitive harm. Scholarly
consensus on the issue has yet to form. Some scholars argue that executive
compensation can and does serve as a mechanism that connects common
136F

137F

135.
In this sense, an additional contribution of this Article is that it provides a corporate
governance justification for the continued use of the standard Cournot model to evaluate oligopoly
behavior even in common ownership environments, at least at current levels. Of course, depending on
industry characteristics, some other model of industrial organization may better describe the industry than
does the Cournot model. For instance, if firms sell differentiated goods and compete on price, then the
differentiated-goods Bertrand model would provide a better descriptor of the industry than would the
standard Cournot model. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Perloff & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium with Product
Differentiation, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 107 (1985) (developing a consumer-preferences model for
differentiated products). However, the Article’s reasoning and conclusions are equally applicable to those
other market structures. For example, if firms compete in accordance with the differentiated goods
Bertrand model, then because the introduction of common ownership would not alter managerial
objectives to compete for the reasons previously discussed, firms would continue to compete in
accordance with that standard model despite the presence of common ownership. Furthermore, because
the standard industrial organization models of firm behavior continue to appropriately describe firm
behavior at current common ownership levels, the Article also rejects the use of additional modifications
to those standard models sometimes used in the common ownership literature. See, e.g., Airline Paper,
supra note 5, at 1548-49 (providing analysis based on a modified version of the differentiated-goods
Bertrand model that assumes that firms place weight on rivals’ net revenues). Indeed, O’Brien & Salop
consider a differentiated-goods Bertrand model in which shareholders can have concurrent interests in
rival firms. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 41. But just like in their modified Cournot model, O’Brien
and Salop leave the control weights unspecified in their modified Bertrand model. See O’Brien & Salop,
supra note 41, at 611.
136.
Using different analysis, Rock and Rubinfeld reach a similar conclusion. See Rock &
Rubinfeld, Coordinated Effects, supra note 134, at 203 (“We are unconvinced by [the Airline Paper’s]
‘unilateral’ effects analysis . . . [but] increased concentration of shareholdings could make coordination
of conduct among competitors easier and more effective.”). In a non-U.S. context, at least one empirical
study has documented a positive relationship between common ownership and coordinated conduct. See
Kentaro Asai & Ben Charoenwong, Ownership Networks and Bid Rigging (Dec. 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298152 [https://perma.cc/CC763AMM] (finding a positive relationship between identical bidding in public procurement auctions in
Singapore and common ownership).
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ownership and competitive harm, 137 but others reject that connection. 138 The
empirical evidence is likewise mixed. 139
The Article’s analysis rejects the role of executive compensation as a
plausible connective mechanism. As discussed in Part III, common ownership,
at least at current levels, cannot be expected to cause boards to alter
compensation schemes in a manner that diminishes executives’ incentives to
compete because that would harm the much more sizable group of non-common
owners. And the common ownership literature does not establish otherwise. To
support the conclusion that executive compensation links common ownership to
competitive harm, the literature relies on an economic model by Miguel Antón,
Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné, and Martin Schmalz. 140 While this model nicely
captures some of the salient features of firm decision-making, it is based on an
assumption of corporate control that renders its key theoretical conclusion
inapplicable to markets as we currently observe them. The primary theoretical
conclusion that emerges from the Antón et al. model is that an increase in
common ownership causes managerial compensation to be less sensitive to ownfirm profitability, which then causes managers to become less incentivized to
engage in conduct that improves firm productivity and in turn causes prices to
rise. 141
That paper’s theoretical finding that common ownership makes managerial
compensation less sensitive to firm profitability, however, is driven by the
important modelling assumption that each firm has one or more common owners
who directly set managerial compensation because they are controlling
shareholders. 142 Under that assumption, the model’s key theoretical conclusion
138F

139F

140F

14F

142F

143F

137.
See Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, Common Ownership,
Competition,
and
Top
Management
Incentives,
J.
POL.
ECON.
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332 [https://perma.cc/L9H5-WMGM] (first
developing a theoretical model and then finding that, in firms with more common ownership, managerial
incentives are less performance sensitive).
138.
See Walker, supra note 131 (arguing that executive pay is not a plausible mechanism
linking common ownership to competitive harm); see also Matthew J. Bloomfield, Henry L. Friedman &
Hwa Young Kim, Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition (Oct.
5, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3936918
[https://perma.cc/HA8W-CGL9] (finding that common ownership has no, or a marginally positive, effect
on the use of revenue-based pay).
139.
See Hemphill and Kahan, supra note 10, at 1413 (reviewing the empirical evidence and
concluding that “the results of these papers [considered as a set] yield no firm conclusion”). This view is
echoed in an article one of whose coauthors, Daniel O’Brien, is the coauthor of the modified Cournot
model that is the theoretical heart of the common ownership literature: “[T]he relationship between
compensation and common ownership is at best unsettled.” O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 763.
140.
See Antón et al., supra note 137 (developing the model).
141.
See id. at 17 (Proposition 1).
142.
See id. at 7, 12 & 13 (“Each firm [in the model] is owned by a majority owner and a set of
minority owners . . . . Each owner i owns a (majority) stake in firm i as well as shares in other
firms . . . [E]ach majority owner i publicly proposes an incentive contract . . . for her manager.”). Note
that because the common owners maintain an interest in other firms in the industry, the assumption that
the common owner sets managerial compensation is effectively a recasting of the blended shareholder
assumption. See id. at 13 (explaining that the common owner’s objective when setting managerial
compensation in the model is “to essentially maximize[] a weighted average of her own firm’s and other
firms’ profits”).
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readily follows: because each firm’s controlling common owner sets their firm’s
managerial compensation, then, as the extent of common ownership increases,
the common owners alter managerial compensation so that it is less tied to firm
profitability because they further benefit from the resulting drop in
competition. 143
Of course, this modelling assumption is incongruent with both observed
ownership levels and the nature of corporate decision-making. First, even
considered collectively, common owners are not controlling shareholders, at
least at current ownership levels, and as a group ordinarily only hold
approximately 21% of the shares of a representative S&P 500 firm. 144 Second,
and as discussed, shareholders, whether controlling or otherwise, do not directly
set managerial compensation. 145 In sum, while the Antón et al. model is
mathematically appealing and predicts that an increase in common ownership
causes managerial compensation to be less tied to own-firm profits, that
prediction is driven by a modeling assumption that does not accord with actual
markets or the nature of corporate decision-making. Under more realistic
assumptions, there would be no expected link between common ownership and
the degree to which managerial compensation is linked to firm profitability, at
least at current common ownership levels. 146
The common ownership literature also grounds its suppositions and
conclusions on the empirical findings of Antón et al., which document a negative
relationship between common ownership and the sensitivity of managerial
wealth to own-firm profitability. 147 However, the lack of an expected theoretical
connection between common ownership and the sensitivity of managerial
compensation to firm profitability suggests caution in interpreting those results.
Because of the absence of a plausible mechanism connecting common ownership
at current levels with the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm
profitability, the statistical relationship between the two observed in the literature
14F

145F

146F

147F

148F

143.
See id. at 17 (“As common ownership . . . increases, the (majority) owner of firm i cares
relatively more about the net profits of firm j in the industry . . . Thus, each owner now prefers competition
to be softer between the firms that she partially owns.”).
144.
See Backus, Conlon & Sinkinson, supra note 1, at 285. It is true that other institutional
investors collectively hold sizable positions in publicly traded firms, but those other investors will not
necessarily share the same competition-based preferences as the common owners. See supra Section II.D.
It therefore seems highly unlikely that the common owners could form some form of controlling
shareholder coalition with other investors for the purpose of making managerial compensation less
sensitive to firm profitability.
145.
See supra note 108 and associated text.
146.
To see this, consider the baseline case where common owners collectively have 21%
interest in every firm in a market segment and the remaining 79% is held by non-common owners. If a
firm’s board were to modify managerial compensation so that it is less connected to firm profitability and
managers responded by curtailing firm productivity, the board would be subjected to shareholder activism
by the non-common owners, potentially seeking their ouster, because the firm, and therefore the noncommon owners, would be better off if their firm’s managers increased firm productivity, holding fixed
the decisions of the other firms’ managers.
147.
See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 132, at 15 (“[Antón et al.] confirmed the practical
significance of [their theoretical model] with a new cross-industry empirical study, which shows that . . .
in industries with higher horizontal shareholding levels, corporations adopt compensation methods that
make changes in executive wealth less sensitive to their own firm’s performance.” (emphasis removed)).
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may reflect spurious correlation rather than any true causal relationship. Other
scholars have critiqued on both theoretical and empirical grounds Antón et al.’s
conclusions regarding the linkage between common ownership and the
sensitivity of managerial wealth to own-firm profitability. 148
The common ownership literature further relies on the empirical results
from an earlier version of the same paper by Antón et al. The earlier version
suggests that, with higher levels of common ownership, firms are more likely to
use a managerial compensation package based solely on own-firm performance
instead of one that uses relative performance evaluation (RPE), that is, a
compensation package that is benchmarked in terms of the profits or share price
performance of a firm’s competitors. 149 In other words, all else equal, with an
RPE compensation package, the manager will earn less if the competitors are
doing better than her firm, and more if they are doing worse. The flaw in the
common ownership literature’s interpretation of these results is that, as explained
in Part III, the kind of managerial compensation package that the study claims is
more associated with common ownership—one based solely on own-firm
performance—does not create an incentive for the managers to choose an output
level below the own-firm net revenue maximizing level preferred by noncommon shareholders. Moreover, as David Walker has observed, there is an
incongruity between the common ownership literature’s argument here and the
sharp increase in the use of RPE compensation packages in general during the
very same period as the increase in common ownership. 150 Indeed, Delta and
American, two of the three most important players in the industry that has been
the common ownership literature’s primary exhibit—airlines—appear to use
RPE, and Vanguard, the ultimate common owner, pushes for it as a general
matter. 151 The fact that over time there has been a parallel positive increase in
the use of RPE and in the extent of common ownership over time raises the
question of whether, at any given moment in time, any negative relationship
between the use of RPE and the extent of a firm’s common ownership is not due
149F

150F

15F

152F

148.
See, e.g., Walker, supra note 131, at 2392-2411; see also Hemphill & Kahan, supra note
10, at 1409-1419 (critiquing Antón et al. and, more generally, the wider class of claimed linkages between
common ownership and competitive harm that target the firm’s output broadly, such as the structure of
executive compensation).
149.
See, e.g., Martin C. Schmalz, Common Ownership and Competition: Facts,
Misconceptions, and What to Do About It, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 8 n.4 (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3176696 [https://perma.cc/TN5D-7ZTE] (“It is
known . . . that common ownership can explain the scarcity of relative performance evaluation, a
prediction for which Antón, Ederer, Giné, and Schmalz (2016) provided first support.”); Martin C.
Schmalz, Why Firms’ Shareholders Condone Seemingly “Excessive” Executive Pay Packages, and What
It Means for the Economy, PROMARKET (July 6, 2016), https://promarket.org/2016/07/06/firmsshareholders-condone-seemingly-excessive-executive-pay-packages-means-economy/
[https://perma.cc/XVV5-2TSZ] (“[W]hen industry competitors are more commonly owned, we should
expect to see (a) higher unconditional top management pay that is (b) less related to the firm’s
performance, and (c) more related to rival firms’ performance. This is precisely the pattern present in the
data, as the new paper shows.”).
150.
See Walker, supra note 131, at 2384-91 (discussing and documenting the rise of relative
compensation schemes).
151.
Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 248-49.
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to some third factor associated with industries that have both high common
ownership and low RPE use, rather than common ownership causing low RPE
use. 152
3. The inertia mechanism. A closely related mechanism discussed in the
literature is what we refer to as the “inertia mechanism.” This mechanism posits
that common ownership can generate competitive harm because common owners
do not push managers to compete as hard in the marketplace as they would if the
common owners were instead non-common owners. 153 This, it is argued, aligns
with the preferences of firm managers, who prefer to live a “quiet life,” which
can be better achieved if firms are not actively competing with one another. 154
When more carefully thought through, however, this theory becomes
unconvincing. The theory rests on two pillars. First, firm managers, in their
desire for an easy life, have interests that align with those of the common
shareholders. Second, because of this interest alignment, managers will be in a
better position to indulge these interests when the proportion of common
shareholders increases. Neither pillar is strong.
a. Interest alignments among common shareholders, non-common
shareholders, and managers. In terms of managerial interests aligning with
153F

154F

15F

152.
Rather than creating an incentive to choose an output level that is less than own-firm net
revenue maximizing, relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensation schemes may create an
incentive to choose an output level that is greater than is net revenue maximizing, since doing so drives
down the profits of competitors. This mis-incentive is presumably considered worthwhile because it is
more than compensated for by the package’s greater precision in rewarding other kinds of managerial
actions, such as greater efforts to cut costs, that enhance the firm’s net revenues. This is a tradeoff that
would probably vary from one industry to another. Thus, in an industry with an extensive use of RPE
compensation schemes, an equilibrium could exist with higher output and lower prices than predicted in
the standard Cournot models discussed in Part III. We find it implausible that a corporate board would
alter the form of compensation package in response to an increase in minority common shareholders when
doing so hurts the interests of the continuing substantial majority shareholders who are not common
owners. And, as just noted in the text, we think the longitudinal data help support the idea that any evidence
of a cross sectional relationship between firms with higher common ownership and lower use of RPE
compensation schemes is due to some common factor rather than a causal relationship. In fairness to the
common ownership adherents, if we were wrong in both these regards and common owners in fact desired
less use of RPE and are successful in pushing managers to adhere to the common owners’ desires, we can
see how output, instead of being above the Cournot level as might happen with the use of RPE, instead
might be at the Cournot level. Note, though, that this would result in own-firm net revenues being lower:
the gain from producing at the Cournot level rather than above would not be as great as the loss due to a
non-RPE compensation package’s lower precision in rewarding other kinds of net revenue-enhancing
actions. Still, we doubt the final condition here: that common owners desire less use of RPE. RPE
represents a higher-powered incentive scheme for managers to increase net revenues by cutting costs and
improving their products. We share David Walker’s skepticism that the Big Three would want to substitute
lower-powered incentives for higher-powered one just to stifle competition a bit. See Walker, supra note
131, at 2400. Walker also notes that fund resistance to RPE is contrary to their publicly stated positions.
Id.
153.
See, e.g., Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct,
10 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 413, 434 (2018) (“‘[D]oing nothing’ is a mechanism by which common owners
can induce portfolio firms to internalize shareholders’ interests in other firms, including their
anticompetitive incentives.”).
154.
See, e.g., Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1518 (“[N]ot explicitly demanding or incentivizing
tougher competition between portfolio firms may allow managers to enjoy the ‘quiet life’ . . . and thus
lead to an equilibrium with reduced competition and sustained high margins”); Azar, Schmalz & Tecu,
supra note 7, at 5 (“[M]utual funds may simply not push firms to compete aggressively, and managers
may consequently enjoy a ‘quiet life’ without aggressive competition.”).
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common as opposed to non-common shareholders, we should start by noting that
the intellectual foundation of the “quiet life” idea in economics relates to
monopoly rather than oligopoly. In contrast to monopoly, in oligopoly there are
competitors and the central issue is how each firm relates to its competitors. 155
The dominant focus in oligopoly theory is what effect an oligopolistic market
structure has on each firm’s decision as to output level. Not surprisingly, that is
exactly the focus of the models on which the common ownership literature itself
is built. Yet there is no reason to think it is any harder to decide to produce at a
higher level than to decide to produce at a lower level.
Moreover, as we discussed in Part III, when it comes to the output decision,
the managers already desire what is in the interests of the non-common
shareholders: the level of output that maximizes solely the firm’s own residuals,
that is, maximizing the difference between what it can sell its output for and the
cost of producing that output. This is because it is from these residuals that
managers can make room for the things that matter to them, such as
compensation, perquisites, power, prestige, the pleasure of benefiting their
associates in the firm, and a sense of doing social good. We could add to this list,
if managers truly do prefer not to work hard, that choosing the level of production
that maximizes own-firm net revenues creates the most space to indulge this taste
as well without facing the loss of their jobs. Thus, the managers likely need no
pressure from the firm’s shareholders to want to choose the level of output that
maximizes own-firm residuals. Therefore, any reduction in pressure resulting
from an increase in the proportion of common to non-common owners should
not matter.
While the effort in making an output-level decision does not vary with the
level chosen, one could argue that implementing a decision to produce at a higher
156F

155.
For support of the inertia mechanism, the common ownership literature ordinarily cites to
John R. Hicks’ classic article, “The Theory of Monopoly,” and Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil
Mullainathan’s more recent empirical analysis of managerial preferences. See, e.g., Airline Paper, supra
note 5, at 1518 (citing John R. Hicks, The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1935), and Marianne
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial
Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043 (2003)). First, Hicks’ work does not support the common ownership
hypothesis. The common ownership literature relates to oligopolistic industries, in which each firm does
face at least some competitors. By contrast, Hicks’ analysis concerns the benefits to managers of operating
in monopolistic companies, where there are no competitors and thus managers can enjoy the “quiet life.”
See Hicks, supra, at 8 (“The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”). The idea there is that a monopoly
environment provides a cushion for a manager wishing to indulge in behaviors that involve less effort but
generate less profits. Unlike the manager of a firm in a more competitive situation, the monopoly’s
manager can indulge in such behavior without revenues falling so much that the firm is bankrupted. The
paper by Bertrand and Mullainathan does not support the supposition that managers of oligopolistic firms
prefer to be idle and that an output reduction satiates that preference. The primary conclusion about
managerial preferences that Bertrand and Mullainathan draw from their empirical analysis is that
managers are hesitant to undertake cognitively difficult activities. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra, at
1067 (“Our findings are in fact much more consistent with a quiet life hypothesis, in which managers are
reluctant to undertake cognitively difficult activities.”). It does not follow that causing the firm to produce
less is cognitively more or less difficult than causing the firm to produce more. Additionally, to the extent
managers are hesitant to undertake cognitively difficult activities, that further undercuts the common
ownership model. Trying to appease the interests of a hypothetical shareholder who is a constructed
amalgam of each of the firm’s shareholders would be much more cognitively difficult than just
maximizing own-firm net revenues.
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level requires more effort than implementing a decision to produce at a lower
level. This could lead, in turn, to a decision to produce at a lower level than would
maximize the firm’s net revenues. We are skeptical of this argument, however.
We suspect that the persons making the output-level decision are top corporate
officials, who do not do most of the implementation work. The common
ownership literature adherents make no effort to show that a decision to have a
higher level of output does involve more effort by these top officials.
What though about areas where the level of managerial effort can affect
firm performance, such as cutting costs or improving product quality? It is not
obvious that there is any difference between the interests of common and noncommon shareholders when it comes to managerial efforts of these kinds. Indeed,
the opposite seems much more likely. It may be true that if a single firm cuts its
costs or improves its product, doing so may reduce the profits of its competitors,
just like if a single firm increases production. But if all the firms in the industry
cut costs or improve the product, profits of the industry as a whole, and of each
firm within it, are likely to go up, which is the opposite of what happens if all
firms increase production. 156 It is what all firms do in equilibrium that is the
focus of the common ownership literature. Yet an equilibrium where reduced
management effort leads to higher costs or less product improvement is
unsatisfactory for both common and non-common ownership. So, that
equilibrium is not one that either common owners or non-common owners would
be motivated to stay passive about. Again, the common ownership literature
adherents make no effort to show that there is a difference in interests between
the common and non-common shareholders with regard to the level of
managerial effort exerted in these directions. And if there is not such a difference,
an increase in common ownership will not change the level of pressure on
managers to exert these efforts.
b. Pressures on managers from an increase in common ownership.
Moreover, even if the interests of managers with regard to promoting
competition were for “quiet life” reasons aligned with common shareholders’
interests, it would not matter. As we showed in Part III, to the extent that the
157F

156.
This can be seen in the numerical example of the baseline Cournot model examined in
Section I.A. Suppose that there is an industry-wide cost reduction so that, instead of the two firms each
having a marginal cost of $2, they instead each have marginal cost of $1. Working through a similar
analysis as in Section I.A, it can be shown that at this lower cost, each firm’s net revenues are higher than
its net revenues when marginal cost was $2. Specifically, at this lower marginal cost, it can be shown that
each firm produces 30,000 units and the market price is $4. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 22, at
391-92 (providing calculations for a generalized two-firm Cournot model with linear demand and constant
marginal cost). So, because of the mutual cost reduction, each firm earns net revenues of 30,000 ∗
($4 − $1) = $90,000, which is higher than each firm’s net revenues of $71,201 when they had the higher
marginal cost of $2. See supra Section I.A. An industry-wide product improvement can be modeled in the
baseline Cournot model by a rightward shift in the demand curve, because this means that for any given
quantity, consumers are willing to pay a higher price. So, in the example considered in Section I.A, a
product improvement can be represented by the inverse demand curve shifting from 𝑃 = 10 − 𝑄/10,000
to 𝑃 = 20 − 𝑄/10,000. It can be shown that this product improvement causes each firm to produce
60,000 units and the market price to be $8. See supra Section I.A. The product improvement therefore
enables both firms to earn net revenues of 60,000 ∗ ($8 − $4) = $240,000, which too is higher than
each firm’s net revenues before the industry-wide product improvement.
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interests of common and non-common shareholders differ, the pressures on firm
managers are exclusively to advance the interests of the non-common owners, at
least given the current level of common ownership. Thus, even if common
owners prefer managerial inertia and do not push managers to cut costs or
improve their products as vigorously as do non-common owners, the increase in
common ownership to date has made no difference in managerial incentives to
compete. These incentives remain trained on own-firm net revenue
maximization. 157
4. Selective omission. This Article’s analysis also complements and adds to
the recent work by Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan, who also critically
evaluate the mechanism question. 158 Hemphill and Kahan first create a typology
of potential mechanisms and reject each of them but one as implausible. 159 The
mechanism that they do not rule out is referred to as “selective omission.” This
refers to a practice whereby a common owner presses the firm’s managers for
actions that increase both the net revenues of the firm and the common owner’s
158F

159F

160F

157.
The one exception, at least in theory, relates to the effectiveness of the activist hedge fund
in correcting any “quiet life”-driven deviation by a firm from the net revenue maximization output level
(a deviation which, for the reasons stated in the text, we find most unlikely). The Big Three are often the
“deciders” in whether an activist-hedge-fund effort succeeds. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 77, at 1814.
The idea would be that, with common ownership, an activist fund would be less likely to launch an effort
against the firm’s managers. The reason would be that, even though a majority of shareholders are noncommon and would support the campaign, the absence of common shareholders’ support would make
gathering the needed number of proxies more difficult. For all the reasons discussed in this Section, we
find this scenario extremely unlikely. The only example to suggest otherwise offered by the common
ownership literature’s adherents—the 2015 proxy fight loss by Nelson Peltz and his hedge fund Trian for
seats on DuPont’s board, see Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1558 nn.36-37; Schmalz, supra note 40—in
fact turns out to not be supportive of the common ownership hypothesis. The claim in the common
ownership literature is that competition considerations caused the Big Three to vote against the campaign,
see Schmalz, supra note 40, but the Big Three voted against Peltz and Trian for reasons wholly unrelated
to competition, see, e.g., Ronald Orol, Why DuPont Beat Nelson Peltz in the Biggest Proxy Fight in Years,
THESTREET (May 20, 2015, 9:30 AM EDT), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/mergers-andacquisitions/why-dupont-beat-nelson-peltz-in-the-biggest-proxy-fight-in-years-13158047
[https://perma.cc/CU5Y-EMY5]. Additionally, retail investors (i.e., non-common owners) also voted
against Peltz and Trian in large numbers. See Orol, supra. The Airline Paper cites a blog post by John
Coffee as suggesting that the Big Three voted against Peltz because his success would hurt their
investments in DuPont’s competitors. See Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1558 (“The most plausible
hypothesis is that the large asset managers are concerned about the impact of hedge fund activism on their
broader portfolio.” (quoting John C. Coffee, The Lessons of DuPont: Corporate Governance for Dummies,
COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (June 1, 2015), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/06/01/thelessons-of-dupont-corporate-governance-for-dummies/ [https://perma.cc/LV7F-CQ9V])). However,
Coffee’s actual explanation was that the funds were long-term investors in DuPont and were concerned
that Peltz was aiming for a short-term gain that would be damaging to the company in the longer run. See
Coffee, supra (noting, after the quoted language above, that “indexed investors are there for the long-term
and will suffer the consequences if the activists’ short-term engagement with the firm produces longerterm losses”). Also, the common ownership literature suggests that the way Peltz wanted DuPont to
become more competitive was to invest more in R&D. See, e.g., Schmalz, supra note 40. But as we noted
above in the text, common owners and non-common owners would both want all the industry’s firms to
invest in positive net present value R&D projects because, unlike if all firms expand production, profits
for the industry are likely to go up, not down. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
158.
See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 10.
159.
See id. at 1400 (“Our main conclusion is that, for most mechanisms, there is either no strong
theoretical basis for believing that institutional [common owners] could or would want to employ them,
no significant evidence suggesting that they do employ them, or both.”). For analysis in response, see
Elhauge, supra note 132, at 33-45.
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portfolio value, while remaining silent as to actions where those two objectives
conflict. 160 Hemphill and Kahan suggest that the selective omission mechanism
could be a conduit for competitive harm. They reason that if the common owner
were instead a non-common owner, then the shareholder would not remain silent
with respect to firm actions that have countervailing effects on the net revenues
of the firm and the common owner’s portfolio value. Instead, they would
affirmatively push for actions that increase firm value and affirmatively reject
actions that decrease firm value. 161
Our analysis shows that even the one mechanism not ruled out as
implausible by Hemphill and Kahan—selective omission—would at most only
be relevant under extraordinary circumstances. To review, when it comes to
deciding on a level of output (something where deciding on a high level requires
no more effort than deciding on a low one), the interests of managers and noncommon shareholders are the same—the net revenue maximizing output level.
Therefore, if common shareholders are passive on the question, that will have no
effect on the output decision. When it comes to other types of managerial
action—cost cutting and product improvement—ones where taking it would both
require managerial effort and, for any given firm, benefit it while hurting its
competitors, if all the firms in the industry forgo the action, both common and
non-common shareholders will be worse off. Thus, the common shareholders are
better off joining forces with each firm’s non-common shareholders and pushing
managers to undertake the action rather than remaining passive. So, where a
firm’s managers fail to cost cut or improve their product, this is not an occasion
where it would be in the best interests of a common shareholder to engage in
selective omission.
A further consideration is a “compared to what” question. To the extent that
the growth in common ownership comes from a diminution in the proportion of
shareholders who are retail, retail investors are not organized and suffer from
rational apathy, so they are not great monitors. 162 In other words, to the extent
that the Big Three are in fact passive, they are not necessarily any more passive
than the retail shareholders they replaced, and so their growth may not signal any
reduction in shareholder pressure for any kind of action. And to the extent that
the growth in index funds is due to a small proportion of investors investing in
managed funds who were not common owners, the managed funds are not known
to be aggressive monitors themselves.
The only situation where common shareholder passivity might matter is
where managers, contrary to their own interests, mistakenly produce at a level
lower than the standard own-firm net revenue maximizing Cournot level and an
activist hedge fund seeks to correct the situation. It is conceivable that in this
situation the common shareholders would not add their support to the activist
because they would see maintaining the status quo as in their interest. This
16F

162F

163F

160.
161.
162.
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situation seems unlikely, however, both because managers would probably not
persist in behavior contrary to their own interests and because of all the other
mechanisms set out in Part III that push managers to choose the own-firm net
revenue maximizing level. 163
5. Crowding Out. The Airline Paper suggests three possible causal links
between common ownership and a decline in competition, two of which—the
idea that common ownership leads to managerial compensation packages that
discourage competition 164 and the “inertia” idea that common owners will be
passive and not join an activist hedge fund campaign aimed at pushing a firm’s
managers to compete more effectively 165—have been rebutted above. The third
is that common owners “crowd out” activist hedge funds. 166 The authors are not
explicit as to what “crowding out” means. For this to be distinct from the inertia
mechanism, however, it must be the idea that because of the rise of common
ownership, it is harder for activist shareholders to acquire their typically 5% to
7% stake that they use as their base before going out to persuade other owners to
vote with them in a proxy fight aimed at changing how the firm is managed. The
idea that such “crowding out” would have a significant effect on the likelihood
of a successful activist hedge fund campaign does not accord with modern
corporate finance theory. Even if the Big Three hold, say, 21% of the shares of
each company in an industry, the other 79% are still held by other investors who
will sell their shares if they believe that the price in the market is above the value
to them of continuing to hold their shares. And that price, prior to the activist
hedge fund putting in its buy orders, will be the same—the market’s view of the
expected future cash flow to be paid to the holder of the share discounted to
present value—whether the Big Three own no shares or 21%. The standard
textbook theory conclusion is that the demand curve for a given stock is flat, 167
which would mean that the presence or absence of the Big Three would not affect
the price at which the activist hedge fund could then buy. To the extent that real
world markets might deviate somewhat from this textbook conclusion, 168 the
common ownership adherents have not shown that the deviation is sufficient to
significantly affect the likelihood of activist hedge fund success, that is, that
despite the remaining large pool of shares available to be traded in a public
164F

165F

16F

167F

168F

169F

163.
See also supra note 157.
164.
See Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1556-57.
165.
Id. at 1518.
166.
Id. (“[C]oncentrated owners such as hedge fund activists have been shown to push their
target firms to compete more aggressively against industry rivals. Competitive concerns thus arise when
concentrated owners get crowded out by diversified institutions that also hold large stakes in industry
rivals.”).
167.
Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the
Effects of Information on Share Price, 45 J. BUS. 179, 182 (1972) (“[T]he market will price assets such
that the expected rates of return on assets of similar risk are equal. If any particular asset should be selling
to yield a higher expected return due solely to the increase in the quantity of shares
outstanding . . . investors seeing these profit opportunities would soon arbitrage them away”).
168.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage Flatten Demand
Curves for Stocks?, 75 J. BUS. 583 (2002).
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market, it would be significantly more costly to acquire 5%-7% of the shares
relative to the Big Three not holding 21% of the shares. 169
6. Justifications for the assumed blended-shareholder objective. As we
have seen, the common ownership literature’s two most central papers—the
Airline Paper and the Banking Paper—simply assume that managers of firms in
common ownership environments will seek to maximize the within-industry
portfolio of a hypothetical blended shareholder. The papers use this blendedshareholder assumption to test whether a higher level of common ownership is
associated with higher prices. 170 Some common ownership scholars, however,
have sought to develop more foundational economic models that have managers
pursuing the interests of the blended shareholder as the predicted outcome of
their theories, rather than assuming such behavior as a first principle. 171
While these foundational models are mathematically elegant, they suffer
from a similar problem as the common ownership model in that they are based
on assumptions that are at odds with the actual corporate governance landscape.
The model by José Azar is representative. 172 He develops a game-theoretic
voting model based on ones from political science in which competing politicians
seek to adopt positions over a range of possibilities to attract sufficient votes for
election. In applying this to the election of directors, he has directorial candidates
in the model propose strategies for the firm and shareholders vote for directors
based on those proposed strategies, which the elected directors then go on to
implement. 173 Given this setup and additional assumptions, Azar’s model
predicts, accurately under the provided assumptions, that managers will propose
170F

17F

172F

173F

174F

169.
Rock and Rubinfeld reach a similar conclusion, describing the idea as “puzzling.” See Rock
& Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 250; see also id. (“[I]ndex funds collectively holding only around 16 percent
of the stock of a typical airline will hardly prevent activist hedge funds from acquiring large (e.g., 9
percent) positions. Indeed, as discussed earlier, Warren Buffett acquired substantial positions over a short
period of time.”).
170.
To conduct the estimations in the Airline and Banking Papers, the researchers had to not
just specify, but also calculate, the control weights that managers place on shareholders’ portfolios. Setting
the control weights to correspond to shareholders’ ownership interests, see, e.g., supra note 42, facilitates
that calculation because data are available on large institutional investors’ ownership interests via their
13F filings. See Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1523-25 (equating control weights with ownership interest
and using 13F data). It should be noted in this regard that a number of researchers have observed that 13F
filings contain errors, including 13F filings relating to ownership interests in airlines. See, e.g., Backus et
al., supra note 122, at 11-12 (“The authors of this current paper noticed when examining ownership of
airlines that many filings contained errors around bankruptcy events.”).
171.
See, e.g., José Azar, Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm
(Aug. 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2811221
[https://perma.cc/DE4M-U57B]; Duarte Brito, Einer Elhauge, Ricardo M. Ribeiro & Helder Vasconcelos,
Modelling the Objective Function of Managers in the Presence of Overlapping Shareholding (Mar. 26,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264113
[https://perma.cc/C7GH-AGXH]; Duarte Brito, António Osório, Ricardo Ribeiro & Helder Vasconcelos,
Unilateral Effects Screens for Partial Horizontal Acquisitions: The Generalized HHI and GUPPI, 59
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 127 (2018); Alexandr Moskalev, Objective Function of a Non-Price-Taking Firm
with Heterogeneous Shareholders (Mar. 5, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3471564 [https://perma.cc/R4T8-56UN].
172.
See Azar, supra note 171.
173.
See id. at 10-11.
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and implement strategies that maximize the welfare of a blended shareholder. 174
However, for the model to support the blended-shareholder assumption used in
the common ownership literature, the strategy proposed by the directorial
candidates must relate to the firm’s output decision (or, more generally, the
firm’s eventual level of competition). This is simply not how we observe
elections for directors working in the real world. Proxy statements do not include
statements on candidates’ preferred level of competition, let alone candidates’
preferred output decision, and there is no evidence that they campaign on this
basis. 175 Additionally, Azar’s model, like other models that endeavor to
microfound the use of the blended-shareholder assumption, are probabilistic
voting models, in that when managers propose strategies, they are assumed to be
uncertain as to how shareholders will vote. While directors may have such
uncertainty as a general matter, they would not have that uncertainty with respect
to the issue that is relevant to the common ownership model—the firm’s level of
output or its amount of competition generally. Instead, directors would know
with certainty that the firm’s majority non-common owners would unequivocally
vote for the proposal that maximizes own-firm net revenues.
7. Other considerations. Finally, this Article’s analysis buttresses the
findings of other scholars who have identified an array of reasons why, regardless
of the mechanism, we should be skeptical about common ownership generating
any competitive harm. For instance, common owners may also hold positions in
downstream suppliers, input providers, or firms in complementary industries.
These other ownership interests would diminish or eradicate the common
owners’ interest in lessened competition in the relevant market. 176 As perhaps
the most obvious example, if a common owner also maintains a large position in
a firm that purchases products from the commonly owned firms, the common
owner’s position in the downstream purchaser would cause it to prefer more, not
less, competition by the product market firms, all else equal.
As is made transparent by the analysis in Section I.B, the common
ownership model used in the literature does not take these offsetting
considerations into account, as the model focuses solely on shareholders’
portfolios in the relevant market, not in other markets. Thus, even under the
blended-shareholder assumption used in the common ownership literature—
175F

176F

17F

174.
See id. at 13.
175.
See, e.g., Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 239 (“[W]e see no evidence that shareholders
vote on competitive strategy and no evidence that directors run on a ‘platform’ that is directed towards a
competitive strategy. In proxy statements, the information provided is limited to qualifications, expertise
and other directorships, and director stock ownership and compensation.”); Hemphill & Kahan, supra
note 10, at 1415 (“[T]here is no evidence that outside director candidates in uncontested elections stand
for any particular competitive strategy . . . .”).
176.
See, e.g., John R. Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship,
ANTITRUST SOURCE 6 (Dec. 2014), https://media.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Paper-trailantitrust-source-Dec-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWR2-TH3F]; Douglas H. Ginsberg & Keith Klovers,
Common Sense About Common Ownership, CONCURRENCES REV., May 2018, at 8; Menesh S. Patel,
Common Ownership and Antitrust: Eight Critical Points to Guide Antitrust Policy, ANTITRUST CHRON.
4 (2019), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/common-ownership-and-antitrust-eightcritical-points-to-guide-antitrust-policy-2/ [https://perma.cc/6ET6-3RBF].
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which this Article argues is an incorrect assumption, at least at current levels of
common ownership—the common ownership model exaggerates common
ownership’s competitive effects by failing to take into account common owners’
shareholding positions in industries outside of the relevant market. 177 This is an
especially important consideration, since it is the large-scale index funds
managed by the Big Three, which have significant ownership positions in all
publicly traded firms in industries spanning the economy, that have been
primarily responsible for driving up common ownership levels.
178F

C. The Analysis Cautions Against the Use of the Key Common Ownership
Concentration Metric: MHHI Delta
The common ownership literature makes extensive use of a metric for
measuring the impact of common ownership known as MHHI Delta, 178 though
as discussed below some more recent common ownership research also uses
additional measures, such as the kappa measure. 179 The MHHI Delta is the basis
of the literature’s central empirical claims—that higher levels of common
ownership have led to higher prices in the airline and banking industries—and it
is the trigger for some of the literature’s recommended policy responses. The
analysis in this Article suggests that these uses of the MHHI Delta can lead to
seriously mistaken conclusions. Specifically, as discussed below, the MHHI
Delta introduces econometric problems that can result in a finding that a higher
level of common ownership leads to higher prices when, in fact, it has no such
effect. And it can recommend antitrust interventions where none are called for.
1. Problems with use of the MHHI Delta in estimating any impact of
common ownership on prices. Using the MHHI Delta to study the impact of
having multiple investment fund common owners on an industry’s
competitiveness can create serious problems. To see why, it is important first to
understand what the metric stands for and why it was developed.
179F

180F

177.
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power,
and Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 212,
217 (2016) (explaining that common ownership studies “do not account for the potentially countervailing
impact of financial investors’ ownership interests in inputs, complementary products, and customers, or
for the potentially countervailing impact of vertical integration by the firms into complementary lines of
business”). Furthermore, intra-common-owner conflicts of interest resulting from the diversity of funds
they maintain would serve to further check any competitive influence of common ownership. See, e.g.,
John D. Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2019) (explaining how large investment
managers have significant internal conflicts of interest because they operate such a broad array of funds);
Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (2020) (discussing
investment managers’ fiduciary duties to fund beneficiaries, who may have conflicting interests).
178.
The MHHI Delta has been used, for example, to estimate the effect of common ownership
on airline prices. See Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1528. It also has been used to describe the extent of
common ownership in a given industry, see, e.g., Antón et al., supra note 137, at 37; as a rough predictor
of common ownership’s potential competitive harm, see Posner et al., supra note 8, at 687-89; and as a
component of policy proposals aimed at addressing common ownership’s perceived antitrust concerns,
see Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1301-02.
179.
See infra Section IV.C.3.

204

Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?
For several decades, economists have used a metric called the HHI, which
is a measure of the level of concentration in an industry. 180 In theory at least, the
higher the HHI, the greater is the burden of an industry’s concentration on its
competitiveness. 181 Though subject to several criticisms, 182 the HHI has been
widely used as a guide to policy. For example, a merger between two firms that
leads to an HHI above a certain threshold will prompt scrutiny by antitrust
agencies and can lead to an injunction preventing the merger or a divestment
order unwinding it. 183
For reasons discussed in Section I.B, if an industry has common ownership
and the common owners have influence over the output decisions of the firms in
which they own shares, the burden on competition arising from a given level of
concentration can be aggravated. The MHHI (the modified HHI) was developed
to deal with situations where these twin conditions are a reality. 184 The MHHI
Delta is the difference between the HHI and the MHHI. The idea in the common
ownership literature is that an industry whose HHI is not above the threshold
could still prompt concern when the MHHI Delta is added into the calculation. 185
The MHHI Delta is a theoretically sound measure. Mathematically, it arises
out of the O’Brien-Salop model discussed above, which serves as the progenitor
of the theory on which the common ownership literature is based. 186 However,
to use the MHHI Delta in a regression designed to determine the effect of
common ownership on prices or for public policy purposes, the metric must first
18F

182F

183F

184F

185F

186F

187F

180.
The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms in the relevant market.
See Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
herfindahl-hirschman-index [https://perma.cc/H58K-9ZAH].
181.
If the market is a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods, then there is a known
positive relationship between the HHI and a measure of the price markup in the industry. See, e.g., Janusz
A. Ordover, Alan O. Sykes & Robert Willig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1857, 1863-65 (1982). Also, under certain circumstances, there is a relationship between the HHI
and the ability of firms to detect defection from a collusive agreement, which is a precondition to
successful collusion. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
182.
For instance, it is understood that the HHI is a relatively poor predictor of competitive harm
in markets in which firms sell differentiated products and engage in Bertrand competition, and economists
have developed alternate competition measures for these types of markets. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1085-86 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (discussing the diversion ratio).
183.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3
(2010), www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/92J9-TD6M]
(noting that the antitrust agencies, when evaluating the likely competitive effects of a proposed merger,
often calculate the HHI).
184.
One example, considerably less controversial than assuming that these twin requirements
are met because of common ownership in an industry attributable primarily to the Big Three, is where one
firm in an industry acquires a substantial stake in a competitor. As others have noted, the O’Brien & Salop
model—the theoretical heart of the common ownership literature—was in fact developed with a focus on
this less controversial example. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 231.
185.
It is worth noting that a driving idea behind why a higher HHI should give rise to concern
about a lack of competition is that collusion and enforcement of collusive agreements through detection
of defection become easier as the number of players in an industry decreases. George Stigler suggested
this idea in his seminal 1964 article. See Stigler, supra note 181. In contrast, common ownership, the
factor that gives rise to an industry’s MHHI being greater than its HHI, leaves unaffected the number of
players.
186.
See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 41, at 610-11.
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be calculated. This calculation involves two objectively measured factors—the
market shares of the industry’s firms and the extent of investors’ holdings across
industry firms. But—and as a point that is often unstated or understated in the
common ownership literature—the MHHI Delta also includes the researcher’s
own subjective evaluation, in the form of control weights, of the extent of
common ownership’s influence on managerial incentives. That subjective
evaluation is captured by the researcher’s choice of control weights—another
component of the MHHI—which reflect the influence that the firm’s various
shareholders are assumed to have on the manager’s output decision. 187 These
control weights reflect the fact that the reason for deriving a modified HHI is the
assumption that common owners have some influence on their firms’ output
decisions and that firm managers trade off the preferences of the non-common
owners for those of the common owners to some specified extent. For this reason,
the MHHI Delta is not a pure reflection of the amount of common ownership in
a given industry. Instead, the metric embodies common ownership’s competitive
effects under the researcher’s chosen specification about how common
ownership affects managerial incentives. While a variety of specifications are
theoretically possible, the common ownership literature largely focuses on just
one: the literature calculates the MHHI Delta using the blended-shareholder
assumption discussed above. That is, the literature assumes that the common
shareholders have a degree of influence in proportion to their holdings. 188
The analysis in this Article shows that this specification is incorrect.
Because current levels of common ownership are not expected to lead managers
to meaningfully depart from own-firm net revenue maximization, the correct
MHHI Delta is zero in any given industry. 189 This is an important observation
18F

189F

190F

187.
Formally, if we index shareholders by i and firms by j, and if 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 is the fraction of shares
in firm j held by investor i, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 measures the weight that the manager of firm j places on the portfolio of
shareholder i, and 𝑠𝑗 measures the market share of firm j, then the MHHI Delta is defined as:
∑𝑖 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘
MHHI Delta = ∑ ∑ (
) ∗ 𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑗
∑𝑖 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
𝑗

𝑘≠𝑗

See id. at 597. Therefore, calculation of the MHHI Delta requires a specification of how managers trade
off the preferences of the firm’s shareholders, which is reflected by the control weights 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 , as well as data
on shareholder ownership levels and firms’ market shares.
188.
More precisely, the common ownership literature assumes the particular variant of the
blended-shareholder assumption discussed in supra note 41, whereby managers are assumed to maximize
a weighted average of shareholder portfolios such that the weights correspond to shareholders’ ownership
interests in the firm. See also supra note 42 (using a stylized example to illustrate the assumption).
Therefore, with respect to the formula discussed in supra note 187, the MHHI and MHHI Delta calculated
in the common ownership literature assume that the control weights (𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ) correspond to shareholders’
ownership interests in the firm (𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ). In contrast, in their work from which the common ownership
literature derives its model, O’Brien and Salop develop a formula that is generalized and expressly does
not specify the control weights. Instead, the authors explain that the weights will depend on the firms’
control structures. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 41, at 610.
189.
This can be seen in the equation in supra note 187. Pick any firm j and consider one of the
firm’s shareholders, shareholder i. One option is that shareholder i is a non-common owner. This means
that, for this shareholder i in firm j, 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 > 0 but 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 = 0 for any firm k other than firm j. Thus, for any
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because the common ownership literature’s claim of reduced competition is
largely built on the empirical findings in the Airline and Banking Papers that
greater common ownership leads to higher prices in those industries. 190 Yet these
findings rely on a misspecified MHHI Delta.
Various scholars have questioned the common ownership model’s use of
the MHHI Delta. 191 In particular, it has been recognized that, because of
endogeneity problems, specifying the control weights as some positive number
when in fact they should have been zero can result in a finding that a higher level
of common ownership leads to higher prices when it in fact has no such effect. 192
The problem arises because when the control weights are non-zero, factors other
than the amount of common ownership can simultaneously affect both the MHHI
Delta and price. 193 Therefore, even if common ownership has no effect on
competition and prices, those other factors could generate a positive relationship
in the data between the MHHI Delta and price. This could lead to the erroneous
conclusion that the observed positive correlation between the MHHI Delta and
price shows a positive causal relationship between common ownership (as
captured by the MHHI Delta) and prices. For example, an increase in demand
can lead to both an increase in prices and an increase in MHHI Delta, which
19F

192F

193F

194F

non-common owner, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 = 0 for any firm k other than firm j. The second option is that shareholder
i is a common owner. If firm managers focus just on the interests of the non-common owners, then, for
this shareholder i in firm j, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 = 0, so 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 = 0 for every firm k. Therefore, for each shareholder in
firm j, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 = 0 for any firm k other than firm j. Thus, the numerator in the equation in supra note 187
is 0, which means that the MHHI Delta is zero.
190.
The baseline panel regressions in the Airline Paper regress price on the MHHI Delta (as
well as the HHI and other covariates) to assess empirically the relationship between common ownership
and airline prices. See Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1528. As discussed, the Banking Paper’s analysis
evaluates both common ownership and partial ownership interests. See Banking Paper, supra note 5, at 3.
The concentration metrics used in the Banking Paper therefore are analogous to the MHHI Delta and the
MHHI but modified to incorporate partial ownership interests. See Banking Paper, supra note 5, at 86
(deriving the GHHI Delta and GHHI, which is the sum of the HHI and GHHI Delta). The baseline panel
regressions in the Banking Paper regress price on the GHHI. See id. at 17.
191.
See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 744-48; Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at
240-46; Patel, supra note 10, at 304-23; Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 10, at 1406-09; McClane &
Sinkinson, supra note 122, at 16-22.
192.
See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 744-47, 752-56.
193.
In other words, when the control weights are not zero and there is common ownership, the
MHHI Delta is endogenous in a regression of price on the MHHI Delta. This arises in the first instance
because, when the control weights are not zero, the MHHI Delta is a function of the firms’ market shares.
This can be seen in the equation in supra note 187 and the discussion in supra note 189. The common
ownership model assumes that 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 . That is, the weight that the manager of firm j places on the
portfolio of shareholder i equals shareholder i’s fractional interest in the firm. With reference to the
discussion in supra note 189, this means that for every common owner in firm k, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 > 0 for at least
one firm k other than firm j. This, in turn, means that the numerator in the equation in supra note 187 is
not 0, which means that the MHHI Delta calculated in the literature is some function of the market shares
of the firms subject to common ownership. The endogeneity of the MHHI Delta for non-zero control
weights arises because market shares are not exogeneous. This is because various market factors can
simultaneously affect both market shares and price. See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 75256.
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creates a positive statistical association between the MHHI Delta and prices
without there being any causal relationship between the two. 194
In sum, the empirical findings in the Airline and Banking Papers that set
off the common ownership alarm bells are based on a modified concentration
measure, the MHHI Delta, that assumes without support that corporate
managers, in deciding on the firm’s output level, seek to satisfy the preferences
of the hypothetical blended shareholder. The analysis in Parts II and III not only
belies that assumption, but also questions the plausibility of the Airline and
Banking Papers’ empirical findings, which are based in the first instance on
regressions of price and the MHHI Delta. 195 While those regressions show a
relationship between the MHHI Delta and competitive harm, 196 that relationship
could merely be attributed to exogenous changes other than common ownership
that simultaneously affect the MMHI Delta and either price or another measure
of competitive harm. 197
2. Inappropriateness of MHHI Delta for policy purposes. As discussed
below, Einer Elhauge calls on the federal antitrust agencies to mount wide-scale
investigations of common ownership in industries based on high MHHI and
MHHI Delta concentration thresholds. 198 Yet a high MHHI Delta (or a high
MHHI) assumes the problem that it is supposed to measure. To calculate it
195F

196F

197F

198F

19F

194.
See, e.g., id. at 752-56 (discussing the endogeneity issue and providing an example of
spurious correlation between price and the MHHI Delta based on shifting market demand that affects both
price and the MHHI Delta via firms’ market shares).
195.
As noted, the baseline regressions in the Airline and Banking Papers regress price on one
of the modified concentration measures. See supra note 190. In this way, the estimations in those papers
are structure-conduct-performance estimations that were once routine in the industrial organization
literature but have since fallen out of favor, in part because of endogeneity concerns. See, e.g., Xavier
Vives, Common Ownership, Market Power, and Innovation, 70 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1, 4 (2020)
(describing structure-conduct-performance estimations and their relation to the Airline and Banking
Papers); Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Empirical Studies of the Effects of
Common Ownership 10-12 (2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.dropbox.com/s/
cielt8q3uh5vkwe/BCS_ESECO.pdf?dl=0 [https://perma.cc/P9Q5-6ZG6] (similar); William N. Evans,
Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, Endogeneity in the Concentration-Price Relationship: Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 41 J. INDUS. ECON. 431 (1993) (analyzing endogeneity issues in concentrationprice regressions and applying the analysis to regressions in the airline industry); see also Steven Berry,
Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial
Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 44, 46-48 (2019) (describing the primary reasons why industrial
organization economists have moved away from structure-conduct-performance estimations).
196.
See supra Section IV.A.1. But see supra notes 124-125 (identifying studies showing no
statistically significant relationship or a limited relationship).
197.
Other scholars have questioned the findings of the Airline and Banking Papers because of
the endogeneity concerns discussed above. See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 752-56; Rock
& Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 240-42; Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case for Doing
Nothing About Institutional Investors’ Common Ownership of Small Stakes in Competing Firms, 13 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 213, 243-48 (2019). In their original papers, the authors of the Airline and Banking Papers
conducted additional econometric analysis to address these and other potential endogeneity issues. See
Airline Paper, supra note 5, at 1517-18; Banking Paper, supra note 5, at 3-4. That econometric analysis
also has been critiqued. See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 9, at 756-57; Rock & Rubinfeld, supra
note 9, at 242-45. For a response to some of these critiques, see Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal
Shareholding Harms Our Economy—And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207
(2020).
198.
See Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1302-03 (calling on federal antitrust authorities to investigate
any horizontal stock acquisition that has or will create a MHHI Delta of over 200 in a market with a MHHI
of over 2,500).
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requires the assumption that common shareholders influence the output decisions
of firms in the industry.
3. The kappa measure. Some recent research into common ownership also
uses another common ownership metric usually referred to as kappa. 199 Kappa
algebraically arises out of the O’Brien-Salop model and represents the implied
weight that a firm’s manager places on the net revenues of rival firms under the
postulates of that modified Cournot model. 200 Just like the MHHI Delta, to
calculate kappa for purposes of conducting empirical analysis or setting policy,
it is necessary to specify the control weights reflecting the influence that the
firm’s various shareholders are assumed to have on the manager’s output
decision. 201 In other words, calculating kappa requires the researcher to make an
a priori assumption about how common ownership affects managerial incentives
to compete. Thus, kappa, like the MHHI, is not a pure measure of common
ownership but instead embodies the researcher’s chosen specification about how
common ownership affects managerial decision-making. And again, just like the
MHHI Delta, the literature generally calculates kappa using the blendedshareholder assumption discussed above, which posits that common
shareholders influence managerial decision-making in proportion to their
holdings. 202 If, as this Article contends, common ownership at current levels does
not cause managers to deviate from own-firm net revenue maximization, then
kappa will be zero for each in a given market segment. 203
20F

201F

20F

203F

204F

199.
For example, the baseline regression of Antón et al., supra note 137, that seeks to ascertain
empirically if common ownership causes executive compensation to be less connected to firm profitability
uses kappa as its measure of common ownership. See Antón et al., supra note 137, at 35; see also Backus,
Conlon & Sinkinson, supra note 1 (using kappa); Boller & Fiona Scott Morton, supra note 127 (same).
Other measures of common ownership have also been developed in the literature. See, e.g., Erik P. Gilje,
Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levit, Who’s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its
Impact on Managerial Incentives, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 152 (2020) (developing the GGL measure).
200.
As others have shown, the manager’s specified objective in the O’Brien-Salop model can
be recast as the manager choosing their firm’s output level to maximize own-firm net revenue and a
weighted average of the net revenues of all rival firms. See, e.g., Backus, Conlon & Sinkinson, supra note
195, at 2-4. Specifically, using the notation in supra note 187, the objective of the manager of firm j in the
O’Brien-Salop model can be represented as the manager choosing its firm’s level of output level to
maximize:
Π𝑗 + ∑ 𝜅𝑗,𝑘 ∗ Π𝑘
𝑘≠𝑗

where Π𝑗 is firm j’s profit and the profit weights, 𝜅𝑗,𝑘 , are defined as:
𝜅𝑗,𝑘 =

∑𝑖 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘
∑𝑖 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗

See id. Kappa for firm j is the vector of profit weights 𝜅𝑗,𝑘 for all rival firms k.
201.
In other words, the researcher must specify the 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ’s that appear in the definition of 𝜅𝑗,𝑘 in
supra note 200.
202.
One notable exception is Backus et al., supra note 1, who calculate kappa using various
alternate specifications of the control weights. See, e.g., id. at fig.13.
203.
This can be seen by using reasoning similar to supra note 189 and supra note 200.
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V. Policy Conclusions
The common ownership literature’s claim that common ownership lessens
competition has led to a number of proposed changes in antitrust policy aimed at
the workings of the nation’s investment funds. These proposals have received
serious attention in policy circles, 204 undoubtedly due in part to the literature’s
suggestions that the lessened competition is leading to higher prices and, through
the profits they generate, to an exacerbation of income inequality as capital’s
share of national income grows at the expense of labor and hence of
consumers. 205 This Article’s analysis indicates, however, that common
ownership is not leading to such problems. These proposals are unwarranted
because they are a solution to a non-problem that will burden a system by which
tens of millions of Americans, for low fees, get a market return on their savings
while minimizing risk through broad diversification. They also would divert the
country’s limited antitrust enforcement capacity away from more important
targets at what may be a crucial time.
205F

206F

A. The Absence of Need for the Proposed Reforms
As a starting point, we note that antitrust laws already prohibit collusive
conduct, and the federal antitrust agencies routinely investigate, litigate, and
criminally prosecute claims for collusion. 206 So, although the critics of common
ownership by mutual funds and ETFs have not yet pointed to any evidence that
the increase in these funds’ holdings has led to any instances of collusion, to the
207F

204.
The Federal Trade Commission has shown an especially keen interest in the common
ownership issue. The Commission has held a hearing on the subject, see FTC Hearing #8: Competition
and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-8-competition-consumer-protection-21stcentury [https://perma.cc/XZ6P-LGU4] (collecting materials from an FTC hearing on common
ownership), and FTC commissioners have engaged on the issue and assessed the leading proposals
discussed below. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 133 (discussing the Elhauge and Posner et al. proposals).
Very recently, the FTC also issued a set of compulsory process resolutions directed at enforcement areas
the Commission deems important, which includes common ownership. See FTC Streamlines Consumer
Protection and Competition Investigations in Eight Key Enforcement Areas to Enable Higher Caseload,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/ftcstreamlines-investigations-in-eight-enforcement-areas [https://perma.cc/76SG-NC9V].
205.
See Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1291-1301; Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual Funds’
Dark Side, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2015, 9:46 AM), slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/
2015/04/mutual_funds_make_air_travel_more_expensive_institutional_investors_reduce.html
[https://perma.cc/W9E7-EDD6] (arguing that common ownership by mutual funds exacerbates economic
inequality); Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of the American Worker
(May 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3832069
[https://perma.cc/ZD5X-7TFF] (concluding that common ownership has resulted in wage stagnation and
income inequality).
206.
The antitrust agencies’ investigations, civil litigation, and criminal prosecutions of
collusion extend far beyond instances of collusion in product markets. See, e.g., Health Care Company
Indicted for Labor Market Collusion, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan 7, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
health-care-company-indicted-labor-market-collusion [https://perma.cc/LH9S-WKT2] (describing a
criminal indictment concerning collusion in a labor market, where an employer allegedly conspired with
rivals to not solicit rivals’ employees).
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extent common owners might facilitate collusion or coordinated conduct by the
firms in which they invest, there already exists an enforced legal prohibition on
that conduct. 207 And, as the Article shows, there is no good reason to think that
common ownership is generating appreciable competitive harm through any
non-collusive mechanism, which is the central claim of the common ownership
literature. So, the tools exist to fight situations where problems might develop,
and there is no reason to develop tools to fight problems that have not
developed. 208
To be clear, this Article does not advocate for a hands-off approach to
common ownership. First, as noted, the Article’s objective was to evaluate
whether common ownership can generate competitive harm apart from any
communication or coordinated conduct. We cannot deny the possibility that, as
some have argued, common ownership could generate competitive harm by
facilitating coordination or collusion. 209 To the extent that evidence arises
suggesting that this has occurred, it would be improper for the antitrust
authorities to not investigate and, if warranted, challenge this behavior.
Second, the Article’s analysis has focused on current levels of common
ownership, not hypothetical sharply higher levels. It is certainly the case that at
some point common ownership could be high enough to affect managerial
incentives to compete. To take an extreme example, if each firm in an industry
had the same set of shareholders so that all the firms were totally commonly
owned, then there would be a heightened risk of competitive harm. For each firm
in that scenario, all its shareholders would prefer that its managers compete less,
all else equal. 210 This Article does not support a non-intervention policy at higher
208F

209F

210F

21F

207.
See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does Common Ownership Explain Higher
Oligopolistic Profits? 12-13 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L., L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2018, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3627474 [https://perma.cc/GY2PMELD] (“Likewise, there are a variety of other plausible coordinated scenarios in which shareholders can
cause competitive harm, such as if shareholders act as a trustworthy conduit for communication among
competitors, advocate an industry-wide anticompetitive compensation structure or possibly even as the
spreader of anticompetitive practices. In each of these cases, depending on the factual context, shareholder
conduct may violate existing antitrust law and be subject to sanctions.” (footnote omitted)); Ginsberg &
Klovers, supra note 176, at 3 (explaining that antitrust agencies have considerable expertise with huband-spoke conspiracies, the exchange of competitively sensitive information, and conscious parallelism
and can apply the current legal framework to common ownership).
208.
In addition to prevailing antitrust law, other existing regulatory factors act to disincentivize
common owners from facilitating collusion by their portfolio companies. For instance, as John Morley
has carefully explained, a large passive investment manager that seeks to exercise control over one of its
portfolio companies may incur significant regulatory burdens under Sections 13(d) and 16 of the 1934
Act. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 177, at 1427-34.
209.
See supra note 134 (collecting sources that analyze common ownership and coordinated
conduct).
210.
However, all else may not be equal. As noted, common owners may also have interests in
related industries. These intra-common ownership conflicts may diminish common owners’ preferences
for reduced competition in the relevant market. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Additionally,
and as also noted above, common owners’ heterogenous interests in the firms in the relevant market would
further check common ownership’s competitive harm. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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levels of common ownership that generate a meaningful modification to
managerial incentives to compete and associated competitive harm. 211
That said, we do not think it is inevitable that broad-based index funds will
ultimately have such a large share of the market that common ownership would
reach a level requiring intervention. These funds have grown in recent years
partly because of a growing awareness among the investing public of the virtues
of diversification and partly because, through the application of technology and
economies of scale, fund managers, particularly the Big Three, have been able to
offer such funds for very low fees. There is evidence, though, that managed
funds, using fundamental analysis, can, at least prior to taking out their fees,
make above-market returns by finding underpriced and overpriced stocks and
trading accordingly. The more money under the management of such funds,
however, the harder it is to do this. Each fund needs to find more and more such
opportunities, and they get harder to find. The converse is true as well: the less
money under management, the easier it is to find opportunities sufficiently good
to cover the management fees and give investors above-market returns. This
suggests that, as an increasing portion of the country’s savings go into broadbased index funds, managed funds will be able to offer the prospect of abovemarket returns and an equilibrium will be reached between the low fees and
diversification of the broad-based index funds and the slightly higher after-fee
expected returns on managed funds. 212
21F

213F

B. The Leading Proposed Reforms and Their Costs
Two reform proposals by leading antitrust scholars would prohibit or
legally burden common ownership even in circumstances involving no collusion
or coordination. One proposal by Einer Elhauge calls on the federal antitrust
agencies to mount wide-scale investigations of common ownership in industries
with MHHI scores above a certain threshold. 213 Another well-known and
detailed proposal by Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, and Glen Weyl would
prohibit common ownership except at de minimis levels. 214 Under this latter
214F

215F

211.
As others have noted, there is an important need for additional theoretical and empirical
research into common ownership. See, e.g., Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 10, at 1447-50. As reflected
by the current Article, one important open line of research is to determine the threshold at which common
ownership is expected to generate meaningful modifications to managerial incentives to compete.
212.
A model of investment fund equilibrium of this sort, along with empirical support, is
worked out in Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry,
118 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2015). See also Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New
Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 32 (2019)
(noting that actively managed funds compete with index funds for investors); Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 879-80 (1992)
(same). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 722 B.U. L. REV. 721
(2019) (concluding that the Big Three could cast as much as 40% of the votes in S&P 500 companies
within two decades).
213.
See Elhauge, supra note 3, at 1303. For additional exposition of his proposal, including a
robust response to critiques, see Elhauge, supra note 197.
214.
See Posner et al., supra note 8, at 678, 708-10. For additional discussion of this proposal,
see Posner, supra note 132, at 146-47.
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proposal, investors in an oligopolistic industry would be required to choose
between holding only the shares of a single one of the industry’s firms or, if it
wished to hold shares in more than one firm in the industry, holding no more
than 1 percent in any such firm. 215 The only way out of this required choice
would be if the investor were a purely passive index fund that engages in no
corporate governance activities of any sort. 216 Investors that fail to meet the
criteria would be subject to lawsuits by the antitrust agencies. 217
Other scholars have critiqued these policy proposals, and this Article
supports the critiques. These other scholars argue that the proposals would yield
little or no gain in competition, but the scholarly critiques are largely based on
other grounds. For example, many critiques arise from econometric problems
that scholars see in the common ownership literature’s empirical results or from
skepticism that fund management companies would take action designed to
lessen competition in an industry. 218 This Article, with its focus on the incentives
of corporate managers, complements and strongly reinforces the conclusions of
these other scholars by showing that common ownership at current levels is
unlikely to generate competitive harm except possibly through facilitating
collusion or coordinated conduct, which is already prohibited under existing
antitrust law. 219
The Posner et al. proposal would generate significant social costs. Consider
first its application to broad-based index funds. The Big Three offer such funds
with fees and expenses that are well less than 1/10th of 1%. The investment-fund
industry has a good number of players and would not appear to have large
barriers to entry, so the dominance of these three firms suggests there are
considerable economies of scale in running such funds. Thus, there is a real
concern that the Posner et al. proposal, in limiting each fund to 1% of every firm
in an industry, would in essence replace the Big Three with the little twenty-one
and, in so doing, substantially raise costs per dollar under management, costs that
216F

217F

218F

219F

20F

215.
See Posner et al., supra note 8, at 678, 708. More precisely, the proposal relates to effective
firms. For purposes of their proposal, an investor is considered to hold the shares of more than a “single
effective firm” if the investor is “invested in more than one firm, and the total market share of all firms
[the investor] holds any stake in is greater than HHI/10,000 in the oligopoly.” Id. at 708 (emphasis
removed).
216.
An index fund is deemed “purely passive” if it “commits to engage in no communication
with top managers or directors, to vote its shares in proportion to existing votes so that it has no influence
in any corporate governance decision, and to own and trade stocks only in accordance with clear and nondiscretionary public rules, such as matching an index as closely as possible.” Id. at 709 (emphasis and
footnote removed).
217.
See id. at 678. For a proposed legislative prohibition on common ownership, see Posner &
Weyl, supra note 205 (discussing limiting the stakes of institutional investors through legislative action).
218.
See, e.g., Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 263-67; Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 10, at
1450-52; Ginsberg & Klovers, supra note 176, at 6; Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 197, at 248-269;
Thomas A. Lambert, Mere Common Ownership and the Antitrust Laws, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2913, 2957-62
(2020); Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 207, at 12; see also Koch et al., supra note 126, at 113 (“Based on
our findings of no widespread influence of common ownership on industry competition, policies limiting
common ownership do not currently appear warranted.”); Alessandro Romano, Horizontal Shareholding
and Network Theory, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 363, 366 (2021) (arguing that the policy proposals could
have the unintended effect of reducing the level of competition in product markets).
219.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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would be passed on to investors. 220 Fee differences of even a fraction of 1% can
make a substantial difference for long-term investments, such as for retirement
or college. That is of particular concern because these funds are the investment
vehicles of tens of millions of ordinary Americans.
Under the Posner et al. proposal, the Big Three could keep their market
shares and accompanying low costs, but only if they step out of their current
corporate governance role completely. Our point here is that common and noncommon shareholders share the same interests over everything except the level
of output. Where the interests are shared, these big management companies can
play an important role and, in so doing, improve the governance of the country’s
public companies. 221 While some scholars argue that these management
companies underinvest in their corporate governance efforts, they do so from the
perspective of wanting them to do more, not less. 222
The Posner et al. proposal would also burden the operations of managed
investment funds, which might generate economic harm by reducing the
accuracy of prices in the secondary markets. 223 In essence, if a fund already had
1% of the shares of one company in an industry, it would face significantly
diminished incentives to engage in fundamental-value research to look for
mispricing among any other firms in the industry. If the fund found one or more
underpriced firms, it could not use what it learned unless it sold its stake in the
original firm. 224
Additionally, both these proposals would require substantial antitrust
resources to implement. 225 This is not a prosaic consideration, as there is a
21F

2F

23F

24F

25F

26F

220.
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 10, at 2129-31 (making a similar point but with
respect to corporate governance activities by the Big Three).
221.
Indexed and managed funds each perform their own corporate governance functions. Index
funds are motivated by the fact that they cannot exit poorly run firms, and they are helped by economies
of scale and scope with respect to pushing for broad, market-wide governance standards. See Kahan &
Rock, supra note 157, at 1776-77; see also Fisch et al., supra note 212 (arguing that index funds are
motivated to improve corporate governance across their broad portfolios of firms as a way to compete
with managed funds). Managed funds, which are much less diversified, are more motivated and, through
the work of their analysts, better situated, to identify specific problems at particular firms. See Kahan &
Rock, supra note 157, at 1789, 1808. For an example of fund efforts with respect to governance, see
Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How Corporate Governance
Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 678-94 (2016).
222.
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 10, at 2119-26; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen &
Scott Hirst, The Agency Problem of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 100-01 (2017).
Additionally, because of the Big Three’s passivity in corporate governance efforts relative to other types
of investors, these scholars do not believe that Big Three are facilitators of significant anticompetitive
conduct. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra, at 108-09.
223.
See Merritt B. Fox & Kevin S. Haeberle, Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and Their
Regulation, 42 J. CORP. L. 887, 890-891 (2017) (discussing the social benefits of accurate share prices in
secondary markets).
224.
This dampening effect on the incentives to engage in price accuracy enhancing fundamental
value research is similar to the effect of restrictions on short selling. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R.
Glosten & Paul C. Tetlock, Short Selling and the News: A Preliminary Report on an Empirical Study, 54
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 648-49 (2010).
225.
Elhauge’s proposal would cause the antitrust agencies to incur significant antitrust
expenses in mounting investigations and potential antitrust litigation. While these enforcement resources
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growing consensus that antitrust resources must be urgently deployed to correct
substantial anticompetitive conduct occurring at key pressure points of the U.S.
economy. 226 The policy proposals advanced in the literature to prohibit or limit
common ownership would divert precious antitrust resources away from
rectification of these actual competitive concerns. 227
This Article’s analysis also informs the propriety of proposals on the other
end of the liability spectrum that would immunize common owners from antitrust
liability if certain conditions are met. For instance, Ed Rock and Dan Rubinfeld
have proposed an antitrust safe harbor that would shield investors who limit their
holdings to 15%, refrain from board representation, and only engage in ordinary
corporate governance activities. 228 While this bright-line rule would provide
institutional investors with relative legal certainty, it could have unintended
consequences. If, for example, six institutional investors each maintained a 10%
interest in rival firms, then those common owners would predominate over the
non-common owners. In that scenario, managerial incentives to compete may be
mitigated to such an extent that antitrust intervention is necessary. 229
For this reason, it would be imprudent at this time for policymakers to make
large-scale modifications to antitrust policies in response to common ownership,
such as through wide-scale antitrust investigation of common ownership,
27F

28F

29F

230F

would be avoided if institutional investors reshaped themselves in a manner that allowed them to fall
within Posner et al.’s safe harbor, Posner et al.’s proposal would necessitate the use of significant antitrust
resources in other ways. For instance, their proposal would require the antitrust agencies to identify yearly
a set of markets deemed to be oligopolies based on concentration numbers and a set of market factors. See
Posner et al., supra note 8, at 698. To mitigate this significant expenditure of antitrust resources, Posner
et al.’s proposal would have the agencies sequentially identify the industries appearing on the oligopoly
list, starting “with industries where there is empirical evidence of competition problems due to common
ownership or other clear empirical evidence of concentration.” Id.
226.
Perhaps most important are the calls for antitrust action against the large technology
companies, which are perceived to be exploiting market dominance in contravention of antitrust laws and
to the detriment of consumer wellbeing. See, e.g., Menesh S. Patel, Merger Breakups, 2020 WIS. L. REV.
975, 1022-23 & nn.230-32 (2020) (citing calls by policymakers, scholars, and advocates for the breakup
up of large technology companies). Indeed, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
have each commenced pathbreaking and far-reaching antitrust litigation against a large technology
platform. These antitrust challenges and other antitrust enforcement in the technology space, as well as
enhanced antitrust enforcement in other market segments, will necessitate the use of considerable antitrust
resources. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control,
Tech Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 69, 70 (2019) (explaining the need for additional
antitrust enforcement resources directed at merger review, exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, and
employer-side monopsony power in labor markets).
227.
This is an especially important consideration, since antitrust enforcement resources have
been steadily declining. See, e.g., Fiona M. Scott Morton, Reforming U.S. Antitrust Enforcement and
Competition Policy, WASH. CTR. EQUITABLE GROWTH (Feb. 18, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/
reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/ [https://perma.cc/E4S2-C8GR] (“The
resources expended on enforcing the antitrust laws in the United States are lower as a proportion of Gross
Domestic Product than they were for most of the mid-1900s and have experienced a notable decline since
2000.”).
228.
See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 270-77.
229.
Rock and Rubinfeld acknowledge possibilities like this. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note
9, at 271 n.144 (“A caveat: although in the current distribution of shareholdings, investments of less than
15% do not pose any significant antitrust risk, in an alternative universe in which, for example, six
investment funds each controlled 15% of each of the airlines, the safe harbor would have to be reevaluated.”).
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prohibitions of common ownership, or safe harbors. As the Article’s analysis
shows, these policies are not just overbroad. They could also generate significant
social cost, ultimately to the detriment of the very consumers that antitrust seeks
to serve. 230
231F

Conclusion
With the investment funds of the three largest management companies now
holding in aggregate around 21% of the shares of a typical S&P 500 firm, the
common ownership issue has become a lightning rod for scholarly debate. The
adherents of the common ownership literature make the provocative claim that
these kinds of cross-industry holdings are leading to higher prices and less
competition and can do so even in the absence of communication or collusion
among firm managers or common shareholders. Others have critiqued this
conclusion, mainly questioning the adherents’ empirical results or the idea that
investment funds with holdings across an industry would, as shareholders in each
firm in the industry, push each firm to compete less. Largely neglected in this
debate is a careful analysis of how the persons who in the first instance actually
make the decisions that determine an industry’s competitiveness—firm
managers—would act differently in the presence of common ownership. After
all, shareholders, whether common or non-common, do not and cannot directly
determine how vigorously their firms compete. Instead, that decision is made by
the managers that the firm’s shareholders collectively appoint to act on their
behalf.
Training attention on managerial decision-making yields important
insights. It forces a critical assessment of the economic model of decisionmaking that lies at the heart of the common ownership debate. In both the
standard Cournot model of oligopolistic competition and the modified Cournot
model, which is the theoretical basis of the common ownership literature, the
critical decision is each firm’s output level. The lower the industry’s total output,
the higher the price of its product. This modified Cournot model assumes that
when a firm’s shareholding body begins to include persons who own shares in
the firm’s rivals, the firm’s managers, in making the firm’s output decision,
jettison the goal of maximizing own-firm net revenue maximization and instead
choose an output level that maximizes some portion of the net revenues of rival
firms. The idea is that this objective serves a hypothetical “blended shareholder”
230.
In light of the Article’s analysis, the optimal policy response is for the antitrust agencies to
follow a case-by-case approach to common ownership through which they continue to monitor common
ownership and target specific instances of anticompetitive conduct. See also Patel, supra note 10, at 28283 (similarly calling for a case-by-case approach to common ownership); accord Rock & Rubinfeld, supra
note 207, at 12 (“[A]ny intervention addressing the anti-competitive effects of common ownership should
require a specific showing of such effects, based on particularized industry findings.”). The Article’s
analysis can aid in that targeted approach. For instance, if the market segment of interest includes semicommon owners whose competition-based preferences are aligned with the common owners’ preferences,
then the corporate governance mechanisms discussed above are more likely to serve as a bridge between
common ownership and non-coordinated competitive harm, all else equal. See supra Section III.D.
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whose interests involve some kind of averaging of the interests of the common
and non-common shareholders.
This blended-shareholder assumption hides a basic conflict between the
two groups. The common shareholders would want each firm’s managers to
make output decisions that incorporate to some extent the net revenues of rival
firms. That is, common shareholders would prefer decisions that result in the
industry’s aggregate output being closer to the level that a firm monopolizing the
industry would choose. The non-common shareholders, who gain nothing from
any increase in net revenues of the firm’s rivals, would want managers to choose
the level of output that would maximize solely the firm’s own net revenues. This
is the same level as would have been preferred by all the firm’s shareholders if
there were no common shareholders. It is also the output level likely to be
preferred by management because maximizing the firm’s own net revenues
maximizes its ability to give managers the things they desire out of their
positions.
Determining how managers would resolve this sharp conflict between the
firm’s common owners and non-common owners cannot be done in the abstract.
Instead, that question must be analyzed in relation to the incentive structure
within which mangers work. This incentive structure consists of a set of sticks
and carrots that have been analyzed by corporate law scholars for decades. The
sticks are threats of a proxy fight (and the related mechanisms of nominating
competing directors and voting against unopposed directors), hostile tender
offer, activist shareholder campaign, depressing the share price by the sale of a
large block of shares, and fiduciary duty suits. The carrots are the managers’
compensation packages and their own share ownership. As we have seen, an
analysis of these sticks and carrots suggests that, relative to no common
ownership, the existence of common ownership, at least at current levels, is
unlikely to change how the sticks and carrots work in any way that would lead
to an output level lower than if the firm had no common shareholders. Thus,
contrary to what is predicted by the common ownership literature’s underlying
theory—the modified Cournot model—the presence of common ownership does
not appreciably lessen competition.
This managerial-focused analysis helps resolve a number of open issues
pertinent to the common ownership debate and also informs significant policy
debates. First, the analysis substantiates the claims of researchers who have
found no empirical connection between common ownership and competitive
harm. Similarly, the analysis reinforces the arguments of certain scholars that the
findings that do show an empirical connection are driven by spurious correlation
rather than any true causal relationship. Second, the analysis informs the
important mechanism question in the literature and shows that there is no noncoordinated mechanism that connects common ownership to competitive harm,
at least at current levels of common ownership. Third, the analysis yields another
reason why researchers and policymakers should reject, or at least be extremely
skeptical about, basing analysis or policy on the modified concentration measure,
the MHHI Delta. The manner in which that metric is calculated and used in the
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literature relies on the erroneous blended-shareholder assumption. As a result,
the metric can, due to endogeneity, lead to a result that appears to show an
association between common ownership and higher prices when none exists.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the Article’s analysis raises a
cautionary red flag to policymakers who may be contemplating significant
modifications to antitrust law or policy in response to common ownership. At
current common ownership levels, such policies, while well-intentioned, would
be imprudent. Existing antitrust law is well-suited to address any plausible
competitive harm resulting from common ownership. Any significant retooling
of antitrust law or policy for purposes of eradicating or significantly tamping
down on current levels of common ownership would be an ill-advised effort to
solve a non-problem. Such a reform would add to the costs of the investment
vehicles of choice for tens of millions of ordinary Americans for such major life
purposes as retirement and the education of their children.
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Appendix: Calculations and Figures for the Examples in Part I
A. The Example of a Standard Cournot Model for an Oligopolistic Industry
As discussed in the text of this Article, the example involves an industry,
widgets, that consists of two firms, Firm A and Firm B. The demand curve for
widgets is depicted by the equation 𝑃 = $10 − 𝑄/10,000, where 𝑄 is the
aggregate widget production of the two firms and 𝑃 is the resulting price for any
given 𝑄. The firms have identical costs, with marginal cost (𝑀𝐶) equal to $2 per
additional unit, whatever is its level of production. Let 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵 represent
production amounts for Firms A and B, respectively.
Figure 1: Best Response Function for Firm A
𝑞𝐴

40,000
30,000
26,667
20,000

20,000 26,667 40,000

80,000 𝑞𝐵

This figure depicts Firm A’s best response function, which provides
the output decision by Firm A (𝑞𝐴 ) that maximizes Firm A’s net
revenues given the output decision by Firm B (𝑞𝐵 ). So, for example,
with Firm A seeking to maximize its net revenues, if Firm B produces
40,000 widgets, Firm A should produce 20,000 widgets, and if Firm B
produces 20,000 widgets, Firm A should produce 30,000 widgets.
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In this market environment, for a given level of Firm B’s output, 𝑞𝐵 , Firm
A will choose its quantity, 𝑞𝐴 , such that its quantity decision maximizes its net
revenues. Based on our assumptions concerning the industry demand curve for
widgets and concerning each firm’s costs, it can be shown that the net revenue
maximizing production amount for Firm A, given Firm B’s production amount,
is given by the equation: 𝑞𝐴 = 40,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /2. 231 In game theory, this function
is referred to as Firm A’s best response function, as it represents Firm A’s
optimal response to Firm B’s quantity choice. It can similarly be shown that Firm
B’s best response function is given by the equation: 𝑞𝐵 = 40,000 − 𝑞𝐴 /2.
Figure 1 depicts Firm A’s best response function. For a given output choice
by Firm B on the horizontal axis, the vertical axis provides the output for Firm
A that maximizes Firm A’s net revenue. So, for instance, if Firm B produces
20,000 widgets, then the output that maximizes Firm A’s net revenue is 30,000
widgets. Firm A’s best response function is downward sloping, which represents
the fact that if Firm B produces more, this expanded output decision will depress
the market price. That, in turn, will decrease Firm A’s marginal revenue, which
will incentivize Firm A to produce less.
23F

231.
This expression can be derived as follows. 𝑄 = 𝑞𝐴 + 𝑞𝐵 , and so 𝑃 = 10 − (𝑞𝐴 +
𝑞𝐵 )/10,000. Total revenue to Firm A is calculated as 𝑇𝑅𝐴 = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑞𝐴 = [10 − (𝑞𝐴 + 𝑞𝐵 )/10,000] ∗ 𝑞𝐴 =
10𝑞𝐴 − 𝑞𝐴 2 /10,000 − 𝑞𝐴 𝑞𝐵 /10,000. Marginal revenue to Firm A is the first derivative of this
expression, that is, 𝑀𝑅𝐴 = 10 − 2𝑞𝐴 /10,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /10,000. To maximize net revenue, the managers of
Firm A choose the output level such that 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. 𝑀𝐶 = $2, and so 10 − 2𝑞𝐴 /10,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /10,000 =
2. Rearranging, 𝑞𝐴 = 40,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /2.
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Figure 2: Firms’ Best Response Functions and Optimal Output Decisions
𝑞𝐴
80,000

40,000
(𝑄𝐴 , 𝑄𝐵 )

26,667
20,000

20,000 26,667 40,000

80,000

𝑞𝐵

This figure graphs Firm A and Firm B’s best response functions. Firm
A’s best response function is the line that is lower on the left side of
the graph and higher on the right side of the graph. The output
combination at the intersection of the two best response functions is
𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 , the net revenue maximizing output decision of each firm
holding fixed the output decision of the other firm. The other output
combination identified in the figure is where the firms split the
monopoly outcome and each firm produces 20,000 units. However, as
we will discuss below, this combination does not represent an
equilibrium set of outputs absent collusion between the two firms.
Denote the expected equilibrium output quantities for the two firms by 𝑄𝐴
and 𝑄𝐵 , respectively. 232 Given the firms’ best response functions, 𝑄𝐴 = 𝑄𝐵 =
26,667. 233 At that quantity combination, each firm is maximizing its net
revenues, given the quantity choice of the other firm. It follows that the system
is in equilibrium: at these respective output levels, neither firm can increase net
revenues by producing either more or less than its current output, holding fixed
the other firm’s quantity decision.
23F

234F

232.
More precisely, 𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 denote the Nash equilibrium of Cournot game.
233.
This is derived from the two best response functions, 𝑞𝐴 = 40,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /2 and 𝑞𝐵 =
40,000 − 𝑞𝐴 /2. Accordingly, 𝑞𝐴 = 40,000 − (40,000 − 𝑞𝐴 /2)/2. Rearranging, 𝑞𝐴 = 80,000/3 =
26,667. If this is so, then 𝑞𝐵 = 26,667 as well.
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Graphically, the expected output combination, 𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 , lies at the
intersection of the two firms’ best response functions. 234 Figure 2 above plots the
two firms’ best response functions, given the specified demand function and
marginal costs, and identifies the firms’ expected output under the assumption of
net revenue maximization. At that level of output, each firm produces 26,667
widgets, that is, 𝑄𝐴 = 26,667 and 𝑄𝐵 = 26,667. In the Cournot oligopoly,
therefore, market output is 53,333 widgets, 235 and so the market price is 𝑃 =
$10 − 53,333/10,000 = $4.67. Because each widget costs $2 to produce, each
firm makes net revenues of 26,667 ∗ ($4.67 − $2.00) = $71,201, with industry
net revenue being 2 ∗ $71,201 = $142,402. 236
As noted in the text of the Article, the shareholders of each firm, even
without common ownership, would be better off if the managers of all the
industry’s firms further constrained their respective individual-firm output
decisions such that, in the aggregate, they equaled the monopoly output level. In
that scenario, industry profits would be $160,000. That could be achieved, for
example, if both firms evenly split the monopoly output level of 40,000 widgets, with
each producing just 20,000 instead of 26,667. Then, with the price of widgets at $6,
each firm’s net revenue would be $80,000 instead of $71,201. This, however,
will not happen. The reason is that each firm, in seeking to maximize its own net
revenues, has an incentive to exploit the other firm’s decision to produce at low
levels by itself producing more than the specified production of 20,000 units.
Consider this first from the point of view Firm A. For 20,000 widgets to be
an equilibrium level of output for Firm A, it must be the output decision that
maximizes its net revenues, given that Firm B is producing 20,000 units. This is
not the case: an output decision of 20,000 is not Firm A’s best response to Firm
B producing 20,000 units. This can be seen from Figure 1, which shows that if
Firm B produces 20,000 widgets, then the output decision that maximizes Firm
A’s net revenues is 30,000 widgets, not 20,000 widgets. If Firm A were to
produce 30,000 units when Firm B produced 20,000 units, then the price would
equal 𝑃 = $10 − 50,000/10,000 = $5. With the cost of each unit being $2,
Firm A would generate net revenues of 30,000 ∗ ($5 − $2) = $90,000, which
is higher than the $80,000 net revenue associated with Firm A producing 20,000
units when Firm B produces 20,000 units.
235F

236F

237F

234.
That is because each firm’s best response function, by construction, provides that firm’s net
revenue maximizing output decision, holding fixed the output of the other firm. If 𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 are net
revenue maximizing choices for each firm, given the output of the other firm, then it must be that for Firm
A, 𝑄𝐴 is a best response to 𝑄𝐵 , and for Firm B, 𝑄𝐵 is a best response to 𝑄𝐴 . In other words, 𝑄𝐴 and 𝑄𝐵 are
on both firms’ best response functions and therefore at their intersection.
235.
Specifically, because 𝑄𝐴 = 80,000/3 and 𝑄𝐵 = 80,000/3, see supra note 233, industry
output equals 2 ∗ (80,000/3), or 55,333.
236.
We round all calculations. In this example, the market price is 14/3 and each firm’s
production is 80,000/3. We round these values to 4.67 and 26,667, which yield the provided net revenue
value of $71,201. Each firm’s net revenues using the unrounded values for the market price and each
firm’s production is
80,000/3 ∗ ($14/3 − $2) = 80,000/3 ∗ ($14 − $6)/3 = $640,000/9 =
$71,111.

222

Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?
In other words, if Firm B restricts itself to producing only 20,000 widgets,
then that will translate into a relatively high market price. It is in Firm A’s selfinterest to exploit that higher market price by itself expanding production beyond
20,000 widgets. This opportunistic incentive is not limited to Firm A. 237 This can
be seen in Figure 2, which also plots the joint-monopoly outcome where each
firm restricts output by producing just 20,000 units. As shown there, that quantity
combination is not on either firm’s best response function and, instead, each firm
has an incentive to produce more than 20,000 widgets. 238 Further, as also shown
in that figure, any output combination in which the firms produce less than the
expected Cournot output level of production cannot be a sustained outcome
because each firm would have an incentive to produce more than the specified
amount. 239
238F

239F

240F

B. The Example of a Modified Cournot Model for an Oligopolistic Industry with
Managers as Agents for a Firm’s Hypothetical Blended Shareholder
As in the first example, the widget industry consists of two firms, Firm A
and Firm B, with an industry demand curve for widgets reflected by 𝑃 = $10 −
𝑄/10,000, and where each firm has identical costs, with marginal cost (𝑀𝐶)
equal to $2 per additional unit, whatever its level of production.
As noted in the text, the difference in the industry from the example above
is that the two firms have a certain amount of common ownership. Assume that
Firms A and B each have 1,000,000 shares outstanding, and three investors each
hold 70,000 shares of A and 70,000 shares of B. Assume that for each firm the
remaining shares are held by non-common owners. At this distribution of
ownership, the hypothetical blended shareholder of Firm A owns 0.21 shares of
Firm B for every share of Firm A they own. We will analyze this situation in
accordance with our formulation of the modified Cournot model used in the
common ownership literature, whereby a firm’s managers, in making their output
decision, are assumed to maximize the wealth of this hypothetical blended
shareholder. The managers of Firm B are assumed to do the mirror image of this.
Note that the managers’ decision rule can be restated in terms of net revenue
maximization, consistent with the discussion above. In particular, Firm A’s
managers choose the output of Firm A that maximizes the sum of Firm A’s net

237.
By parallel reasoning, if Firm A produces just 20,000 widgets, then Firm B has an incentive
to take advantage of the associated higher price by itself producing more than 20,000 widgets, because
that output choice, holding fixed Firm A’s output choice of 20,000, will allow Firm B to earn higher net
revenue than if it produced just 20,000 units.
238.
In game-theoretic terms, it is not a Nash equilibrium for firm managers to split the
monopoly outcome.
239.
As shown in Figure 2, for any such output combination, each firm’s best response to its
rival’s output is to produce more than the specified output.

223

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 39:101 2022

revenue and 21% of the net revenue of Firm B, taking as fixed the output decision
of Firm B. 240 Firm B’s managers proceed analogously.
Recall that we label as 𝑂𝐹𝑁 (other firm negative effect) the negative effect
on the value of the blended shareholder’s portfolio arising from the extra unit of
output’s impact on the net revenues of the other firms in the industry whose
shares the blender shareholder holds. This means the managers of the firm in
question will set its level of output such that the gain in its own revenues from
producing an extra unit, its 𝑀𝑅, equals the marginal cost of producing this extra
unit, its 𝑀𝐶, plus this other negative effect, 𝑂𝐹𝑁. In other words, it will choose
the level of output where 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 rather than where 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. Thus,
this amplified downside will lead the firm to choose a different point in the
tradeoff between having an extra unit to sell and that extra unit’s depressing
effect on price. Since 𝑀𝑅 decreases with each additional unit of output, the
output level at which 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 will be below the output level at which
𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. 241
Let 𝑞𝐴 ′ and 𝑞𝐵 ′ represent production amounts for Firm A and B,
respectively. In this market environment, for a given level of Firm B’s output,
𝑞𝐵 ′, Firm A will choose its output, 𝑞𝐴 ′, such that its decision maximizes the sum
of its net revenue and 21% of the net revenue of Firm B. Each extra unit by Firm
A, because it adds a unit to the total industry output of 𝑄, reduces the price at
which Firm B can sell each unit of its output by $(1/10,000), 242 and thus reduces
Firm B’s net revenue by $(1/10,000) ∗ 𝑞𝐵 ′. Given that Firm A’s objective is to
maximize the welfare of the blended shareholder, the managers of Firm A only
weigh its output decision’s impact on the net revenues of Firm B to the extent of
.21, or 21%, relative to the decision’s impact on the net revenues of Firm A.
Accordingly, letting 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 reflect Firm A’s 𝑂𝐹𝑁, then 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 = .21 ∗ (𝑞𝐵 ′ ∗
1/10,000).
Based on our assumptions concerning the industry demand curve for
widgets and concerning each firm’s costs, given any particular output level of
Firm B, that is, 𝑞𝐵 ′, it can be shown that the output level of Firm A that meets
the modified objective of maximizing the sum of Firm A’s net revenues plus
21% of Firm B’s net revenues can be calculated by setting 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 40,000 −
.605 ∗ 𝑞𝐵 ′. 243 In other words, this expression depicts Firm A’s best response
241F

24F

243F

24F

240.
The only way that Firm A’s output decision for a given period affects Firms A and B, and
hence the value of Firm A shares and Firm B shares, is through its effects on these firms’ respective costs
and revenues in that period. Dollar for dollar, on a per-share basis, the greater the net revenues, the greater
the addition to share value.
241.
A curve representing 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 for each possible level of output will be higher at all
output levels than a curve representing just 𝑀𝐶. Thus, the 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁 curve will intersect the firm’s
downward sloping 𝑀𝑅 curve at a lower level of output than does the 𝑀𝐶 curve.
242.
This can be seen from the demand curve, 𝑃 = $10 − 𝑄/10,000. Thus, 𝑑𝑃/𝑑𝑄 =
−1/10,000, that is, the price goes down by $1/10,000 for each additional unit supplied to the market by
the industry.
243.
As discussed in the text, to maximize the sum of Firm A’s net revenues plus 21% of Firm
B’s net revenues, Firm A chooses the output level such that 𝑀𝑅𝐴 = 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 , where 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 is 21% of
the negative effect of an extra unit of Firm A’s output on Firm B’s net revenues. The first step is to
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function, given the modified objective. It can similarly be shown that Firm B’s
best response function is given by the equation: 𝑞𝐵 ′ = 40,000 − .605 ∗ 𝑞𝐴 ′.
The solid line in Figure 3 below depicts Firm A’s best response function
under the blended-shareholder assumption. For comparison, the dashed line
depicts Firm A’s best response function under the standard Cournot model,
where the managers of Firm A are assumed to maximize Firm A’s net revenue
alone.
Figure 3 highlights a fundamental implication of the blended-shareholder
assumption that drives the theoretical conclusion in the common ownership
literature that common ownership reduces managerial incentives to compete: for
any non-zero level of Firm B’s output, Firm A’s optimal decision is to produce
less under the blended-shareholder assumption than under the standard Cournot
model. For instance, if Firm B produces 40,000, then, as shown in Figure 3, Firm
A’s optimal decision under the blended-shareholder assumption in the common
ownership literature has Firm A producing 15,800 units. By contrast, Firm A
would produce 20,000 units if instead Firm A’s managers sought, as in the
standard Cournot model, to maximize solely Firm A’s net revenues. 244
245F

calculate 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 . As noted in the text, 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 = .21 ∗ (𝑞𝐵 ′ ∗ 1/10,000). Earlier, we calculated 𝑀𝑅𝐴 , which
equals 10 − 2𝑞𝐴 /10,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /10,000. See supra note 231. We have assumed that 𝑀𝐶 = $2. So,
choosing the level of output whereby 𝑀𝑅𝐴 = 𝑀𝐶 + 𝑂𝐹𝑁𝐴 means choosing the level at which 10 −
2𝑞𝐴 /10,000 − 𝑞𝐵 /10,000 = 2 + .21 ∗ 1/10,000 ∗ 𝑞𝐵 ′. Solving this equation for 𝑞𝐴 ′ shows that 𝑞𝐴 ′ =
40,000 − .605𝑞𝐵 ′, which is thus Firm A’s best response function. By parallel reasoning, 𝑞𝐵 ′ = 40,000 −
.605𝑞𝐴 ′, which is Firm B’s best response function.
244.
Recall that in this modified Cournot model example, where the managers of Firm A seek
to maximize the sum of Firm A’s net revenues and some portion of Firm B’s net revenues, 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 40,000 −
.605𝑞𝐵 ′. See id. So, if 𝑞𝐵 ′ = 40,000, then 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 40,000 − .605 ∗ 40,000 = 15,800. In contrast, in the
standard Cournot model, where Firm A seeks to maximize solely its own net revenues, 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 40,000 −
𝑞𝐵 ′/2. See supra note 231. So, if 𝑞𝐵 = 40,000, 𝑞𝐴 = 40,000 − 40,000/2 = 20,000.
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Figure 3: Best Response Function for Firm A Under Both the BlendedShareholder Assumption and the Standard Cournot Assumption
𝑞𝐴

40,000

20,000
15,800

80,000 𝑞
𝐵
This figure depicts Firm A’s best response function under the blendedshareholder assumption (dark line) and Firm A’s best response
function under the standard Cournot assumption that firm managers
seek to maximize their own firm’s net revenues (dashed line). The
figure shows that, for any non-zero amount of Firm B’s production
(𝑞𝐵 ), Firm A’s optimal decision is to produce less under the blendedshareholder assumption than under the Cournot assumption.
40,000

66,116

As in the standard Cournot model, the equilibrium output quantities for the
two firms will be at the intersection of these modified best response functions.
Denote the expected equilibrium output quantities for the two firms as 𝑄𝐴 ′ and
𝑄𝐵 ′, respectively. Given the firms’ best response functions, it can be shown that
𝑄𝐴 ′ = 𝑄𝐵 ′ = 24,921. 245
246F

245.
This is derived from the two best response functions, 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 40,000 − .605𝑞𝐵 ′ and 𝑞𝐵 ′ =
40,000 − .605𝑞𝐴 ′. Accordingly, 𝑄𝐴 ′ is the value of 𝑞𝐴 ′ that satisfies: 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 40,000 − .605 ∗ (40,000 −
.605𝑞𝐴′ ). Rearranging, 𝑞𝐴 ′ = 15,800 + .366𝑞𝐴 ′. So, . 634𝑞𝐴 ′ = 15,800, and therefore 𝑄𝐴 ′ = 15,800/
.634 = 24,921. 𝑄𝐵 ′ can be shown by parallel calculations to also equal 24,921.
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Figure 4: Firms’ Best Response Functions and Optimal Output Decisions
Under Both the Blended-Shareholder Assumption and the Standard Cournot
Assumption
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This figure depicts Firm A and Firm B’s best response functions under
the blended-shareholder assumption (dark lines) and their best
response functions under the standard Cournot assumption that firm
managers seek to maximize their own firm’s net revenues (dashed
lines). The two firms’ equilibrium output levels under either
assumption lie at the intersection of their best response functions
associated with the imposed assumption.
Figure 4 above provides the analysis graphically. The figure depicts the two
firms’ best response functions under the blended-shareholder assumption (the
dark lines) and the standard Cournot assumption that firm managers seek to
maximize own-firm net revenues (the dashed lines). The equilibrium under the
blended-shareholder assumption and the equilibrium under the standard Cournot
assumption occur at the intersection of the respective best response functions. As
shown in Figure 4, both firms produce less under the blended-shareholder
assumption than under the standard Cournot assumption.
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